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The aim of this dissertation is to provide an analysis of central concepts in phi-
losophy of science from the perspective of current molecular and developmental
research. Each chapter explores the ways in which particular phenomena or
discoveries in molecular biology influences our philosophical understanding of
the nature of scientific knowledge. The introductory prologue draws some
general connections between the various threads, which revolve around two
central themes: causation and explanation. Chapter Two identifies a par-
ticular type of causal relation which is widespread across the sciences, but
cannot be straightforwardly accommodated by extant accounts of causation
and causal explanation. Chapter Three explores how the form of redundant
causality identified in the previous chapter plays an important role in causal
explanation, by making the effect stable and robust. Chapter Four offers a
novel perspective on the debate over biological reductionism by distinguishing
between different paradigms of molecular explanation. Chapter Five provides
a philosophical analysis of the so-called “Developmental Synthesis” of evolu-
tionary and developmental biology, and suggests a general account of scientific
unification grounded in the notion of explanatory relevance. Chapter Six of-
fers an account of dispositional properties inspired by mechanisms of gene
regulation, according to which dispositions are not properties of entities, but
properties that describe the behavior of abstract idealized models. Finally,
Chapter Seven scrutinizes the concept of the molecular ecosystem, a metaphor
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The study of the biochemical processes underlying organismic development
has progressed immensely since the second half of the 20th century, providing
us with momentous findings, such as the structure of DNA, the mechanisms of
gene regulation, and the fact that organisms and species, which are phenotyp-
ically very different and distant from a phylogenetic perspective, develop in
surprisingly analogous ways. While philosophy has traditionally been subtly
responsive to discoveries in the natural sciences, the philosophical impact of
molecular biology has been limited, especially when compared to other areas
1
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of science, such as physics and evolutionary theory.
Molecular mechanisms are often depicted as rigid, self-regulated, determin-
istic gears, where every little piece has its specific and independent role that is
unaffected by the cellular and environmental context in which it is embedded.
This picture, however, is highly misleading. To paraphrase a humorous anal-
ogy from molecular biologist Susan Lindquist, while protein interactions are
typically depicted as dancers individually performing in a spacious ballroom,
a more accurate representation would be the famous “stateroom scene” from
the Marx Brothers movie A Night at the Opera, where virtually every action
and reaction is heavily constrained by the surrounding environment.
The aim of this work is to uncover some of the philosophical insights that
appear as soon as we replace the simplistic view of molecular interactions oc-
curring in a void with a more complex and realistic picture. I begin, in Chapter
Two, by focusing on the causal processes underlying gene regulation in bac-
teria, which require a sophisticated interaction between proteins and operator
sites that is affected by features of the context, such as the concentration of re-
actants within the entire system. Once we move away from simple—relatively
speaking—bacterial cells and consider gene regulation in eukaryotes such as
the fruit fly Drosophila (Chapter Three), the scenario becomes even more
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complex. The morphological and morphogenetic paradigms of explanation in-
troduced in Chapter Four illustrate how the geometry of the system in which
molecules diffuse and interact affects patterns of variation. Attention to the
complexities of molecular interactions, and to how these processes can be ef-
fectively explained, sheds light on traditional philosophical problems, such as
reductionism (Chapter Four), the unity of science (Chapter Five), dispositional
properties (Chapter Six), and the coevolution of organisms and environment
(Chapter Seven). Indeed, all these examples emphasize the pitfalls that stem
from an overly narrow view of development, which overlooks the complexi-
ties of the structure of molecules and of the system in which they diffuse and
interact.
This introduction provides a synopsis of the chapters that follow, and draws
some general connections between the various threads of discussion, which re-
volve around two central themes: causation and explanation. Although each
chapter is self-contained and can be read independently of the others, they all
further a collective goal, that of providing an analysis of traditional philoso-
phy of science from the perspective of current molecular and developmental
research in biology. Each of the following chapters explores the ways in which
particular biological discoveries influence our philosophical understanding of
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the nature of scientific knowledge, suggesting some refinements and extensions
of some central concepts in the philosophy of science (which were originally
developed with respect to physics) in order to make them applicable to the
special sciences as well.
1.2 The Causal Relevance of Aggregate Entities
Contemporary scientific practice routinely treats high-level, aggregate proper-
ties as “causally relevant.” Examples are widespread throughout the natural
and social sciences: physicists talk about the increase in pressure of a gas
causing a container to explode, ecologists mention the density of foxes in an
ecosystem as a cause of fluctuations in the local population of rabbits, and
economists explain the increase in the price of stocks as caused by high de-
mand. A similar tendency can also be witnessed in the arts, for instance, in
the explanation of the visual effects of pointillism—the technique of painting
by applying tiny distinct dots of pure color on a canvas. This appeal to the
causal relevance of aggregates, however, is especially evident in domains such
as chemistry and molecular biology, where the occurrence of a certain reac-
tion, or the rate at which a reaction takes place, are typically explained by
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mentioning the concentration of the various reactants.1
Chapter Two examines a class of biological examples where this tendency
has particularly striking effects: these are cases involving the activity of ge-
netic switches, the molecular mechanisms that determine whether and in what
quantity the coding region of a gene is transcribed into protein within a cell.
Genetic switches are extremely sophisticated from a biochemical perspective,
but their general structure and mode of operation is rather simple and intu-
itive. The regulatory region of genes contains stretches of DNA—called “op-
erator sites,” or, more simply, “operators”—that are bound by proteins called
“transcription factors.” Depending on the type of transcription factor that
binds to the operators controlling a particular gene, the gene can either be
expressed (i.e. transcribed into protein), or silenced. The concentration of
transcription factor in the entire system plays a crucial role in the process be-
cause it governs the probability that, once a particular molecule gets knocked
off the operator, an event that typically happens many times per second, the
DNA site will be filled by a transcription factor of the same kind. The dispo-
sition to regard the concentration of repressor in a cell as causally relevant is
1In this context, “concentration of x” simply refers to the quantity of a certain element
x within a specified volume; for example, the number of x-molecules per unit volume inside
a cell.
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reflected by the phrase—commonly encountered in both technical and popular
literature—that the transcription (or repression) of the gene is caused by the
high (or low) concentration of a certain molecule within the system.
While the claim that concentrations can have causal powers is clear and
intuitive, upon further scrutiny it appears to be in tension with other com-
mon intuitions about causation and is deeply puzzling from a philosophical
perspective. This is because, in a typical chemical reaction, only a subset of
molecules will be actively involved in the transformations that constitute the
reaction; only a tiny fraction of the entities in a concentration are causally
active, at any given time. This aspect is particularly striking in the example
just described, since only a handful (out of a huge number of molecules) are
causally active, at once. But how can an entity or property have causal in-
fluence on an effect when most of its components are causally inert? Is the
causal relevance of concentrations just loose talk? I argue that it is not. First,
note that statements attributing causal powers to concentrations and other
aggregates are found not just in elementary textbooks or popularizations of
science, but also in technical articles published in specialized journals. More
importantly, concentrations play a counterfactual-supporting role: the state
of the gene—whether it is active or repressed—depends on the concentration
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of repressor in the system, and counterfactual support, it is generally agreed,
is sufficient to attribute causal relevance to a property or entity, once all the
relevant variables are specified.
Once we recognize the causal relevance of concentrations, the next step is
to provide an analysis thereof. So-called “difference-making” theories of causa-
tion, which treat causes as factors making a difference to their effects, recognize
the causal power of aggregates. Yet, the extant apparatus fails to discrimi-
nate between the influence of concentrations and other forms of redundant
causation. Thus, I suggest that we integrate difference-making theories with
a new concept that captures the causal relevance of aggregate properties—the
concept of causation by concentration, which I define as a causal relation that
is multiply-realizable, probabilistic, and “quantitatively” redundant, since the
effect is triggered by changes in the concentration of actual or potential causes.
1.3 Redundant Causality and
Robustness of Explanation
The theoretical significance of genetic switches in biology can hardly be
overstated. These sophisticated pieces of cytological machinery lie at the very
heart of cellular differentiation. For instance, the selective activation of genes
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explains why various parts of an organism are so different, despite the fact that
virtually every cell constituting it has exactly the same genes.2 This shows
that the example presented and discussed in Chapter Two is a paradigm of
an extremely important style of molecular-developmental explanation. Set-
ting their biological significance aside, genetic switches also raise philosophical
issues regarding the role of redundancy in causation and causal explanation.
Redundant causality, which occurs when multiple independent events con-
stitute sufficient causes for the same effect, comes in two variants. Cases of
overdetermination are symmetric, in the sense that all candidate causes have
an equal claim to be called causes of the effect. Cases of preemption, in con-
trast, are asymmetric, in the sense that candidate causes are not on a par:
there is a preempting cause that actually brings about the effect, and a pre-
empted backup cause that would have brought about the effect, had the former
cause been absent. Causation by concentration instantiates the structure of
preemption: the molecules that actually bind to the operators are the pre-
empting causes, while all the backup molecules that are in the neighborhood
of the switch are redundant, preempted backups. While the presence of re-
dundant causes is typically viewed as a challenge for theories of causation (as
2I say “virtually” because there are some notable exceptions—such as red blood cells,
that do not contain any DNA—but, for present purposes, we can set these exceptions aside.
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in the famous “backup assassin” scenarios), in cases of causation by concen-
tration preemption plays an important role, stabilizing the effect and making
it counterfactually robust and highly probable.
The connection between redundancy and robustness is of old vintage: it was
explicitly noted and discussed over three decades ago by Alan Garfinkel, who
introduced the classic example of fluctuations in the populations of rabbits and
foxes inhabiting a field. Garfinkel persuasively argues that population-level ex-
planations cannot be eliminated and replaced by microexplanations that only
mention interactions between individual organisms, because the former are
more perspicuous—in the sense that they omit unnecessary details—and sta-
ble, since they tell us not just what, in fact, happened, but also what would
have happened under relevantly similar circumstances. These considerations
regarding explanation can be straightforwardly applied to causation: can we
reduce all causes to actual interactions? The discussion in Chapter Two sug-
gested a negative answer: at least some aggregative forms of causation cannot
be reduced to actual interactions between their components. Chapter Three
develops this argument in greater detail. By presenting an abstract model of a
genetic switch, the first part of the chapter examines the plausibility of a form
of causal actualism, according to which all and only causal relations are actual
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physical interactions. I argue that this assumption comes at a cost: reducing
the causal structure of the system to actual physical interactions renders pro-
cesses such as gene expression random and improbable, since organisms have
no control over which molecules bind to operator sites, while they do control,
quite precisely, the amount of transcribed protein. The upshot is that not
all causes of gene expression occur at the level of actual interactions between
individual molecules; some causally relevant factors act at a higher level, the
level of protein concentration.
The emphasis on sequences of binding events highlights another impor-
tant feature of causal relations: causes and effects are often not instantaneous
events, but rather enduring processes. The second part of the chapter focuses
on the role of processes in causal explanation. In providing causal explana-
tions, there is a widespread tendency to leave out events that occur between
the cause and the effect. The reason for this omission is not that these interme-
diary events do not contribute to the effect. Rather, the reason is that causal
explanations generally mention only actual difference makers, and omit poten-
tial difference makers, an important distinction that I borrow from the work of
Ken Waters. Events or processes that occur between causes and effects tend to
be potential difference makers, and are thus generally omitted. There are, how-
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ever, some interesting exceptions. As I show by discussing the segmentation of
the early Drosophila larva, the processes by which molecules diffuse can play
an actual difference-making role in causal explanations. This observation has
important implications concerning the philosophy of causation. The notions
of process and activity—presently conceived within the actualist framework
that, as said, attempts to reduce causal relations to actual interactions—are
too narrow to capture this important actual difference-making role. The com-
plexity of biological systems requires an account of causation that incorporates
the stabilizing role of causal redundancy, captured by difference-making ap-
proaches to causation, with a process-based or mechanistic perspective. What
is required, in other words, is the development of a precise concept of redun-
dant causal process, a causal process that encompasses both preempting and
preempted causes.
1.4 Molecular Explanations
In Chapter Four, the focus of the discussion shifts from causation to expla-
nation. While philosophers typically refer to the characteristic kind of ex-
planation found in genetics and molecular biology as “mechanistic” or “causal
mechanical,” they generally fail to distinguish between different types of ex-
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planation. The aim of this chapter is to identify three paradigms of molecular
explanation—which I call “genetic,” “morphological,” and “morphogenetic”—
and examine their nature, form, and characteristic features.
In genetic explanations, the difference makers of the explanandum occur
at the biochemical level, broadly construed, so as to include functional and
dispositional properties of genes and molecules. To illustrate, consider the
occurrence of sickle-cell anemia in human beings who are homozygous for the
sickling allele. Sickle-cell anemia has a purely molecular difference-maker, in
the sense that a single mutation in a single gene will trigger the disease in
an otherwise healthy organism. To be sure, the genetic explanans does not
necessarily, or even commonly, capture all causes and effects of the disease; the
mutation, by itself, is not sufficient to trigger the disease in the absence of the
whole developmental apparatus. The point is that the mutated hemoglobin
gene, when homozygous, is the triggering factor that produces the sickling of
the erythrocytes, if the organism is exposed to low oxygen conditions. In gen-
eral, when biochemical properties determine the occurrence of an event against
a set of relatively stable background conditions, the resulting explanation can
abstract away from other causes and effects.
Clearly, not all biological events can be subsumed under a genetic explana-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 13
tion. To wit, in order to capture why leopard coats are spotted, while zebras
are striped, the details of the pigment-producing molecules will not take us
very far. This is because leopard and zebras, like most mammals, employ
the same kind of cells to pigment their coats; specific differences in the struc-
ture and function of melanocytes across species do not explain differences in
pattern. By developing a Turing-style reaction-diffusion model, J.D. Mur-
ray persuasively shows that the features that are principally responsible for
such differences are the size and shape of the system in which these molecules
diffuse. In general, when the difference-making factors occur at the level of
variation in geometrical parameters, the event can be subsumed under what I
call a morphological explanation. Genetic and morphological explanations lie
at the opposite side of the spectrum: in one case, genes and gene products do
all the explanatory work; in the other, the explanation is delivered by prop-
erties of the entire system in which the molecules diffuse. In this latter kind
of explanation, biochemical details, beyond basic dispositional properties of
reactants, are neither necessary nor relevant; they only muddy the waters.
Genetic and morphological explanations, however, are not mutually ex-
clusive. Indeed, the paradigmatic explanatory model in current molecular-
developmental biology is what I call a morphogenetic explanation, where bio-
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chemical details are brought together in a morphogenetic field to account for
the formation of a trait. To illustrate, let us return to the segmentation of
the Drosophila larva along the anteroposterior axis. As in Murray’s coat pat-
terning example, rates of diffusion and the geometry of the system play a
fundamental role in segment specification. Yet, while a relatively abstract
mathematical model is sufficient to capture differences in coat patterns across
mammals, explaining segmentation also requires a specification of biochemical
details because the identity and structure of genes and macromolecules make a
difference to the outcome. The crucial difference with genetic explanations is
that, while the structure of the hemoglobin gene is sufficient to determine the
sickling of the erythrocytes in an otherwise physiologically “normal” individ-
ual, the variable parameters that control the fate of each nucleus also include
the spatial organization of the embryo. In short, morphogenetic explanations
require a combination of biochemical and geometrical properties.
The individuation of these explanatory paradigms is important for assess-
ing broad philosophical stances, such as reductionism. Succinctly put, reduc-
tionists maintain that molecular biology can explain all biological events in
terms of genes and macromolecules alone, while antireductionists reply that
some events must be explained at a higher level. The debate thus crucially
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hinges on establishing the range of phenomena that can be described and
explained in purely molecular terms. Distinguishing between various kinds
of molecular explanation reveals how ambiguous and difficult it is to artic-
ulate the extension of a “purely molecular language.” Genetic explanations
constantly appeal to dispositional properties (e.g. flexibility, elasticity) and
other functional terms, such as “transcription factor,” which are extremely
hard to define in structural terms. And once we focus on morphological and
morphogenetic models, the need for enriching a strictly biochemical language
becomes only more evident. So, who wins, the reductionist or the antire-
ductionist? Some readers might view my discussion as a vindication of the
reductionist framework; others might interpret my emphasis on spatial and
geometrical properties as a form of “soft” antireductionism. In a sense, both
parties are right. The forms of explanation isolated here are inconsistent with
both a radical reduction of all biology to the molecular level, and an overar-
ching holism. Once we set these views aside, however, it becomes clear that
modest reductionism substantially overlaps with sophisticated antireduction-
ism, suggesting that the opposition depends more on terminological quibbling
than metaphysical or methodological disagreement. The moral that we ought
to draw is that “reductionism” and “antireductionism,” as currently intended,
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are too coarse-grained and ambiguous to effectively classify biological expla-
nations.
1.5 The Unity of Science
Chapter Five explores some characteristic features of biological explanations
to shed light on another classic debate in the philosophy of science: the unity
of science. Philosophers have traditionally addressed the question of theory
unification in terms of theoretical reduction: two theories are said to be unified
when one is reduced to the other, or both are subsumed under a broader,
more general theory. However, given that successful reductions are notoriously
hard to find in the biological sciences, one can legitimately question whether
theoretical reduction is the right framework to assess real or alleged cases
of unifications in this domain, such as the Modern Synthesis of genetics and
evolution or the more recent integration of developmental biology into the
evolutionary framework.
The emergence of the philosophy of the special sciences as an independent
field of study has encouraged the development of non-reductive models of uni-
fication, which allow for areas of science to be synthesized without thereby
being reduced or eliminated. While these models constitute an advancement
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over traditional reductive accounts, fundamental issues remain unresolved. In
general, while extant unity-as-interconnection models provide an accurate de-
scription of the main kinds of intertheoretic relations, they fail to explain why
unification is (or should be) an explicit goal of scientific research. As philoso-
phers of science, we should not rest content with a description of how the
integration of scientific knowledge is sometimes obtained; we should also be
interested in understanding why unification is an important scientific endeavor.
In an attempt to examine the process of unification in the biological sci-
ences, I consider a paradigmatic case: the so-called Developmental Synthesis
that over the past few decades has attempted to bridge the methodological
and theoretical gap that has separated development and evolution since the
beginning of the 20th century. What do researchers mean when they claim
that a reunification of developmental and evolutionary biology is currently in
progress, and what evidence do we have in support of this claim? Many ad-
vocates of evo devo maintain that the Developmental Synthesis consists in an
attempt to close the explanatory gap that was left open by founders of the
Modern Synthesis, by addressing the fundamental issue that was set aside: the
nature and structure of the mechanisms of variation. While the discovery of
the molecular mechanisms of ontogeny is a remarkable scientific achievement,
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I contend that it falls short of motivating claims of ongoing “unification” of
evolutionary and developmental studies. By focusing on some of the scien-
tific breakthroughs underlying the emergence of evo devo, I argue that the
unification of the two is motivated by the necessity of developing a shared
explanatory basis that borrows a set of concepts and tools from both disci-
plines. The discovery that organisms such as flies, humans, and elephants,
which are phenotypically very diverse and loosely related from a phylogenetic
perspective, develop in remarkably analogous ways—a fact known as “molecu-
lar parsimony”—opened up evolutionary questions that could not be addressed
with the concepts and methodology of standard evolutionary theory and, at
the same time, emphasized the importance of embedding developmental pro-
cesses within an evolutionary framework.
These considerations suggest that what underlies the ongoing synthesis of
development and evolution is their mutual explanatory relevance: developmen-
tal concepts figure into evolutionary explanations, and developmental explana-
tions must be embedded within an evolutionary framework. These claims can
be generalized into a general criterion for scientific unification: Two scientific
fields are in the process of being unified when they are mutually explanatorily
relevant, i.e., when theoretical and experimental results in one are necessary
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for raising questions and providing explanations in the other. This criterion
fulfills two important desiderata of a general philosophical account of scien-
tific explanation. First, it motivates the significance of unification for scientific
progress; second, it provides a relatively precise condition for establishing when
two fields are in the process of being unified. This notion of unity is what lies
at the core of interdisciplinarity, a term that is widely employed, but seldom
framed precisely.
1.6 Dispositional Properties
Dispositional properties are manifested by objects in particular conditions. For
example, the attribution of solubility to salt and of fragility to glass captures
the fact that salt typically dissolves when placed in water and glass tends to
shatter when struck with sufficient force. Dispositions are everywhere: they
are commonly employed in everyday discourse and they play a role in every
field of knowledge, such as the natural and social sciences, the arts and, of
course, philosophy. In spite of their ubiquity, the task of providing a truth-
conditional analysis of dispositions and an explanation of why a particular
entity manifests a certain behavior under particular circumstances has proven
to be a daunting task. The aim of Chapter Six is to spell out a general account
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of dispositions inspired by the study of mechanisms of gene regulation.
The most straightforward analysis of dispositions is in terms of subjunctive
conditionals: an entity x is disposed to D under conditions C if and only if
x would D if it were the case that C. Thus, for example, to say that salt is
soluble is to say it would dissolve if it were placed in water. This simple con-
ditional analysis (SCA), originally suggested by Carnap, has been endorsed
by a number of eminent philosophers, such as Ryle, Goodman, Quine, and
Mackie. Yet, there is now a widespread consensus that this analysis is fatally
flawed, because the connection between dispositions and entailed conditionals
breaks down in cases where objects temporarily loose or acquire dispositions
(“finkish dispositions”) or when the manifestation of a disposition is “masked”
or “mimicked.” Upon further reflection, this is hardly surprising: after all, we
are all familiar with cases of salt failing to dissolve, when placed in saturated
water. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that dispositions are not
captured by conditionals, but rather by regularities: salt is soluble if it dis-
solves in water most of the time. There is, however, a problem that should not
go unnoticed: dispositions are often attributed to entities when the manifesta-
tion of the disposition is the exception, rather than the rule. Already Aristotle
observed that acorns have a disposition to grow into oaks when planted in soil,
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 21
even though most acorns simply rot. The effect, however, is particularly strik-
ing in cases where the connection between disposition and regularity cannot
be reinstated by refining the stimulus condition. Consider, for example, the
disposition of a gene to be transcribed as RNA. Due to the presence of mech-
anisms of regulation and repression, most genes are silenced, not transcribed,
and it is surprisingly hard to generate suitable regularities that capture this
tendency. We are thus left with the question of what grounds our ascription
of dispositions, given that these attributions cannot be reduced to (more or
less sophisticated) subjunctive conditionals, or to regularities in nature.
The aim of this chapter is to offer a solution to this problem. I contend
that dispositional properties are, in fact, grounded in lawlike regularities, and
can thus be analyzed in terms of subjunctive conditionals, but these regular-
ities are not actual. On the deflationary account offered here, dispositions
capture the behavior of abstract models, but are not properties of entities, an
assumption that is often taken for granted, but seldom backed up by philo-
sophical argument. To illustrate, consider common textbook diagrams of gene
expression. The ascription of the disposition to be transcribed indicates that,
when the conditions in a cell suitably resemble the idealized conditions for
gene expression captured by the model, genes are transcribed. It should be
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noted, though, that these conditions are never instantiated in real cells, which
are much more complex than the simplified diagrams found in textbooks. This
is because the goal of these diagrams is not to accurately describe the cytolog-
ical environment, but rather to explain how certain mechanisms and processes
take place. Distinguishing between the goals of explanation and description
resolves the tension between dispositions and regularities. Since genes are reg-
ularly transcribed in these abstract models, the disposition can be analyzed as
a subjunctive conditional. However, it follows that the legitimate bearers of
dispositional properties are not real entities such as genes, but rather the class
of models in which the behavior captured by the conditional occurs without
exceptions.
My simulacrum account of dispositions—which is not restricted to scientific
posits, such as genes, atoms, or molecules, but can also be applied to ordinary
objects like salt or glass—has three general payoffs. First, it preserves the
SCA, which provides the simplest, clearest, and, in my opinion, most intuitive
analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between
dispositions and regularities, in spite of the fact that some regularities do not
hold in the actual world. Third, it provides a unified framework for analyzing
and explaining dispositions. I should note that the burden is now shifted from
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analysis to explanation. Yet, while the present account does not specify the
conditions under which disposition attributions are pragmatically assertible,
it advances the discussion by subsuming many of the difficulties surrounding
dispositions to a much more general problem: the nature of the model-world
similarity relation.
1.7 Molecular Ecosystems
Biologists often employ a suggestive metaphor to describe the complexities
of molecular interactions within cells and embryos: individual molecules and
macromolecular complexes are said to be part of ecosystems that integrate
them in a complex network of relations with many other entities. The prac-
tice of employing ecological concepts to describe cytological interactions has a
long history that traces all the way back to the end of the 19th century, when
early embryologists used to refer to groups of cells whose position and fate
are specified with respect to the same sets of boundaries as “morphogenetic
fields,” “fields or organization,” or “cellular ecosystems.” Since the rediscovery
of embryology and developmental biology and their reintegration with genet-
ics and evolution in the second half of the 20th century (see Chapter Five),
these concepts have been revived in contemporary biological practice. Yet, the
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extent to which the molecular microcosm resembles the ecological macrocosm
is a question that has seldom been addressed explicitly. The aim of the final
chapter of this dissertation is to explore structural parallels between ecological
environments and cellular modules metaphorically called “ecosystems.”
Ecologists typically define ecosystems as communities of organisms to-
gether with their physical environment. In other words, ecosystems are con-
stituted by the totality of biotic elements enclosed within a spatial region,
together with the abiotic physical components of the area, such as air, soil,
water, and sunlight. Despite the intuitive appeal of this general definition,
from a philosophical perspective, the ecosystem is one of the most elusive bi-
ological concepts and one of the hardest to analyze. Consequently, instead of
providing a precise definition of the molecular ecosystem, I focus on some of
the criteria that ecologists employ to characterize ecological units, and em-
phasize some striking analogies with the cellular environment. To begin, I
distinguish between two modes of ecosystem individuation. In the former
case, the system is identified on the basis of physical discontinuities and “nat-
ural boundaries;” in the latter, the focus is on the range of action of selected
components. The second aspect scrutinized here is the community structure
of ecosystems: molecular systems instantiate many of the characteristic rela-
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tions that occur in ecological environments, such as competition, predation,
mutualism, and metabolic cooperation. Finally, I examine the concept of the
environment, showing that Brandon’s distinction between external, ecologi-
cal, and selective environments can be preserved at the cytological level and
employed to characterize the molecular environment. These similarities with
the biosphere suggest a more precise characterization of the molecular ecosys-
tem as a collection of interacting molecular gears, exhibiting a characteristic
community structure, together with their molecular environments.
In the second part of the chapter, I discuss some applications to actual bio-
logical practice. The molecular ecosystem concept defined here disambiguates
between two uses of “ecosystem” in systems biology, it provides a more sys-
tematic account of the community structure of molecular networks, and sheds
light on the constituents of molecular niches—the cytological correlate of the
ecological niche. Needless to say, the relation between molecular developmen-
tal biology and ecology deserves to be scrutinized in much greater depth. The
moral that we ought to draw from this new scrutiny of an old metaphor is
that the analogy between macrocosm and microcosm is not only suggestive,
but also accurate and, more generally, that molecular and ecological studies
can fruitfully illuminate each other.
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1.8 Concluding Remarks
It is only fair to note that this monograph barely scratches the surface of a
rich and thriving discipline such as molecular developmental biology. The case
studies selected here constitute a tiny subset of the ongoing work in the field,
and many other discoveries, experiments, and research programs are waiting
to be probed and analyzed. Let me conclude this introduction by mentioning
some areas where further work is awaiting. As noted, the form of redundant
causality introduced and discussed in the first two chapters is not confined
to molecular biology, but is widely instantiated in fields such as physics, psy-
chology, economics, ecology, and evolutionary biology. In order to develop a
robust account of the causal role of concentrations and other kinds of aggre-
gates, it is necessary to undertake a general analysis that compares this form
of causation and causal explanation across the natural and social sciences.
In addition, similarities and differences between the paradigms of explanation
individuated in Chapter Four can be further probed and refined, as well as
the relation between abstract models and the world that is assumed—but not
fully developed—in Chapter Six. Moreover, the extent to which the unity-
as-interdisciplinarity model, introduced as a “working hypothesis” in Chapter
Five, can be applied in other areas of science is another question that requires
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an independent investigation. Finally, the discussion in Chapter Seven by no
means exhausts the similarities (and distinctions) between the cellular micro-
cosm and the ecological macrocosm. Settling these (and other) open questions
is a task that awaits future work. With respect to the material contained here,
I would rest content if this dissertation successfully introduces some new prob-
lems and sheds light on some old ones. More importantly, if the present work is
able to show the promises and potential rewards of exploring the philosophical




This chapter is concerned with concentrations of entities, which play an important—
albeit often overlooked—role in scientific explanation. First, I discuss an ex-
ample from molecular biology to show that concentrations can play an irre-
ducible causal role. Second, I provide a preliminary philosophical analysis of
this causal role, suggesting some implications for extant theories of causation.
I conclude by introducing the concept of causation by concentration, a form of
statistical causation whose widespread presence throughout the sciences has
been unduly neglected and which deserves to be studied in more depth.
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2.1 Introduction
Statements about concentrations of entities within a domain are widespread
in scientific explanations. Sometimes concentrations figure qua explananda,
as when a chemist wants to understand the presence of a particular number of
calcium ions within a volume of solution. Other times, concentrations are in-
voked as explanantia. For instance, the reliability of the technique of titration
in analytic chemistry can be explained by reference to the amount of a reactant
in a solution. Despite the frequent explanatory appeal to concentrations within
scientific practice, philosophers have generally overlooked their significance—
though Waters’ (1998) discussion of biological generalizations that individuate
distributions of entities constitutes a notable exception.
This chapter investigates the role of concentration in scientific explanation.
More specifically, I have three goals. The first is to show that concentrations
can have an irreducible causal role in the triggering of events. Second, I employ
Lewis’s concept of preemption to provide a preliminary analysis of explanations
involving concentrations, suggesting some implications for extant theories of
causation and causal explanation. Finally, I define and introduce causation by
concentration: a widespread form of causation that has been unduly neglected
and deserves to be studied independently of other types of causes and in more
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depth. I conclude by mentioning some further applications and refinements.
The claim that concentrations have causal powers might sound not partic-
ularly surprising or, worse, trivial. After all, concentration is just a measure
of relative quantity, and we are all familiar with events where relative quan-
tity is causally relevant to the outcome of a process, for example, when some
bricks piled at the center of a roof cause the roof to collapse. However, I
identify a specific way in which concentrations can bring about effects, a prob-
abilistic causal relation that, differently from the case of the bricks, cannot
be straightforwardly reduced to the additive contribution of its components.
This particular form of causation, omnipresent in science, is introduced by
discussing, at length, an example from molecular biology: the functioning of a
genetic switch. The focus on biological detail is motivated by the significance
of the case study. Genetic switches constitute the foundation of the operon
model of gene regulation and are thus a paradigm of an extremely important
style of molecular-developmental explanation, one that is central to present
(and, most likely, future) developmental biology. Hence, a general theory of
causation that cannot account for these cases is defective in important re-
spects. Nonetheless, scientists and scientifically-inclined philosophers might
still wonder what is new. Anyone who is familiar with analytic and physical
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chemistry is likely to have encountered examples analogous to the case pre-
sented here. In this respect, the value of the present discussion does not lie
in the exposition of a familiar phenomenon. Rather, my contribution consists
in motivating the claim that the causal role of concentrations in these scien-
tific processes is indeed irreducible, and thus ought to be covered by general
accounts of causation. This point is appreciated best when the example is
described in some detail.
Before moving on, some brief remarks about terminology. Throughout
the chapter, I refer to the quantity of x within a specified volume (“there are
n molecules of x per unit volume inside a cell”) as the concentration of x.
When talking about the ratio of substance x to substance y, I use the expres-
sion relative concentration, while I employ the term distribution to refer to
the allocation of entities according to some spatial parameter (the position of
molecules of x within the cell).1 It should be noted that while many distribu-
tions are compatible with a single concentration, a difference in concentration,
in a given volume, implies a corresponding difference in distribution. In stan-
dard philosophical jargon, concentrations supervene on distributions.
1To be sure, focusing solely on quantities and ratios of chemical substances represents a
simplification, since other processes and entities—such as the presence of ions and dissoci-
ating molecules—are also important. However, for present purposes, we can safely restrict
our attention to the number of molecules per unit volume and set other biochemical details
aside.
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2.2 Solving Lillie’s Paradox:
Lysogenic Induction in Phage λ
Phenotypic differences among organisms and among parts of an organism
can be explained by appealing to differentiation, the generation of cellular
diversity. For a long time, the understanding of differentiation was complicated
by a major puzzle, known as the “Developmental Paradox” (Amundson 2005)
or “Lillie’s Paradox” (Burian 2005) after the embryologist Frank Rattray Lillie.
Given that (almost) every somatic cell contains the same genetic material, it
cannot be the DNA alone that is responsible for the determination of the fate
of a cell. If the same information is encoded in the genome of the precursors
of both muscle cells and neural cells, then why do the former develop into
myocytes and not into neurons? The answer to Lillie’s paradox resides in
the fact that not every gene is simultaneously expressed in every cell. At
any given time, most genes are silenced and the network of active genes is
different in every type of cell. The silencing of genes is not a permanent state:
depending on signals that can be either internal (e.g. epigenetic) or external
(e.g. environmental) to the cell, the same gene can be selectively transcribed at
different times. Much of what we know about differential gene expression stems
from research on viruses that infect bacteria (“bacteriophages” or “phages,” for
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short). Hence, phages are a good place to begin investigating gene regulation.
By focusing on the development of phage λ, I shall illustrate and explain
the functioning of a genetic switch, the molecular structure that controls the
expression of genes at different times and in different places.2 I suggest that,
besides their unquestionable scientific value, genetic switches also have great
philosophical interest, for they instantiate features of causation that are often
neglected or overlooked.
Phage λ is an obligate parasite of the bacterium Escherichia coli. Obligate
parasites are organisms that cannot live independently of their host. In order
to survive and reproduce, phage λ must introduce its genetic material within
the genome of a bacterium. The virus attaches by its tail to the surface of
an E. coli, drills a hole through the cell wall, and injects its chromosome into
the bacterium, leaving its empty coat behind. Once infected, the bacterium
faces two possible fates. Under normal circumstances, the virus undergoes a
process of extensive replication, called lytic growth, and, within some forty-five
minutes, about one hundred new progeny phages burst out of the bacterium,
2We should note that, strictly speaking, the development of phage λ does not instantiate
Lillie’s paradox because infected bacteria do not develop into different kinds of cells, and
thus do not undergo differentiation. However, many of the relatively simple mechanisms
underlying differential pathways in viruses are analogous to the (generally more complex)
molecular processes that occur in higher organisms, and thus can be used to study and
explain the basic processes of cellular differentiation in eukaryotes as well.
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lysing3 the host cell, and are ready to infect other E. coli. Alternatively, under
certain conditions, the λ chromosome inserts itself into the host chromosome
and, as the bacterium grows and divides, the phage is passively replicated and
passed along to its bacterial progeny. As long as no perturbation occurs, this
passive state, commonly referred to as lysogeny, is maintained indefinitely.4
However, if the cell is “disturbed” by an external agent such as ultraviolet
(UV) light, the phage goes through a process called lysogenic induction and
enters the lytic cycle. Our target here is an explanation of the molecular
process underlying lysogenic induction: the event that leads a passive virus to
initiate (and maintain) an active process of replication, terminating with the
lysis of the bacterial cell.
Here is a simplified reconstruction.5 DNA sites where protein binds to
enhance or inhibit the transcription of genes are called “operators.” Whether
3In cytology, the term “lysis” refers to the death of a cell through the breaking of the
cellular membrane, which causes the contents to spill out.
4The fate of the phage on initial infection is determined by the stability of a transcription
activator protein called Clear 2 (cII). When stable, cII reaches high concentration and leads
to lysogeny, whereas the phage enters the lytic cycle when the concentration of cII is lowered
by degradation. Factors that favor lysogeny include low temperature, cell starvation, and
high multiplicity of infection. The differential fate of phage λ has an intuitive explanation.
When a phage infects a bacterium in good health, it lyses, because of high protease activity,
due to sufficient nutrients. In contrast, in low protease activity “starving” cells the phage
will lysogenize, waiting for a more favorable environment to reproduce. However, recent
research suggests that whether an infected bacterium initially lyses or lysogenizes might
also depend on physical differences between individual cells (St-Pierre and Endy 2008).
5For a complete explanation, see Ptashne (2004).
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the phage is passively replicated (lysogenic growth) or extensively replicated
(lytic growth) depends on the kind of molecules that bind to specific operators
on the λ chromosome. When a protein called “Clear 1” (“cI,” for short) is bound
to these sites, then cI—the gene that keeps the phage in a lysogenic state—is
transcribed, while gene cro is silenced. As a result, the phage is passively
replicated (Figure 2.2.1a). In contrast, when a protein named “Control of
repressor operator” (Cro) binds to the operators, gene cI is silenced and gene
cro is transcribed, initiating a cascade of other cellular events that induce
lytic growth (Figure 2.2.1b).6 In short, lysis and lysogeny are a consequence
of differential gene expression, which depends on interactions between protein
and nucleotides.
The last aspect left to be explained is the effect of external perturbation. As
noted, when the phage is undergoing lysogenic growth, cI is turned on and cro
is turned off. UV light flips the switch, activating cro and silencing cI, thereby
triggering lysogenic induction.7 How does this process work? In order to bind
6Throughout the chapter, I follow the terminological convention of italicizing the gene
name and not italicizing the protein. Thus “cro” and “cI ” name genes, whereas “Cro” and
“cI” name proteins, sequences of amino acids coded by the gene.
7In general, the effect is triggered by any mutagen—i.e. physical or chemical agent that
modifies the genetic material of an organism increasing the frequency of mutations above the
natural threshold—or other source of stress. However, since considerations raised concerning
UV light can be straightforwardly extended to other factors, I will refer to UV radiation as
the efficient cause of lysogenic induction.











Figure 2.2.1: Differential gene expression underlying lysogenic and lytic
growth. Transcription of cI and repression of cro leads to passive lysogenic
replication (a). Transcription of cro and repression of cI triggers active lytic
replication (b).
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to the operators, cI molecules need to “dimerize” into roughly a dumbbell-
shaped structure. Irradiation by UV light damages the host DNA, changing
the behavior of RecA, a bacterial protein whose normal function is to catalyze
recombination between DNA molecules (whence its name). When DNA is
damaged, RecA becomes a highly specific enzyme that randomly cleaves cI
dimers in the E. coli cell, irreparably turning them into monomers. In the
monomeric form, the affinity of cI molecules with operators drops drastically
so that it becomes very difficult for them to bind. Cro molecules, which do not
dimerize and are left untouched by the action of RecA, are thus free to attach
to the operators and transcribe cro, the gene that initiates the lytic cycle.
We can summarize the above explanation by isolating three causal rela-
tions:
(1) The binding of cI to the operators causes and maintains passive lysogenic
growth.
(2) The binding of Cro to the operators causes and maintains active lytic
growth.
(3) UV radiation causes the switch to flip by replacing cI molecules with Cro
molecules at the operator sites.
CHAPTER 2. CAUSATION BY CONCENTRATION 38
Let us focus on these causal processes. The causal relations (1) and (2)
are instances of standard interactions between molecular gears and are not
particularly challenging from a philosophical perspective. In contrast, the
causal relation described by (3) is more interesting. UV radiation triggers
the random cleavage of cI dimers (via the action of RecA), which replaces cI
molecules with Cro at the operators, inducing lytic growth. But how can the
random cleavage of cI dimers have a causal effect on the genetic switch, without
actually interacting with the nucleotides?8 The key to answering this question
lies in the role played by the relative concentration of proteins within the cell.
In the next two sections, I elaborate the function of cI and Cro concentrations
in infected E. coli, arguing that they play a genuine and irreducible causal
role. The rest of the chapter provides a philosophical analysis of this sort of
causal relation.
8The indirect interaction between RecA and DNA resembles ordinary cases of “causation
at a distance,” such as familiar (and problematic) cases of double prevention (Collins 2000;
Hall 2004). However, the present example is further complicated by the fact that the random
cleavage process does not affect all dimers, and thus not every cI dimer is prevented from
binding with the switch. Our problem here is to understand the mechanisms that ground
causation at a distance in these probabilistic cases.
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2.3 Repressor Concentration and
the Tuning of the Switch
Recall from above that phage λ can reproduce in one or the other of two
modes (slow-acting lysogeny or accelerated lytic growth) and that the mode is
determined by a mechanism of differential gene expression, that is, a genetic
switch. When cI is found at the operators the phage grows as a lysogen,
whereas it lyses when Cro binds. The problem is how the random cleavage of
cI dimers in the bacterial cell (by RecA) can bring about a change of molecules
at the operators, inverting the expression of genes.
The first thing to note is the instability of the binding process. When a
molecule binds to DNA, it does not remain there indefinitely: proteins fall off
and reattach all the time. In spite of this, cI and cro are not continuously
turned on and off, depending on whether cI or Cro is found at the operators.
The switch is, at the same time, a finely tuned gear and an extremely stable
system: it is surprisingly sensitive to changes that take the concentration
of repressor above or below a certain threshold, but it is insensitive to the
occasional binding of the ‘wrong’ protein at the operators. This is because,
provided that the relative concentration of cI:Cro is appropriate, the operators
are very likely to be filled by the right molecules at any given instant and the
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Figure 2.3.1: The OR operator complex on λ DNA.
phage remains in the selected state virtually indefinitely.
All of this is a consequence of the switch’s sophisticated structure. The OR
operator complex, which lies between cI and cro, contains three seventeen-
base-pair individual operators called OR1, OR2, and OR3 (Figure 2.3.1). Each
operator serves a different function and has a specific affinity for binding with
proteins, meaning that for any fixed amount of substance circulating in the
cell, the probability that each site is bound is not identical (Table 2.1)
Table 2.1: Affinity patterns governing the binding of repressor at OR operators.
Molecule type Affinity pattern
cI (ignoring cooperative binding) OR1 > OR2 = OR3
cI (factoring cooperative binding) OR1 = OR2 > OR3
Cro (no cooperative binding) OR3 > OR2 = OR1
Lysogenic growth requires simultaneous binding of cI at both OR1 and OR2.
OR1, the operator closest to the cro gene and with the highest cI-affinity, exerts
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negative regulation: it prevents the transcription of cro, the gene that brings
about the lysogenic induction. However, OR1 exerts no positive regulation,
since it is too far from cI to activate it. For there to be positive enhancing,
cI must bind to OR2 as well. In spite of the significant difference in affinity,
it virtually never happens that cI binds to OR1 but not to OR2 because the
cI dimers bind cooperatively. Molecules at OR1 interact with OR2, facilitating
the binding of cI to the lower affinity site OR2 as well, so that both operators
are bound simultaneously at a concentration of cI that would be sufficient to
bind onlyOR1 if the two sites were binding independently (non-cooperatively).9
Finally, consider the operator closest to cI : OR3 has a lower cI-affinity and does
not bind cooperatively, meaning that the concentration of cI will normally not
be high enough for dimers to regularly bind to this site. However, when the
concentration increases above a certain threshold—for example, if cell division
is temporarily inhibited—then cI dimers start attaching also to OR3, with the
effect of repressing the transcription of cI and further synthesis of cI. In short,
OR3 acts like a sink: it has no positive control over gene expression, only the
negative capacity to inhibit the production of the cI protein by silencing cI.
9Binding of repressor to OR2 but not to OR1 would lead to the simultaneous transcription
of both genes, with disastrous consequences for the cell. However, since the affinity of OR2
is tenfold lower than OR1, under normal circumstances (i.e. in non-experimental settings),
the binding of dimers at OR2 but not OR1 is extremely unlikely.
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The binding pattern of Cro is similar, with two significant differences. First,
no cooperative binding occurs. Second, while transcription of cI requires both
positive and negative regulation (repression of cro and activation of cI ), tran-
scription of cro requires no positive regulation. The presence of Cro at a single
operator (OR3), blocking cI transcription, is thus sufficient for cro to be tran-
scribed, even in the absence of protein at OR2 and OR1. Cro binds also to
the lower affinity sites OR2 and OR1 only when Cro concentration becomes too
high, to repress the expression of cro and downregulate its own transcription.10
(See table 2.2 for an overview.)
Table 2.2: An overview of the binding of repressor at the OR operator complex.
Molecule Operators Effect
cI OR1 cI binds to OR2 through cooperative binding
cI OR1, OR2 cI transcribed, cro silenced: lysogenic growth
cI OR1, OR2, OR3 cI and cro silenced, lysogeny maintained
Cro OR3 cro transcribed, cI silenced: lytic growth
Cro OR3, OR2, OR1 cro and cI silenced, lysis maintained
With all of this in mind, we can turn back to the problem posed at the
beginning of this section: how does repressor concentration stably regulate the
switch, given that protein molecules continuously fall on and off from DNA?
10In spite of the fact that Cro does not bind cooperatively, OR2 and OR1 are always bound
at the same time because, as shown in table 1, they have the same Cro-affinity.
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The explanation, in the case of cI, runs as follows (the explanation of Cro is
analogous). Suppose that a cI dimer detaches from OR1. If there is enough
cI in the cell, there is a high probability that a nearby cI dimer (the same
one or another) will take its place for, as said, OR1 has high affinity with cI.
The same thing happens when a cI molecule detaches from OR2 because, in
spite of the difference in affinity, the two sites bind cooperatively. Due to its
low affinity, OR3 is usually left empty. However, if the cI concentration goes
above a certain threshold, molecules will bind also to this site, inhibiting the
production of cI (without promoting Cro) until the concentration goes back
to normal levels.
The fine-tuning of the switch to concentration makes it immune to per-
turbation. The presence of isolated Cro molecules in the cell, which might
wander in the proximity of the operators and attach to them, has negligible
effects on the fate of the phage. This is because, when the relative concentra-
tion of cI:Cro is high enough, it is very unlikely that enough Cro molecules will
bind to the operators at the same time: as soon as that single Cro molecule
drops off, its place will be taken by cI. And the right concentrations are main-
tained by both positive self-regulation and negative control that inhibits the
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production of molecules if the concentration becomes too high.11
All of this shows that considering the structure and dispositions of the
molecules interacting with the operators is not sufficient to explain the func-
tioning of the switch. What ensures the stability of gene expression is the
relative concentration of cI:Cro in the whole E. coli cell, which determines the
probability that, at any time, enough molecules of the same kind are in the
neighborhood of the operators, ready to bind.
2.4 Concentration and Causality
Having established the important role of concentration in providing stability to
cellular processes, we can now turn back to the question of the relationship be-
tween concentration and causality. In presenting the explanation of lysogenic
induction, I suggested that the change in repressor concentration, triggered by
UV radiation, figures among the causes of the flipping of the switch. How-
ever, this claim could be challenged. In particular, one could acknowledge
11It should be apparent by now that, for the switch to function properly, the relative
concentration of cI:Cro must be under constant control. This regulation is possible in virtue
of the fact that cI and cro encode precisely cI and Cro, the proteins that regulate the
transcription of those same genes. Transcription of cI ensures both that enough cI is being
produced in the cell and that Cro is not synthesized. Vice versa, transcription of cro brings
it about that Cro is synthesized while the production of cI is blocked. Ergo, the regulation
of the quantity of protein produced is really a matter of positive feedback and feedforward,
i.e. self-regulation of the genes involved.
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that concentrations play an important role within the process, while doubting
that the relation between repressor concentration and gene expression is really
causal. In other words, the objection runs, talking about concentrations is
a useful generalization that captures concisely what is going on in the cell.
But, strictly speaking, there is nothing that is “caused” by concentrations: all
causal interactions occur at the level of individual protein molecules binding,
or failing to bind, to operators on λ DNA.12 Against this view, I argue that,
independently of the particular view of causation we adopt, the relation be-
tween changes in concentration and differential gene expression is genuinely
and irreducibly causal (in a sense to be made clear below).
Consider the following question: how many molecules are required to oper-
ate the switch? To maintain lysogenic growth, cro must be silenced while cI is
transcribed. This requires two cI dimers (one at OR1 and one at OR2), and that
means four monomers of protein total. Even less protein is required for lytic
growth—repression of cI and transcription of cro—since a single Cro monomer
(at OR3) is sufficient. This “snapshot” (correctly) describes the switch as be-
12For instance, advocates of process theories of causation might be inclined to reject the
claim that concentrations are genuine causes because no mark transmission (Salmon 1984)
or exchange of conserved quantities (Dowe 2000) is involved in the relation between the
cause and the effect.
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ing operated by four molecules, at most.13 14 However, something important
is missing from the snapshot. In support of this claim, I will show that the
production of the molecules binding the operators is necessary but not suffi-
cient for the switch to function properly; what is missing from the explanans
is precisely an account of the role of repressor concentration.
The problem with the snapshot is twofold, concerning both the activation
and the stability of gene regulation. Consider activation first. Suppose that
only two cI dimers are transcribed in an infected E. Coli cell. In principle,
this would be enough to trigger lysogenic growth, for it is certainly possible
that both dimers find themselves in exactly the right position. However, the
probability of such an event occurring is extremely low. This is because pro-
teins essentially need to reach the switch by diffusion in order to have a chance
to interact with the nucleotides. And the probability that all molecules are at
13By a “snapshot” I simply mean a description of all the physical interactions between
molecules, relevant to a given explanation, occurring at time t.
14Strictly speaking, this is an oversimplification because, while four molecules are indeed
sufficient to regulate the OR complex, the differential fate of the bacterium is also governed
by another operator complex, called OL, which is located 2.4 kb away on the λ chromosome
and interacts with OR by folding DNA in a “hairpin” loop. OL contains three individual
operators, called OL1, OL2, and OL3, which, like the OR operators, bind to cI or Cro
to increase the repression of genes. As a result, the regulation of gene expression in the
phage requires a few more repressor molecules to control OL as well as OR. However,
given that the OR-OL interactions are extremely complicated, not fully understood, and,
more importantly, considerations regarding the regulation of OR can be straightforwardly
extended to OL without affecting the main philosophical argument, we shall set the OL
complex aside and focus solely on OR.
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the right place at the right time is governed by the relative concentration of
repressor substance found within the bacterial cell or (the reductionist might
say) of the trajectories of all individual molecules after they have been syn-
thesized. Furthermore—and this leads us to the second issue—even if, against
all odds, both dimers did find themselves in the right position, still the system
would not operate efficiently, for it would lack the necessary stability. As said,
protein constantly falls off from operators, and when this happens, there must
be a sufficient number of potential replacement pieces in the neighborhood to
maintain the switch in a particular direction across time. In conclusion, even
though a small number of molecules are, in principle, sufficient to govern the
switch, a lot more are required to ensure that all pieces fall in the right place
and for the process to remain stable. What controls gene expression is not
whether any specific group of dimers binds or fails to bind to the operators,
but the relative concentration of cI:Cro.
In addition to being descriptively accurate, this explanation is also backed
up by patterns of counterfactual dependence. Consider the following state-
ments:
1. If the cI (Cro) molecules that are now bound at the operator sites were
not there, lytic (lysogenic) growth would be activated and maintained.
CHAPTER 2. CAUSATION BY CONCENTRATION 48
2. If the relative concentration of cI to Cro were below (above) a certain
threshold, lytic (lysogenic) growth would be activated and maintained.
(1) is very likely to be false, for even if these dimers were elsewhere or did
not exist, still the cro gene would not be transcribed (or the state would not
be maintained), provided that the relative concentration of cI:Cro satisfies a
certain threshold. In contrast, even if it is physically possible that (2) comes
out false, it has an overwhelming probability of being true: when the concen-
tration satisfies the threshold value, molecules at the operators are replaced,
and stably so.
In short, the patterns of counterfactual dependence regarding both stasis
and change of the switch are captured at the level of repressor concentration,
for the presence or absence of particular molecules (or sufficiently small subsets
of molecules) does not make a difference.15 I should make it very clear that
the bottom line is not to dismiss the explanatory role played by the snapshot,
which provides a useful description of the interaction, at an instant, between
molecules and nucleotides. The point is rather that this description is only
15The reason for this should be obvious by now: RecA acts at the level of concentration.
By randomly cleaving dimers, it reduces the quantity of repressor within the whole cell,
drastically lowering the probability that once a dimer naturally falls off from DNA there
will be a replacement repressor in the neighborhood ready to take its place. But no specific
dimer has to be cleaved for the flipping to succeed.
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partial: there is an important causal component of the explanation that is not
captured by a snapshot and can only be provided by a broader description
that takes into account the contribution of concentration.
What does all of this show? At the beginning of this section, I claimed
that concentrations can have “genuine causal powers” that are “irreducible” to
interactions between molecules and operators. To clarify the relevant sense of
reduction, contrast the effect of repressor concentration on the genetic switch
with the example, mentioned at the outset, of the bricks causing the roof to
collapse. The crucial difference between the two cases can be appreciated by
introducing the notion of net causal influence, the sum of all individual causal
components of an effect (Hitchcock 2001b).16 The concentration of bricks
that causes the roof to collapse is identical to the net sum of all the bricks
that are on the roof. Adding up the component effects—the forces exerted
by every single brick—we obtain the net causal influence, which corresponds
to the force exerted by the concentration of bricks. In contrast, the causal
influence exerted by repressor concentration is not identical to the net sum
16Hitchcock notes that the relation between a cause C and an effect E can be extremely
complex, with many—possibly independent—routes, and distinguishes between net effects
and component effects along a causal route. Each causal pathway constitutes a component
effect. The net causal influence of C on E is the sum of all the component effects, after we
have balanced the positive and negative effects of all routes, factoring out those that cancel
each other and considering non-additive interactions. An analogous distinction is found in
Woodward (2003) in terms of “total” vs. “contributing” causes.
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of all component interactions between molecules and nucleotides (the addi-
tive sum of all the snapshots) because, in addition to all the molecules that
actually interact with the nucleotides, the repressor concentration comprises
also of many proteins that might never physically interact with the operators.
Nonetheless, these potential causes play a counterfactual supporting role in
virtue of their disposition to activate the switch, if bound. The presence of re-
dundant molecules, which play a potential “backup” for proteins that actually
bind to the operators, constitutes the crucial causal feature of concentrations
that makes them irreducible to actual mechanical interactions.17
Before moving on, let us respond to one final objection. The claim that
concentrations play a genuine causal role could be resisted by insisting that
only mechanical interactions, such as those between molecules and nucleotides,
constitute acceptable causal relations. However, such stipulation comes at a
cost, for it completely severs the connection between causality and counter-
17Here it is important to distinguish between a weaker and a stronger sense in which
the effect triggered by a concentration could be “reduced” to interactions between its con-
stituents. On the weaker reading, to say that a concentration is reducible to the effects of
its components is to say that the totality of constituent-level causal relations in the system
(at a time) is sufficient to ground the concentration-level dependence relations. While this
claim raises important and controversial issues—such as whether all causal interactions take
place at the fundamental, as opposed to a “higher,” level—the argument developed here is
intended to remain agnostic with respect to it. Our primary concern is with a different,
and stronger sense of reduction: the present argument rejects the possibility of reducing the
causal effect of concentrations to a subset of the fundamental relations, namely the actual
interactions between molecules and operators.
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factual dependence. Now, surely, simple counterfactual dependence is not a
necessary condition for an event to figure among the causes of another, as
shown by ordinary examples of redundant causation, in which an effect does
not depend upon any particular cause because of the presence of other—actual
or potential—causes.18 Nevertheless, there is a widespread assumption within
the philosophical community that, whatever causes turn out to be, the fact
that the probability of an effect E directly depends upon the occurrence of an
event C is sufficient ground for C to be a cause of E. In the example at hand,
patterns of counterfactual dependence are captured by events described at the
level of concentration (a decrease in cI concentration would make lysogenic
induction vastly more probable), and cannot be reduced to actual molecule-
nucleotide interactions. Hence, unless we are willing to concede the possibility
of an event that does not counterfactually depend upon any of its causes, we
must conclude that concentrations are causes of the flipping of the switch.19
18Essentially, this is what happens in the case of protein-nucleotide interactions: each
binding of a particular repressor molecule at an operator is a cause of gene expression, but
the effect does not counterfactually depend upon the occurrence of these causes.
19In spite of its popularity, the claim that counterfactual dependence is a sufficient crite-
rion for causation has been questioned, on the grounds that it contrasts with other allegedly
uncontroversial theses about causes, such as locality, intrinsicness, and transitivity (Hall
2004). Even granting that counterfactual dependence fails as a general criterion for causa-
tion (an important issue that is too large to be discussed in full in the present work), the
situation in the case of the switch is different from alleged counterexamples to the sufficiency
claim, where event A prevents event B from preventing C from causing D. In such cases
of double prevention, event E does counterfactually depend upon C; what is at question
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If this is the case, then statements such as “the fall in the concentration of
repressor within the cell caused the switch to flip” should be taken at face
value, and not as shorthand generalizations for causal interactions occurring
at a lower level.
2.5 Preemption in Concentrations:
Analysis and Implications
The upshot of the above discussion is that there are two different kinds of
causal processes regulating gene expression within an infected bacterium: a
mechanical one, instantiated by protein binding to operators, and a statistical
one, instantiated by the relative quantity of molecules satisfying a concen-
tration threshold.20 But how can the distinction between these two forms of
causation be cashed out?
is whether A’s double preventing action should be included among the causes of E, since
without A, C would not have occurred. In contrast, if we set aside the causal role of con-
centrations in the genetic switch, we end up with an event (lysogenic induction) that does
not depend, even in part, upon any of its direct causes, for even considering the totality of
repressor-nucleotide interactions will not make the effect robust. In short, the problem here
is not just that it is possible to have causation without counterfactual dependence (a well-
known fact) or, perhaps, counterfactual dependence without causation. The point is that
the causal role of concentrations is necessary to make lysogenic induction counterfactually
depend upon its direct causes.
20To be sure, nothing we said here prevents us from following (Hall 2004) and treat
production and counterfactual dependence as two different concepts of causation, insofar as
we admit the change in concentration as a cause of the flipping of the switch.
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Following David Lewis (1986b, 2000), in asymmetric cases of redundant
causation where there is a cause that brings about an effect and another cause
that would have brought about the effect had the first cause been absent, let us
call the cause that actually brings about the effect the preempting cause, and
the other the preempted alternative, or backup. As remarked, concentrations
give us the right counterfactuals because the occurrence of the effect (lysogenic
induction or maintenance of lysogeny) does not depend on any particular dimer
(or small subset of dimers) actually binding to the operators, as long as there
are enough backup molecules that would take their place had those molecules
not been there. Hence, the difference between the two kinds of causal claims
can be explained as follows: the snapshots merely provide the preempting
causes, but this is not enough. To capture the full causal story we need to
specify also the preempted causes that make the process stable. In short, the
role of concentration is to provide the causal backup, the redundant causes
that would have brought about the effect had the circumstances been slightly
different. Throughout the rest of this chapter, our goal will be to investigate
the causal role of concentrations through the concept of preemption and to
discuss its implications for extant theories of causation.
The counterfactual-supporting role of concentration challenges any theory
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of causation and causal explanation that purports to reduce all causal events
to actual interactions between their components. 21 In contrast, basic coun-
terfactual accounts such as Lewis (1973a,b, 2000) or Woodward (2003) will
recognize concentration as a cause of lysogenic induction. However, as I will
argue, both these influential theories lack a specific concept that discriminates
between the causal-types instantiated by concentrations and other kinds of
causes. To emphasize, causes involving concentrations are not a counterexam-
ple to Lewis or Woodward’s account, nor do they necessitate a new theory of
causation. Nonetheless, they show that counterfactual frameworks should be
more fine-grained and need to be supplemented in order to pinpoint particular
causal relations.
Let us focus on manipulability theory first.22 Within an interventionist
framework, we can make sense of the causal role of concentration by saying,
for instance, that most interventions that set the concentration of cI dimers be-
21As noted, process theories of causation (Salmon 1977, 1984, 1998; Dowe 2000) fail
to capture the explanatory relevance of concentrations in causal relations (cf. Hitchcock
1996). Also mechanistic theories of causation (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Glennan
2002; Machamer et al. 2000) seem committed to an “actualism” of this sort and thus cannot
straightforwardly admit concentrations as irreducible causes within their framework.
22Since such account is well known among philosophers, I will not summarize it here in
full. For our purposes, it should suffice to recall that Woodward provides a non-reductive
theory of causation, based on the idea that causal relationships occur between properties,
and are governed by patterns of counterfactual dependencies concerning manipulability:
what would happen if the value of certain properties were to be manipulated.
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low the relevant threshold will result in lysis, or such interventions will result
in lysis with high probability.23 Note, however, that the basic manipulabil-
ity framework does not discriminate between actual causes and backups, and
thereby lacks a precise concept that distinguishes between manipulations that
affect actual causes or net causal influences, and manipulations that affect
potential (or redundant) causes. Supplementing the framework with actual-
and potential difference makers (Waters 2007) is a step in the right direction
but, by itself, will not suffice. Such distinction discriminates between causes
that make a difference vs. causes that do not make a difference (in a given
context); however, it does not pinpoint the case at hand, where both protein-
nucleotide interactions and concentrations are actual, not merely potential dif-
ference makers. Here potential difference makers are part of a concentration,
which is an actual cause of the flipping of the switch.
Moving on to a different framework, Lewis (2000) explicitly recognizes that
cases of preemption constitute a serious problem for counterfactual theories of
causation, and proposes to account for them by amending his original (1973a)
23This statistical qualification is necessary because some interventions will set the trajec-
tories of all, or almost all, of the dimers so that they will not bind with the operators. Under
these unnatural distributions—which are physically possible, albeit extremely unlikely—lysis
will occur despite the fact that the concentration is below the threshold.
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account and interpreting causation in terms of influence.24 It is questionable
whether this modification successfully solves all difficulties, but let us set these
problems aside. For the purposes at hand, I want to focus on a more general
problem with extant counterfactual accounts of causation—whether in the
original or the amended “causation as influence” form—namely that they fail to
distinguish between kinds of preemption. In particular, while some redundant
causes depend solely, or primarily, on concentrations of entities, others do not.
To illustrate, consider the following scenarios.
1. To make sure that a person is killed, an assassin is hired to shoot a victim
and, unbeknownst to the killer, a deadly poison is also administered, in
the eventuality that the killer fails. The assassin successfully performs
her job; the poison turns out to be redundant.
2. To make sure that a person is killed, a mobster hires a number of assassins
who roam the city in search of the designated victim. One of the assassins
finds her and kills her; all other killers turn out to be redundant.
Both examples involve preemption. We have an actual preempting cause
24“Where C and E are distinct actual events, let us say that C influences E if and only if
there is a substantial range C1, C2... of different not-too-distant alterations of C (including
the actual alteration of C ) and there is a range E1, E2... of alterations of E, at least some of
which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, and if C2 had occurred,
E2 would have occurred, and so on. Thus we have a pattern of dependence of how, when,
and whether upon how, when, and whether.” (Lewis 2000, 190)
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and redundant preempted causes that would have brought about the effect
had the former cause failed. However there is an important difference: in
the second scenario, but not in the first, the number (concentration) of killers
plays an important role in explaining why the victim was guaranteed (or al-
most guaranteed) to die. Of course, the concentration of potential causes is
not the only important factor. Mental states of the assassins, their shooting
ability, etc. are also relevant to the explanation of the murder. Likewise, the
chemical structure of repressor molecules, their ability to bind with the opera-
tors, and so forth, are also important in genetic switches. However, whereas in
the poison case the concentration of backup causes plays no significant role in
the explanation of the necessity (or quasi-necessity) of the effect, this factor is
important in the other examples. If the city is large enough, too small a num-
ber of assassins might not be sufficient to account for the inevitability of the
murder.25 Note that analogous distinctions between kinds of preemption are
also found in actual science. For instance, in molecular biology, the epigenetic
mechanism of DNA methylation, that prevents protein from binding to genes,
may be viewed as a form of preemption, albeit preemption of a different sort
25Of course, the former scenario could be slightly modified in a way that makes concen-
trations relevant as well. For instance, instead of a single deadly poison, the victim could be
administered a large number of less-than-lethal poisons, each of which has a small chance
of actually killing the victim.
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from the one discussed here, where concentration plays a significant role.
In sum, even though concentrations count as genuine causes in both coun-
terfactual and manipulability frameworks, both accounts lack a specific con-
cept that discriminates between different kinds of redundant causation. In the
next section, I will introduce a new causal concept to overcome this problem.
However, a legitimate worry should be addressed first. I suggested that con-
centrations play a specific causal role that deserves to be classified and studied
independently of other types of causation. But what is the explanatory pay-off
that offsets the cost of proliferating types of causes and explanations?
As noted byWaters (2007)) andWoodward (2010), two independent projects
belonging to the philosophy of causation should be kept distinct. The first con-
sists in providing criteria that discriminate causal from non-causal relations.
The second project—that has received much less attention—is to distinguish
among different types of causal relationships. This chapter is not intended as
a contribution to the former project (except insofar as it jeopardizes actualist
theories of causation). Rather, it is supposed to draw the attention to a spe-
cific form of causal relation that plays an important, albeit overlooked, role in
scientific explanation. Among several arguments that show the benefit of spec-
ifying a variety of causal types, one is linked to causal pluralism (cf. Cartwright
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2007). If causal relations do not constitute a single monolithic block, but come
in a diverse array, then a context- or topic-dependent analysis is the only way
to specify the structure of this dappled world of causes. Another—distinct
but related—reason for adopting a wide range a causal types, stems from the
precision that we gain in analyzing and explaining scientific phenomena. The
isolation of specific causes provides us with the conceptual tools to analyze and
compare scientific claims across various fields, in spite of remarkable method-
ological differences. In this respect, the frequent appeal to concentrations in
science renders the development of a concept that underlies their causal role
extremely useful. This is the task that I set out to fulfil in the following,
concluding section.
2.6 Causation by Concentration :
General Definition, Refinements, and
Further Applications
In the first part of the chapter, we presented an explanation in which
concentrations are an irreducible causal factor. Next, we employed the concept
of preemption to elucidate this causal factor and distinguish it from net causal
influence. Two observations follow. First, the biological example shows how
CHAPTER 2. CAUSATION BY CONCENTRATION 60
causal redundancy, a notion traditionally discussed by philosophers in the
context of everyday (or imaginary) settings and ordinary language—backup
assassins, stones breaking windows, spells trumping one another, etc.—has
fruitful applications in science as well. Second, as noted, basic theories of
causation based on patterns of counterfactual dependence (e.g. causation as
influence, manipulability theory) lack a specific concept that discriminates
between various kinds of preemption.
In order to make the causal role of concentration more precise, let us fo-
cus on its general characteristics. First, the cause is multiply-realizable, since
concentrations supervene on and can be instantiated by several particular dis-
tributions. Second, the cause-effect relation is probabilistic26 as opposed to
deterministic, for it is physically possible (though very unlikely) that the re-
pressor concentration in the cell is well above the required threshold, yet the
phage does not lyse. This could occur, for instance, if all cI dimers are lo-
cated near the boundaries of the cell, too distant to have a causal effect on
the switch. Third, the causal relation is redundant, leaving space for both
preempting and preempted causes. In addition, the redundancy must depend,
26To say that a causal relation is “probabilistic” is simply to say that cause and effect
are correlated by statistical—as opposed to deterministic—laws. Probabilistic analyses of
causation were originally advanced by Reichenbach (1956), Good (1961), and Suppes (1970)
and, more recently, in amended form, by Salmon (1984) and Eells (1991).
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at least in part, on the quantity of potential causes as opposed, for instance,
to differences in qualitative states. I suggest that we call causation by con-
centration (CC) a causal relation that is multiply-realizable, probabilistic, and
“quantitatively” redundant, since the effect is triggered by changes in the con-
centration of actual or potential causes. When all three conditions are met, the
effect is irreducible, in the sense discussed above, to actual causal interactions.
Supplementing extant accounts of causation with the concept of CC allows
us to distinguish between cases of preemption that, like the genetic switch,
depend on concentrations, and other cases (such as the standard backup as-
sassin scenario or DNA methylation) where preemption is independent of such
feature.27
This general characterization of CC was inspired by a particular example:
lysogenic induction in phage λ. However, concentrations figure as a causal
factor in the explanation of a variety of other phenomena, both within and
outside molecular biology, suggesting that CC can be widely and fruitfully
applied in other areas of science as well. Extending the concept to new fields
27To be sure, the three criteria are intended to provide a general characterization of cau-
sation by concentration, not a precise definition. To fix the right set of phenomena with
sufficient precision, it is necessary to further analyze the relation between concentrations
and distributions, especially with respect to multiple-realizability and probabilistic consid-
erations. For example, one important issue concerns how distributions affect concentrations
and the probability that an entity will come into contact and bind with operators. Questions
of this kind, worthy of further careful analysis, transcend the scope of this paper.
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necessitates subtler distinctions and additional refinements.
While the simple genetic switch discussed here involves a single relative
concentration, in more complex scenarios several substances are simultane-
ously at play, generating a hierarchy of redundant causes. For example, in
the anterior-posterior segmentation of certain thoracic areas of Drosophila,
the high concentration of nanos protein brings about an effect that would be
triggered anyway by the low concentration of bicoid and, vice versa, high con-
centration of bicoid can causally preempt the action of nanos. In these cases,
it is useful to distinguish between preempting and preempted concentrations.
Another important difference between instances of CC lies in the presence
of thresholds. In phage λ, when the relative concentration of cI:Cro goes above
a certain (remarkably precise) value, lysogenic induction becomes very likely
to occur, while it will probably not occur when the concentration is below
the threshold. Compare this with the following examples: rates of chemical
reactions; cross effects that appear in accordance with the Onsager reciprocal
relations in irreversible thermodynamics; oscillating color change in Belousov-
Zhabotinsky reactions; and stationary Turing patterns that arise from the
diffusion of substances. Like the genetic switch, these cases exhibit CC be-
cause the effect depends on and is triggered by complex patterns involving
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concentrations and concentration gradients. There is, however, an important
difference. While the relative concentration of cI:Cro has a threshold, these
other examples exhibit no single tipping point where a certain effect becomes
likely to occur; differences in concentrations generate differences in patterns.
The conflation of these types of CC can be avoided by referring to the former
cases as causation by concentration with threshold, or CCt.
A detailed examination of CC in physics, chemistry, and biology deserves
an independent discussion that transcends the scope of this chapter. How-
ever, let me clarify one last issue. In thermodynamics and other areas of the
physical sciences, scale-invariant properties, such as pressure or temperature
(average kinetic energy of the constituent molecules), are usually referred to
as intensive properties. In contrast, additive properties like heat, that are
directly proportional to the system size or the amount of material contained
in the system, are known as extensive properties. If we compare the intensive
property of gas pressure with the extensive property of heat, where all kinetic
interactions (as well as rotational, vibrational, and other forms of energy) need
to be taken into account, it is tempting to classify the exhibition of intensive
properties as a form of CC. Indeed pressure is a function of concentration and
it is the concentration of gas that brings about the pressure’s effects. Yet, the
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redundancy occurring in the case of many scale-invariant properties, where
average kinetic energy is measured, is different in important respects from
the causal type exhibited by the genetic switch, where the binding of some
molecules on DNA may preempt the binding of others. To illustrate, when
we measure pressure at a surface, only the interactions between molecules and
walls of the container matter. In this case, the collision of some molecules
preempts other interactions, and the effect is triggered by CC. In contrast,
when we consider the uniform pressure of a gas at equilibrium (important, for
instance, for plotting phase changes on phase diagrams and considering the
effect of shock waves), what happens at the walls is not the only thing that
matters; no genuine preemption occurs. To avoid confusion, I suggest that gen-
eral cases of causation by intensive properties be kept distinct from instances
of CC (lysogenic induction, pressure at a surface), where concentrations in the
proper sense of the term are at issue and preemption occurs.
Finally, let me note some possible applications of CC to the “higher” sci-
ences. Consider the sort of functional explanation we often find in economics
and evolutionary biology. In a sense, we can explain the profit of a local store,
or the coevolution of rabbits and foxes in the same territory, by summing
up the store-customer/rabbits-foxes interactions. Focusing on the former ex-
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ample, suppose that at time t, the store sells item x to customer a; at time
t’ the store sells item y to customer b, and so forth. If the sum of all the
sales is greater than the overall costs, then we have an explanation of why
the store made profit. Notice, however, that this itemized description of all
the monetary transactions is not fully explanatory of the success of the eco-
nomic strategy for—just like the snapshots of the switch—it is not stable. As
a contingent matter of fact, it was customers a, b, and c who purchased the
items. But if the strategy is robust, even if a, b, or c (or all of them) had not
bought the items, other customers would have made the purchase, provided
that the actual distribution of customers satisfies an appropriate concentra-
tion. In short, it is not the actual transactions between store and customers
that explains the success and robustness of a simple economic strategy, but
rather its efficacy against the background of the concentration of potential
customers.28 All of this is to say that the success of simple economic and evo-
lutionary strategies can be explained in terms of CCt : the causal relation is
multiply-realizable, statistical, and quantitatively redundant, with a threshold
for break even points and rates of survival.
28My considerations regarding counterfactual robustness in economics bear important
analogies to Pettit’s (1996; 2000) remarks concerning “virtual selection” and “black boxes”
in functional explanation in the social sciences. There are also important similarities with
Jackson and Pettit’s (1990) notion of a “program explanation,” with the proviso that, on
my view, concentrations are both causally relevant and causally efficacious, in their sense.
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In conclusion, examples involving backup assassins, pressure, customers,
rabbits and foxes, and so forth, have been discussed at length and for a long
time. I have attempted to show that, in spite of relevant differences, they are
all instances of CC, and that it is important to recognize them as such. As a
form of causation instantiated in many areas of the natural and social sciences,
CC deserves to be analyzed more in detail and further refinements need to be
introduced to extend its range of application. The present chapter is intended





The aim of this chapter is to examine the stabilizing effect of redundant causal-
ity on scientific explanation. In the first part, I argue that redundant pre-
empted causes cannot be replaced by actual preempting interactions because
of their counterfactual-supporting role, which makes systems robust. The sec-
ond part is concerned with the role of processes in causal explanation. By
focusing on an array of examples from the biological sciences, I advocate the
importance of developing a notion of redundant causal process that combines
the stabilizing effect of redundancy with a process-based or mechanistic per-
spective.
67
CHAPTER 3. REDUNDANT CAUSALITY 68
3.1 Introduction
Redundant causality, which occurs whenever multiple independent events con-
stitute sufficient causes for the same effect, comes in two variants: overdeter-
mination and preemption. Cases of overdetermination are symmetric, in the
sense that all candidate causes have an equal claim to be called causes of the
effect. Consider Billy and Susie jointly lifting a rock that could be easily lifted
by either of them individually. It would be preposterous to argue that Billy
causes the lifting while Susie does not, or vice versa, since both of them are
contributing to the outcome. In contrast, cases of preemption are asymmetric,
in the sense that candidate causes are not on a par. Imagine Billy and Susie
reaching for a baseball that is heading towards them, and Susie catches the ball
before Billy does. As in the previous scenario, we have two potential causes of
the catch, but their contribution towards the outcome is very different: Susie
catches the ball, Billy does not.1 Following Lewis (1973a), I refer to the cause
that brings about the effect as the preempting cause, and to the backup that
would have brought about the effect, had the former cause been absent, as the
1This is an instance of early preemption, in which the preempting cause completes the
process before the backup has a chance to do so, since Susie’s intervention prevents Billy
from reaching the ball. There are also cases of late preemption, where both preempting
and preempted causes take the process to completion. Trumping preemption, originally
introduced by van Fraassen and developed by Schaffer (2000), constitutes a good example.
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preempted cause.
Redundant causality poses a challenge to all theories of causation that
analyze causes as factors making a difference towards the occurrence of their
effects.2 Simply put, the problem is that in cases of redundant causality,
the outcome appears to be counterfactually independent of any particular
cause, due to the presence of other contributing causes (overdetermination)
or backup causes (preemption). To illustrate, in the scenarios just envisioned,
were Billy absent, still the rock would be lifted by Susie alone. Likewise,
the presence of the preempting cause (Susie) is not necessary for the ball to
be caught because of the presence of Billy. In short, as philosophers have
long recognized, causes cannot be straightforwardly identified on the basis
of counterfactual dependence alone; the task for difference-making accounts
is to point out which patterns of counterfactual dependence are relevant for
assessing causal relations.
A variety of refinements have been suggested in order to resolve the prob-
lem. Cases of overdetermination are arguably less troublesome because it is
possible to treat the effect as a product of a single complex cause, instead of
2Difference-making accounts constitute a substantial subclass of existing theories of cau-
sation, including counterfactual theories (Lewis 1973a, 2000; Menzies 1996, 1999), proba-
bilistic theories, (Reichenbach 1956; Eells 1991), manipulability theories (Woodward 2003),
and Mackie’s (1974) Neo-Humean approach.
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multiple independent causes. On this view, Billy and Susie are not two redun-
dant causes of the lifting of the rock; rather, Billy and Susie jointly constitute
a single (non-redundant) cause, which does make a difference to the fact that
the rock is lifted.3 This strategy, however, is not applicable to cases of preemp-
tion because preempting and preempted causes cannot be treated on a par.
Another solution is to adopt a finer-grained criterion for individuating events
since, while the preempting cause is not necessary for the effect to be brought
about, it does make a different to the way in which it occurs (Lewis 2000).
The idea is that the catching of the ball does, in fact, counterfactually depend
upon Susie because, if Susie did not catch, the ball would still be caught be
Billy, but the catching-event would be a different one (it would occur at a
slightly different time, in a slightly different place, etc.).4 Following a different
path, other authors have argued that, even in cases of redundant causality,
the effect does counterfactually depend upon its causes, as long as one “holds
fixed” the appropriate conditions (Hitchcock 2001a; Woodward 2003; Halpern
and Pearl 2005).
3For a sketch of a solution along these lines, see Lewis (2000).
4Note that this same strategy can be also be applied to overdetermination, since Billy
does make some difference to the lifting: even though the rock could easily be lifted by Susie
alone, less force would be exerted. For a discussion of some of the limits of this approach,
see Collins et al. (2004).
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An alternative possibility to deal with the problem of preemption is to
dodge the difficulty by adopting an altogether different theory of causation.
Instead of focusing on difference-making as the hallmark of true causal re-
lations, one can follow a different approach, according to which causes are
identified by the kind of process that connects them with effects. For instance,
Salmon (1984) first attempted to isolate causes in terms of their capacity to
transmit marks, by applying Reichenbach’s (1958) criterion of mark transmis-
sion and Dowe (1992) subsequently offered a refined version that focuses on
the capacity of causal processes to transmit conserved quantities.5 So-called
process theories of causation are not devoid of counterintuitive implications,
facing substantial difficulties such as distinguishing between genuine causal
processes and other “pseudo-causal processes” like moving shadows or spots of
light, or screening off irrelevant causal processes (e.g. birth control pills pre-
venting a male from getting pregnant). Setting these difficulties aside, however,
process theories provide an effective solution to the problem of preemption. If
causation necessarily involves an actual physical connection between causes
and effects, then distinguishing between preempting and preempted causes
becomes straightforward. While preempting causes are bona fide causes, the
5Further refinements are found in Salmon (1998) and Dowe (2000).
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relation between preempted causes and effects can be readily dismissed as a
pseudo-causal process since no mark is transmitted and no conserved quantity
is exchanged.6
In sum, redundancy constitutes a challenge for theories of causality. While
various amendments have been proposed—both from within the difference-
making framework and by exploring alternative approaches—no uncontrover-
sial solution has yet been offered. Finding the appropriate way of distinguish-
ing between preempting and preempted causes remains an open problem in the
philosophy of causation. In what follows, I shall not attempt to assess each of
these strategies. The aim of this chapter is to show that redundant causality
plays an important stabilizing role and to analyze the effect of redundancy
on causal explanation, I begin by presenting a population-biology example
purporting to establish the irreplaceability of population-level explanations in
systems exhibiting redundant causality. Next, I examine the irreducible causal
contribution of aggregate entities by focusing on an example from molecular
biology.7 The second part of the chapter is concerned with causal processes.
6Indeed, Dowe has argued that cases of omission, absence, prevention, and double-
prevention do not constitute genuine instances of causation, but rather a close relative that
he calls “causation*” (1999; 2000) or “quasi-causation” (2001). In brief, these quasi-causal
relations capture patterns of counterfactual dependence, but should not be identified with
truly-causal relations. A similar position is defended in Armstrong (2004).
7Following Strevens (mingb), I define an aggregate property as one whose realization is
achieved by the joint instantiation of several—more or less independent—properties. Ag-
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More specifically, I suggest that processes connecting causes with their effects
can be abstracted away from causal explanations when they play a potential
difference-making role, whereas these processes can be omitted when they pro-
duce actual variation. The final section draws some general implications for
theories of causation and causal explanation. I conclude by advocating the
importance of combining the stabilizing role of redundant causation with a
process-based or mechanistic perspective.
3.2 Redundant Causality and
Levels of Explanation
The connection between redundant causality and explanatory robustness
is old news; it was explicitly noted and discussed over three decades ago by
Alan Garfinkel, who developed a famous example from population biology:
“Suppose we have an ecological system composed of foxes and rabbits.
There are periodic fluctuations in the population level of the two species,
and the explanation turns out to be that foxes eat the rabbits to such a
point that there are too few rabbits left to sustain the fox population,
so the foxes begin dying off. After a while, this takes the pressure off
the rabbits, who then begin to multiply until there is plenty of food
for the foxes, who begin to multiply, killing more rabbits and so forth.”
(Garfinkel 1981, 53)
gregate properties are instantiated by aggregate entities.
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We can construct a simple global model of these fluctuations by taking as
basic variables the level of the rabbit population at time t (x(t)) and the level
of the fox population at t (y(t)). We can then represent the dynamics of the
system in terms of the Lotka-Volterra differential equations:
dx/dt = αx− βxy dy/dt = δxy − γy
These equations provide population-level explanations of the growth over time
of the community of rabbits (dx/dt) and of the community of foxes (dy/dt)
in terms of the value of the two populations and four parameters representing
their interactions (α, β, γ, δ). Intuitively, given that an increase in the popula-
tion of foxes will increase the pressure on the rabbits, one can explain the low
population of rabbits (at time t) by mentioning the high population of foxes.
Likewise, if one of the rabbits (call it r) gets eaten at t, one can reasonably
say that the cause of r being eaten is the high number of foxes at t.
Can these macroexplanations be eliminated and replaced by explanations
at the microlevel, which make no reference to populations and mention only
interactions between individual foxes and rabbits? Garfinkel argues persua-
sively for a negative answer. The problem, succinctly put, is that the objects
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of the higher-level and the lower-level explanation do not really correspond, in
the sense that they do not explain the same thing. To illustrate, compare the
following statements:
(H) Rabbit r was eaten because of the high population of foxes.
(L) Rabbit r was eaten because it passed through the capture space of fox
f1.
(H) captures why the poor r was guaranteed—or almost guaranteed—to be
eaten, given the large number of foxes roaming the field, but does not specify
where or when r was eaten. (L), in contrast, tells us that r was eaten because
it encountered f1 at t ; it says nothing concerning what would have happened
to r, had it not crossed paths with f1.
Which explanation is better? The answer depends on the explanandum at
hand. If the goal is to pick out the fox that eats the rabbit, or the precise
spatiotemporal location of the eating event, (L) clearly has the edge. Yet,
Garfinkel notes, for the purposes of explaining why the rabbit was eaten at
all, the higher-level explanation (H) is superior to its lower-level counterpart
in two respects. First, from a pragmatic point of view, mentioning the pop-
ulation as the cause is more perspicuous since it abstracts away irrelevant
information. Provided that all we want to know is why r was eaten by a fox
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(not when, where, or how) then the fact that r was eaten by f1, at time t, and
in a specific location is neither necessary nor relevant. Second, and more im-
portantly, (H) is superior to (L)—relative to the same explanandum—because
it is counterfactual-supporting and stable under various perturbations. The
population-level explanation tells us not just what actually happened, but also
what would have happened had things gone differently. To wit, imagine re-
tracing the movements of r and f1 leading to their interaction. Had these
trajectories been different—for example, had r turned left before the pond in-
stead of right—then r would not have encountered f1. However, provided that
the population of foxes at t is high enough, most alternative routes that r could
have taken would have resulted in an encounter with a fox and, consequently,
in r being eaten. This aspect, the fact that the outcome would likely be the
same under slightly different circumstances, is not and can not be captured
by (L). What is required is a different kind of explanation, one such as (H),
which notes that some fox eats the rabbit, but is indifferent as to which one
does. To emphasize, (H) is not a better explanation tout court. The point is
rather that, relative to certain explananda, focusing on the fox that actually
eats the rabbit is inadequate because it fails to account for the robustness of
the outcome. In such cases, it is the higher-level explanation that delivers the
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goods.
Why is the event of r being eaten so stable? Garfinkel argues—correctly,
in my opinion—that what makes this outcome robust is redundant causality,
which he defines as follows. A system exhibits redundant causality if, for every
consequent Q, there is a bundle of of antecedents Pi such that: (i) if any one of
the Pi is true, so will be Q ; and (ii) if one Pi should not be the case, some other
will (or, better, probably will).8 In the example at hand, Q is the fact that
r is eaten, P1 corresponds to r being eaten by f1, P2 corresponds to r being
eaten by f2, and so forth. Note that the rabbit-fox ecosystem satisfies both
conditions: the fact that f1 eats r implies that r gets eaten. Furthermore, had
f1 not eaten r, it is extremely likely that r would have been eaten by another
fox.
From a discussion of this example, Garfinkel draws important implications
concerning explanation (and reductionism, which he construes as a relation
between levels of explanation). More specifically, he claims that even assum-
ing that the microlevel determines the complete causal picture—in the sense
that for every macrostate there is a corresponding microstate, and for every
8Throughout this chapter, I replace Garfinkel’s deterministic formulation with a sta-
tistical notion of redundant causality based on the idea that redundant causes make the
occurrence of the effect more or less probable—but not necessarily inevitable—when the
actual triggering mechanism fails.
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microstate there is a complete microexplanation—still population-level expla-
nations cannot always be eliminated and replaced by lower-level ones. Citing
the actual mechanism P1 that brings about effect Q is inevitably defective as
an explanation of why Q occurred, when the system exhibits redundant causal-
ity. This is because P1, by itself, fails to capture the robustness of the effect,
i.e. the fact that the outcome would have occurred even in the eventuality
that P1 had failed, since Q would have (probably) been brought about by one
of the other Pis.
In conclusion, explanations must capture redundant causation in order to
capture the robustness of effects. But do redundant causes play an active
role in producing the effect, or are they just important from an explanatory
perspective? In the ecological scenario, there is a strong intuition that all
causal work is exhausted by rabbit-fox interactions, i.e. foxes eating rabbits.
Indeed, while Garfinkel is not entirely explicit on this issue, he seems to endorse
the view that the causal structure of the ecosystem is completely determined
at the level of actual rabbit-foxes interactions.9 Against this claim, in the
following section, I argue that redundant causes are not just explanatorily
relevant. The probability-raising effect of populations, concentrations, and
9A similar position is defended by Strevens (mingb).
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other aggregate entities play a genuine causal role that cannot be reduced to
the contribution of actual interactions between their individual components.
The argument is developed by focusing on a simple model of a genetic switch,
the molecular mechanism that determines whether and in what quantity a
gene is transcribed into RNA within a cell.
3.3 Irreducible Redundant Causality
Consider a cell containing a gene g, which is controlled by a switch that has
two positions: on and off. The position of the switch is governed by a single
operator O: a site on DNA where proteins called transcription factors bind to
regulate gene expression. When three molecules of transcription factor α are
bound to O, the switch is on and gene g is transcribed into RNA; when three
molecules of transcription factor β are bound to O, the switch is off and g is
silenced (Table 3.1). Before moving on, a few qualifications are in order. First,
what happens when a combination of α and β molecules bind to O? To avoid
unnecessary complications, I shall assume that it is not possible for both α
and β molecules to simultaneously bind the operator: once the first molecule
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attaches, only molecules of the same kind can bind.10 Second, what happens
when the operator is empty? Although the operator will virtually never be
left protein-free for more than an instant—provided that there is a suitable
amount of transcription factor in the cell—let us stipulate that, in the absence
of protein, the switch is off and the gene is repressed. Thus, strictly speaking
β-molecules are not required to silence g; they function as “inhibitors” that
attach to O, preventing α from binding. Yet, for the sake of simplicity, I refer
to β-molecules as causing the repression of g.




Just as in the population ecology example, we can provide two different
explanations of gene expression, one at the higher level, and one at the lower
level:
(H*) The switch is on because the concentration of α-molecules is high.
10As a matter of fact, several real-life organisms employ a similar control mechanism on
the kind of protein that binds to the operator(s). This is cooperative binding, a process
whereby the molecules already attached interact with the operator to facilitate the binding
of molecules of the same type. While the details need not concern us here, for a philosophical
discussion see Chapter Two.
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(L*) The switch is on because three α-molecules are bound at O.
L* provides an explanation of the position of the switch (and, hence, the state
of the gene) by pointing at the individual protein that bind the operator on
DNA: three α cause transcription of g. In contrast, H* provides a higher-level
explanation of gene expression which focuses on the relative concentration of
α : β within the entire cell. That is possible because, just as the number of
rabbit-fox encounters is proportional to the ratio of rabbits and foxes in the
ecosystem, the number of interactions between the operator and α-molecules
and between the operator and β-molecules is proportional to the relative quan-
tity of transcription factor within the cell. Consequently, we can account for
the fact that the gene is on at t by noting that the ratio of α : β in the cell is
disproportionately in favor of the former.
H*-style concentration-level explanations cannot be eliminated and re-
placed by L*-style descriptions of individual binding events, and the reason is
analogous to the one provided by Garfinkel: the two explanantia capture differ-
ent explananda. While L* tells us which molecules activate g at t, H* captures
why there are three α-molecules (as opposed to three β-molecules) on O at t.
Accordingly, for the purpose of explaining why the activation is to be expected,
the higher-level explanation is superior to its lower-level counterpart in two re-
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spects. First, from a pragmatic point of view, mentioning the concentration of
protein is more perspicuous, since it abstracts away irrelevant details regard-
ing particular binding events. H* tells us precisely what we want to know:
why three molecules of the “right” kind are found at O, regardless of their
exact identity. Second, and more importantly, the concentration-explanation
is counterfactual supporting and stable under perturbations of its conditions:
it tells us not just what, in fact, happens, but also what is likely to happen
under relevantly similar circumstances. To wit, suppose that molecules α1, α4,
and α9 are bound to O at t. Were the initial distribution of individual proteins
in the cell even slightly different, it is extremely unlikely that precisely these
molecules will find themselves on the operator at that exact time. However,
provided that the relative concentration of α : β satisfies a certain—relatively
precise—threshold, most alterations of the actual distribution of molecules
(or their trajectories) would result in three α-molecules at O with consequent
transcription of g.11
As in the previous example, individual protein-DNA binding events do not
and can not capture the robustness of the effect. Again, what makes the state
11The “threshold effect” is a consequence of the operator containing three binding sites,
together with the assumption that, due to cooperative binding, only proteins of the same
kind can attach simultaneously. This complex binding mechanism has the effect of stabiliz-
ing the system, preventing the random activation/silencing of the gene determined by the
occasional binding of the “wrong” type of molecule.
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of the gene so stable and predictable is the presence of redundant causality.
Recall, Garfinkel defines a system as exhibiting redundant causality if, for
every consequent Q, there are a bundle of antecedents Pi such that if any one
of the Pi is true, so will be Q ; and if one Pi should not be the case, some other
probably will. In the switch model, Q corresponds to g being turned on, P1
corresponds to {α1, α4, α9} binding O, P2 corresponds to {α2, α3, α4} binding
O, and so forth, with the Pi exhausting all possible combinations of α-triplets.
Note that the model under present consideration satisfies both conditions: the
truth of P1 renders Q true. Furthermore, had {α1, α4, α9} been absent, other
α-molecules would likely be there, provided that the relative concentration of
α : β is appropriate.
So far, the structure of the genetic switch is analogous to the rabbit-fox
ecosystem. In both scenarios, due to redundancy, the presence of no single
entity makes a difference to the occurrence of the effect: no individual fox is
necessary to ensure that the rabbit gets eaten and no particular molecule is
required to operate the switch. Yet, the two models also exhibit significant
differences. First, while a single fox can eat a rabbit, three molecules are
required to operate the switch at any given time. Hence, on the assumption
that causes must be sufficient to bring about their effects, fox f1 can be treated
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as a sufficient cause of the eating of r. However, no individual molecule is a
sufficient cause of gene expression (at time t); a triplet, such as {α1, α4, α9}, is
required. The second difference is a consequence of the fact that transcription
factors do not remain attached to operators indefinitely or until something
causes them to detach; the combination of electrostatic and Van der Waals
forces that govern protein-DNA interactions lead molecules to constantly fall
off and reattach to operators. As a result—contrary to the eating of the rabbit,
which is a permanent and irreversible state—the presence of three molecules
at O will only determine the position of the switch for a very short period,
virtually an instant, and does not affect the proteins’ capacity to bind again in
the future. But gene transcription is not an event that occurs instantaneously;
it is an enduring process that must be maintained for the time necessary for
synthesizing the required amount of protein. Hence, in order to isolate a
sufficient cause for the expression (or silencing) of the gene, even a triplet of
molecules is not enough; we must combine all the triplets that interact with
the switch for a suitably long time interval < t1...tn >. This binding pattern
can be represented in a matrix such as Table 3.2:
Let us focus on the matrix. All interactions between transcription factors
and operators figure in its rows. Hence, if all causal relations governing the
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Table 3.2: An example of a binding pattern at O in the < t1...tn > interval:
time molecules binding
t1 α1, α4, α9
t2 α4, α16, α23
t3 α65, α91, α15
... ...
tn α2, α43, α4
switch occur at the level of protein-DNA bindings, then Table 2 contains all
causes of gene expression. This assumption, however, is troublesome. As
noted, interactions between protein and nucleotides are neither perspicuous
nor stable enough to provide an adequate explanation of gene expression. I
now argue that this is because the causal relations that make the switch robust
are not captured in the matrix; they occur at the level of concentrations. We
thus ought to conclude that protein-DNA bindings do not exhaust the causal
relations governing the switch.
To begin, we should note that the position of the switch does not depend
on the molecular interactions captured in the matrix. To wit, Table 3.2 tells
us that that, at time t1, {α1, α4, α9} are bound at O, keeping g on. However,
suppose that, at this time, these molecules are very far from the switch or, per-
haps, that they are not in the system at all. What would happen under these
circumstances? The answer is simple: nothing! Provided that the relative
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concentration of α : β satisfies the appropriate threshold, it is overwhelmingly
likely that the gene would still be on. Thus, if we insist in reducing all causes
of gene expression to protein-DNA interactions, it follows that gene expression
does not counterfactually depend upon any of its causes and the occurrence
of the causes does not significantly increase the probability of the effect. This,
by itself, is not necessarily a problem. As mentioned at the outset, the in-
dependence of causes from counterfactual dependence is common to all cases
of redundant causality, of both the symmetric (overdetermination) and asym-
metric (preemption) kind. Similarly, there are well-known counterexamples to
the thesis that causes always raise the probability of their effects. Consider a
dying plant that is sprayed with a fertilizer that has an 80% chance of healing
it and a 20% chance of killing it. The plant dies after being sprayed, and the
fertilizer causes the death. Yet, the fertilizer does not increase the probability
of the death. Hence, one might legitimately observe, the fact that transcription
does not counterfactually or probabilistically depend on actual protein-DNA
interactions is not a conclusive argument against the claim that matrices like
Table 2 capture all causes of gene expression. It just confirms a piece of old
news, that counterfactual and probabilistic dependence are not necessary for
causality. Things, however, are not that simple.
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So far, I have focused on the negative claim that gene expression is independent—
counterfactually and probabilistically—of any particular binding event. But
what does the position of the switch depend on? The answer is: the rela-
tive concentration of transcription factor in the system. The reason for this
is straightforward: the probability that an α-molecule (as opposed to a β-
molecule) binds to the operator is a function of the ratio of α : β in the entire
system. If the value of α : β were to drop below the threshold, the probability
that gene g switches off would thereby become overwhelmingly likely. Con-
versely, were the value to increase again, the gene will switch on with near
certainty. Thus, from the assumption that the matrix captures all causes of
gene expression, it follows that counterfactual dependence is not even a suffi-
cient condition for causality. While the thesis that counterfactual dependence
is not necessary for a factor to count as a cause of an effect is common knowl-
edge among philosophers of causation, the idea that dependence is insufficient
for causality is much more controversial. Yet, even this claim has been chal-
lenged. Hall (2004), for example, considers cases of “double prevention” where
event A prevents event B from preventing event C from causing event D. Un-
der these circumstances, D counterfactually depends upon A, but including
A among the causes of D conflicts with other allegedly uncontroversial theses
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about causality, such as locality, intrinsicness, and transitivity. Hence, Hall
concludes, counterfactual dependence is not, in general, a sufficient condition
for causality. While a deeper analysis of double prevention would take us too
far, I briefly note that, in our present model, counterfactual dependence does
not conflict with any other feature of causality. Variations in levels of concen-
tration are local and intrinsic—in the sense that they occur within the same
system as the switch—and do not conflict with transitivity issues, since the
causal contribution of aggregates and individual bindings run in parallel, not
in sequence. Thus, even granting Hall’s conclusion that counterfactual depen-
dence, in general, is not sufficient for causality, it remains unclear why, in the
present scenario, dependence is not sufficient for attributing causal powers to
aggregates of molecules.
It appears that the only reason to resist the attribution of causal power to
the relative concentration of protein is the assumption that all and only causal
relations must be actual interactions. Reducing the complete causal struc-
ture of the switch to actual bindings, however, comes at a cost. First, note
that Table 2 represents a binding sequence that is fragile, non-repeatable and
hardly predictable, since the probability that precisely these molecules bind to
the operator in exactly this order is extremely low. Second, reducing all the
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causal work to actual interactions turns gene expression into a highly contin-
gent process that cannot be governed by the cell. This is because cells regulate
concentrations, not binding events. Biological organisms have no control over
which molecules bind to their operator sites; what they do control (and do
so quite precisely) is the quantity of protein that is produced.12 In short, if
the causal structure of the system were exhausted by actual protein-DNA in-
teractions, then gene expression would be governed by a causal relation that
is neither counterfactual-supporting not probability raising, and is random,
contingent, and improbable. But this runs contrary to virtually everything
molecular biology has taught us about the cytological machinery. Gene ex-
pression, biologists tell us, is an extremely robust, repeatable, and predictable
process, which holds across a wide-variety of conditions, and is constantly
monitored by biological organisms. Now, surely, it might be argued that an
explanation of transcription is independent of and need not coincide with an
explanation of why this process is robust. Nevertheless, a (causal) explana-
tion of gene expression that fails to account for the stability of cytological
processes is seriously defective, and it is only when we factor also the backup
12By “control” here I simply mean that cells can respond to shortage of protein by pro-
ducing more molecules of the relevant kind. In contrast, cells have no way of preventing the
accidental binding of the “wrong” kind of transcription factor, at least when the operator is
empty—when some slots are full, binding sequences can be regulated through cooperative
binding.
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molecules that do not bind to the operator—but would under slightly different
circumstances—that we obtain a robust causal explanation of gene expression.
This, of course, is not to deny that actual molecular interactions play a crucial
role in gene regulation. On the contrary, without the proper binding inter-
actions, gene expression becomes impossible. The point is rather that the
“probabilifying” effect of redundant proteins is not just relevant for explaining
the stability of the outcome, but plays a genuine and irreducible causal role in
bringing about the effect.
With all of this in mind, let us return to the rabbit-fox ecosystem. In spite
of the noted differences with the genetic switch, the ecological model exhibits
a similar form of irreducible redundant causality. Even granting that fox f1 is
a sufficient cause of the eating of the rabbit, a single fox cannot ensure the ro-
bustness of the outcome. More importantly, the population-level fluctuations
of the communities of rabbits and foxes during an extended period of time
< t1...tn > are independent of particular foxes eating particular rabbits. Just
like gene expression, population dynamics are not instantaneous events, but
long-lived enduring processes that are neither caused nor explained by matrices
including all and only actual rabbit-fox interactions. Fluctuations in species
levels require higher-level causal explanations that include both preempting
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and preempted causes. The upshot is that Garfinkel is right in claiming that
higher-level explanations are irreplaceable. The reason is that the probabilistic
causal role of populations, concentrations, and other aggregate entities, neces-
sary to ensure the stability of effects, cannot be replaced by actual interactions
between component entities.13
3.4 Causal Processes and Difference Making
The examples discussed above highlight two features of causal relations that
are often neglected. First, preempted causes provide stability to the system;
second, causes and effects can be enduring processes instead of short-lived
instantaneous events. The first part of this chapter focused on the relation
between redundancy and robustness. I now turn to an analysis of long-lived,
process-like events in causal explanation.
Consider, once again, the model of the genetic switch. As noted, there
are two types of factors that regulate gene expression. On the one hand,
13To be sure, aggregate properties, such as concentrations or populations, can be reduced
to disjunctions of components. One can capture the robustness of the eating of the rabbit
by noting that the rabbit could be eaten by f1, or f2, or f3... Likewise, the robustness of
gene expression is grounded in the fact that the gene can be activated by α1 or α2, or α3...
The point is that, in order to capture the stability of the effect, we cannot select only the
molecules that actually bind, or the foxes that actually capture rabbits; one must also factor
the redundant (backup) disjuncts.
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there are individual transcription factors that interact with DNA, activating
the switch. On the other hand, there are concentration-level interactions,
encompassing both actual preempting causes and backup mechanisms, which
render the state of the gene stable and robust across a variety of circumstances.
These two causal relations can be treated as instances of a single concept of
causation or, alternatively, as different in kind, for example by endorsing Hall’s
(2004) distinction between causal production and causal dependence. In this
chapter, I shall not commit to either view, provided that we recognize that
both individual molecules and concentrations are simultaneously at work.14
At the same time, there is a feature of the system that does not figure in
the causal explanation: the diffusion of molecules that governs the trajectory
of individual proteins in the system. We should note right away that, far from
being a negligible factor, the diffusion of molecules is crucial for gene tran-
scription. To illustrate, imagine the occurrence of a mutation which makes
α-molecules diffuse much more slowly than β-molecules. Under these circum-
14It is important to view both factors as independent because it is possible for causes at
different levels to conflict. Consider, for example, the following scenario: the cell contains
a concentration of α-molecules that would normally ensure that the gene is on. Yet, it so
happens that the relatively few β-molecules in the system find themselves in the proximity of
the operator, flipping the switch off. It seems to me that the correct response to this kind of
scenario—which is extremely unlikely, albeit physically possible—is that the concentration
level causes gene transcription, but its action is trumped by the unexpected binding of β.
Compare this with the example of the plant, where the fertilizer causes the death of the
organism while simultaneously increasing its probability of survival.
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stances, a relative concentration of α : β that would normally ensure that the
gene is stably expressed might not be sufficient to maintain stable transcrip-
tion, if the greater velocity of β trumps the higher concentration of α. Given
its importance, why is diffusion omitted from the explanation of the genetic
switch? The reason is that, in the model under present consideration, no such
mutation occurs: both types of molecules diffuse (roughly) in the same way
and are equally likely to reach the binding site. Hence, while the diffusion
process could, in principle, affect the conditions for gene expression, it does
not, in fact, affect the result.15 In this respect, we can compare the diffusion
of molecules in the cell with the force of gravity or density of the atmosphere,
that ensure that a brick thrown with sufficient force will shatter a window,
but which need not be mentioned in the explanation of the shattering. For all
purposes, all these background conditions can be assumed to remain constant
across the relevant circumstances and thus not to make a difference to the
outcome.
Despite these considerations, we should not be too quick in dismissing the
15Of course, this is not to say that the outcome of the diffusion process is deterministic
or that it will always be identical. Indeed, different binding patterns are likely to occur
each time, due to the specificity of initial conditions and to random perturbations. The
point is rather that, since the process of diffusion triggers a homogeneous distribution of
transcription factor in the cell; gene expression is affected by the concentration of protein,
not by the precise distribution resulting from diffusion.
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relevance of these background conditions for causal explanation in general.
While the process of diffusion can be treated as an “uneventful occurrence”
in the case of the genetic switch, it actively affects patterns of gene expres-
sion in a different class of biological models. A good illustration is provided
by the specification of cell fate during the development of the fruit fly larva.
The differentiation of the early Drosophila embryo along the anteroposterior
axis is governed by the relative concentration of two morphogenetic proteins
called Bicoid and Nanos.16 During the preliminary organization of the embryo,
bicoid mRNA is transported to the anterior regions where Bicoid protein is
synthesized and diffused. As a result, the concentration of Bicoid is higher in
the anterior pole of the larva and gradually declines the further along we move
towards the posterior pole. Precisely the opposite is true of nanos mRNA,
which is initially transported to the posterior regions, where the Nanos pro-
tein is synthesized and whence it diffuses. Consequently, the concentration
of Nanos is higher in the posterior regions and gradually declines the closer
we get to the anterior pole. Just like the α and β molecules of our previous
example, Bicoid and Nanos are two transcription factors, and activator and a
16The formation of the dorsal-ventral axis is similar, albeit more sophisticated from a
molecular perspective. Since these complexities are not essential to the following philosoph-
ical argument, I shall restrict my attention to the anteroposterior axis.
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repressor, respectively. Through an interaction with DNA sites, Bicoid induces
the action of a gene, hunchback, which triggers the development of the anterior
segments of the embryo. In contrast, Nanos protein binds to trailer regions
of the hunchback mRNA—aptly called “Nanos-response elements”—to prevent
the transcription of hunchback mRNA into protein. As nuclei divide, they will
find themselves in different areas of the embryo. Nuclei located in the anterior
regions, where the concentration of Bicoid is high and the concentration of
Bicoid is low, activate the genes that trigger the development of the head. In
posterior regions with little or no Bicoid but plenty of Nanos, nuclei generate
the abdomen. Finally, nuclei located in the central regions, where the Bicoid
: Nanos ratio approaches 1 : 1, generate the thorax (Figure 3.4.1).
If we compare the causal structure of axis formation in the fruit fly with
the unicellular genetic switch presented above, a striking similarity is revealed:
both systems exhibit the same kind of redundancy. In the simpler case, we have
a single switch, which responds to the relative concentration of two proteins:
α and β. In the more complex case, there is a sequence of switches—because,
instead of a single cell, we have a series of nuclei embedded in an embryo—
regulated by an analogous process. If we divide the Drosophila embryo along
the anteroposterior axis, what we obtain is a series of individualized segments,


























Figure 3.4.1: Anteroposterior segments in the Drosophila embryo.
each of which determines the preliminary identity of nuclei it contains by
responding to the locale relative concentration of two proteins: Bicoid and
Nanos. Yet, there is also a significant difference that should not be overlooked.
In the unicellular model, the relative concentration of α : β is homogeneous
throughout the cell. Consequently, the position of the switch within the system
is irrelevant for determining the state of the gene, as witnessed by the fact that,
once the diffusion of molecules has reached equilibrium, relocating the gene
complex within the cell would not alter its state. In contrast, the distribution
of transcription factor in the fruit fly embryo is not homogeneous, and for
good reason. The differential expression of genes, necessary for the various
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parts of the embryo to differentiate and specialize, is possible because the
relative concentration of Bicoid : Nanos varies across segments, distinguishing
the signals that determine the preliminary identity of each nucleus according
to its position within the system. Otherwise, every cell in the larva would be
type-identical and, instead of developing into a complete fly, the embryo would
produce a formless mass of identical undifferentiated cells.17
These analogies and differences between unicellular and multicellular mod-
els of gene regulation are reflected in their causal structure and, consequently,
in their causal explanations. While the (relative) concentration of protein
causally affects differential gene expression in both unicellular and multicel-
lular systems, the diffusion of protein plays a very different role in the two
models. In the unicellular case, the homogeneous distribution of molecules
can be treated as a background condition and can thus be abstracted away
from the causal explanation. In contrast, diffusion is responsible for actual
variation in the development of many multicellular organisms and, as a result,
it cannot be omitted. To wit, compare the original presentation of the two
scenarios. While nothing was said regarding the diffusion of molecules in the
17This difference becomes hardly surprising once we realize that, while multicellular em-
bryos require the formation of concentration gradients to specify the identity of cells, uni-
cellular organisms, such as bacteria and individual cells, need not differentiate the identity
of multiple cells.
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unicellular case, our oversimplified explanation of fruit fly segmentation had
to specify that Bicoid and Nanos are transcribed and diffused from opposite
poles, to motivate the formation of specular concentration gradients.
In order to understand the different role of the process of diffusion in the two
models, it is useful to introduce the concept of actual difference making, origi-
nally developed by Waters (2007) to explain the centrality of genes in molecu-
lar biology. Working within the context of Woodward’s (2003) manipulability
framework, Waters views causes as factors that make a difference towards
their effects, but introduces an important distinction between two kinds of
difference-makers: actual and potential. Succinctly put, an actual difference-
making cause (ADM) is a factor that is responsible for some actual variation
in a population of reference. In contrast, a potential difference-making cause
(PDM) is a factor that does not vary across a selected population—and, hence,
is not responsible for any actual variation—but would produce variation, were
we to intervene upon it. To illustrate, consider a population of flowers that
come in two color variants: yellow and blue. Furthermore, assume that the
color of the petals is governed by two alleles of a single gene a: flowers with
allele a1 are blue, while flowers with allele a2 are yellow. In this scenario, a1
and a2 are ADMs in the flower population. This is because there is actual
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color variation among individuals (some flowers are yellow, others are blue),
and such variation depends on the presence of the allele in the genotype of
the plants.18 At the same time, there are number of factors that do not vary
across the population; however, were they to vary, they would produce pheno-
typic differences. Suppose, for example, that the field is homogeneously low in
nitrogen; however, if planted in nitrogen rich soil, some of the flowers would
develop a red phenotype. Under these circumstances, the level of nitrogen in
the soil is not an ADM, since it does not cause actual variation: as a matter
of fact, there are no red flowers. Nevertheless, nitrogen is a PDM because it
would produce diversity, were we to intervene upon its level.
Waters’ analysis of difference-making in biology constitutes an important
contribution to the literature on causality, which deserves to be investigated
in further detail.19 The important point, for present purposes, is that the
distinction between ADMs and PDMs can be used to shed light on the question
under present scrutiny: why it is that the process of diffusion can be neglected
in the explanation of gene expression in unicellular models, while it is required
18To be sure, the allele does not determine the color in the sense that the presence of
the gene, by itself, is sufficient for producing the phenotype. Obviously, in the absence
of the entire cytological apparatus or the appropriate developmental and environmental
conditions, the gene alone will produce nothing at all. The point is rather that whether
a “normal” flower, growing in the appropriate environment develops a yellow of a blue
phenotype depends on whether it has allele a1 or a2 (see Chapter Three).
19For a critical discussion and elaboration of Waters’ view, see Weber (ming).
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in multicellular ones. The answer is that the process of diffusion is a PDM
in the former class of models, while it is an ADM in the latter.20 As noted,
were we to relocate the transcription site of α and β, the pattern of gene
expression would remain invariant due to the homogeneous distribution of
molecules in the system. In contrast, the diffusion of molecules is responsible
for the differentiation of nuclei in the fruit fly larva, and thus generates actual
variation. To wit, were one to invert the transcription site of Bicoid and Nanos,
the result would be abdominal segments turning into thorax and, vice versa,
thoracic segments turning into abdomen.
In sum, the process of diffusion governing the trajectories of molecules is
a difference-making factor in both classes of models. However, it can be ab-
stracted away from unicellular models, where it acts as a background condition
20It is important not to confuse Waters’ notion of an actual difference maker with the
idea that causal relations can be reduced to actual interactions between variables. Waters
captures a distinction between factors that are responsible for variation in a particular
population and factors that do not produce variation, but the underlying notion of cause is
understood counterfactually, in terms of what would happen were one to intervene on the
value of certain variables. Of course, whether a model exhibits actual or potential variation
depends, in part, on the variables employed to characterize the example. If one describes
the Drosophila embryo, as I have done here, as divided in segments, then we have actual
variation in concentration of proteins across the segments. In contrast, if we describe the
larva as exhibiting a constant concentration gradient, relative to this description, there is
no actual variation. How to introduce variables in causal models and how to select the
population(s) of reference are substantial questions that require an independent discussion
and that cannot be addressed in detail here. For present purposes, I shall follows standard
biological practice, and simply assume that the division in segments constitutes an adequate
and fruitful description of the situation at hand.
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PDM, but not from multicellular models, where the formation of concentration
gradients produces actual variation. These considerations suggest that causal
explanations, in general, need to mention only ADMs of the effect, while PDM,
in general can be abstracted away. More specifically, it goes to show the impor-
tance of processes in causal explanations, which act as background conditions
in certain models, but play an actual difference-making role in others.
3.5 Implications
Let us take stock. The first part of the chapter analyzed the stabilizing role
of redundant causality. I began by considering Garfinkel’s argument against
the possibility of eliminating population-level explanations and replacing them
with micro-explanations that cite only actual interactions between individual
components. Next, I motivated this negative result by claiming that aggregate
entities play an irreducible causal role. The previous section focused on the role
of processes in causal explanation. More specifically, I argued that background
processes, such as diffusion, can be omitted when their difference-making role
is merely potential, but they cannot be eliminated when they account for
actual differences in the population of reference. I now draw some general
implications of these previous discussion for theories of causation.
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We can divide philosophical approaches to causality in two broad cate-
gories, depending on whether they attempt to reduce causal relations to ac-
tual interactions (actualism) or they allow potential interactions to affect the
nature and status of causal attributions (non-actualism). The examples dis-
cussed here, which emphasize the irreducibly counterfactual-supporting and
stabilizing role of inert preempted causes, jeopardize actualist accounts of
causation and causal explanation. Consider, for instance, Salmon and Dowe’s
process theory. On their view, the only (relevant21) genuine causal processes
in our scenarios are foxes eating rabbits and molecules binding to DNA, since
population-level fluctuations in ecosystems and variation in protein concentra-
tion transmit no marks and exchange no conserved quantities.22 In short, the
identification of causal relations with actual processes fails to recognize the
contribution of concentrations and populations as genuinely causal: if mark-
transmission or conservation of quantities are a constitutive and characteristic
feature of genuine causal relations, then aggregative entities lack distinctive
21Of course, an actualist is not committed to the claim that these are the only causal rela-
tions in the system. On the process theory under scrutiny, for example, molecules bumping
into one another or against the cellular membrane, as well as other kinds of molecular re-
actions are all bona fide causal relations. The point is that these other causal relations are
not directly relevant for explaining the expression of the gene (Strevens mingb).
22But see Millstein (ming) for a different perspective.
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causal powers.23 This, however, is problematic. Any attempt to reduce the
position of the switch, the differentiation of nuclei in Drosophila, or the fluc-
tuation of ecological communities to actual interactions is confronted with
the pressing question of why these processes are stable and predictable given
that—on the actualist view—the causes governing them are extremely fragile
and removed from organismic control.
Over the last couple of decades, process-oriented approaches to causality
have flourished in the context of the “new mechanistic philosophy,” a move-
ment that purports to offer an allegedly novel account of explanation and other
fundamental concepts in the philosophy of science, centered on the notion of
mechanism. The new mechanistic philosophy is not a homogeneous enter-
prise; it rather encompasses a broad range of projects, developed by a number
of authors, with different interests and agendas. Some caution is thus required
before attempting sweeping generalizations. Narrowing our scope to the issue
of causality—the main topic of this chapter—it is important to distinguish
between two different approaches. While some mechanists borrow “external”
23Aggregate entities are collections of individuals. Thus, insofar as as these individuals
have any causal power, their collection will have causal powers too, namely the additive sum
of the causal powers of their constituents. The point is that, from an actualist perspective,
the causal power of these aggregates is straightforwardly reducible to actual interactions
between constituents.
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accounts of causality,24 in what follows, I restrict my attention to authors who
attempt to develop a specific mechanistic approach to causality, distinct from
and independent of pre-existing theories of causation (e.g. Machamer 2004;
Bogen 2005). The new mechanists are less than explicit regarding their com-
mitment to (non)actualism; yet mechanistic theories of causality seem, at least
prima facie, to endorse the same sort of causal actualism that characterizes
traditional process theories:
“Non-existent activities cannot cause anything. But they can, when
other mechanisms are in place, be used to explain why a given mecha-
nism did not work as it normally would, and why some other mechanism
became active. Failures and absences can be used to explain why an-
other mechanism, if it had been in operation, would have disrupted
the mechanism that actually was operating. Maybe we should draw a
distinction and say they are causally relevant rather than causally effi-
cacious. They are not, to use an old phrase, true causes.” (Machamer
2004, 35-6)
If preempted interaction are not causally efficacious, then also mechanis-
tic approaches to causality fall prey to the problems discussed above. This
conclusion, however, might be too strong. While Salmon and Dowe explicitly
attempt to reduce causal relations to actuality, the new mechanists can define
the notion of activity more broadly to include preempted causes as part of the
24Glennan (2002) and Craver (2007), for example, work with Woodward’s (2003) manip-
ulability theory.
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mechanism. To wit, mechanisms are generally conceived as “a variety of sys-
tems of processes that produce phenomena in virtue of the arrangement and
interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan 2009) or, alternatively, as com-
plex systems whose interacting components produce characteristic “activities”
(Machamer et al. 2000), or “behavior” (Glennan 2002). Insofar as one does not
place restrictive constraints to the effect that these behaviors or activities must
be produced solely by actual interactions, nothing prevents the incorporation
of redundant causes and processes within the scope of the mechanism, sup-
plementing the actual interactions that produce the effect with the preempted
molecules that render the production of the effect counterfactual-supporting
and robust. After all, preempted foxes and preempted molecules are not ab-
sent; they just do not interact with rabbits and DNA. Yet, broadening the
scope of these concepts is a slippery slope: including activities produced by
causal interactions runs the risk of trivializing the whole idea of a mechanism
and the related notion of production. If any kind of activity can be produced
by some mechanism or another, then the whole project of explaining causa-
tion in terms of mechanisms loses its bite. A discussion of various competing
definitions of mechanism and their implications for causality is an important
philosophical endeavor that, however, transcends the scope of this chapter.
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The important point, for present purposes, is that, while theories of causation
in the new mechanistic tradition have the resources to recognize the contribu-
tion of redundant causes, characterizing the nature of causality via a concept
of mechanism broad enough to include the contribution of redundant causes,
processes, and activities, without thereby trivializing the whole notion, is no
simple matter.
Setting processes and mechanisms aside, consider difference-making theo-
ries of causality and the idea that causal judgments and causal relations are
grounded in patterns of counterfactual dependence. These theories—which ex-
plicitly reject actualism—recognize the causal contribution of concentrations
and other aggregative properties as distinct from and irreducible to the contri-
bution of actual interactions between their components. Nevertheless, existing
difference-making theories of causation do not explicitly distinguish between
different types of causal variables. Accounts based directly on patterns of
counterfactual dependence (Lewis 1973a, 2000), for example, fail to distin-
guish between simple forms of preemption (e.g. backup assassins), cases of
double preemption (Collins 2000; Hall 2004), and other redundant relations.
The manipulability framework provides some refinements through a specifica-
tion of structural equations and graphs, which differentiate the structure of
CHAPTER 3. REDUNDANT CAUSALITY 107
various causal relations. Yet, it still lacks a precise concept to discriminate
between kinds of variables. For example, there is no concept to distinguish
between the sort of manipulations that affect the contribution of individual
entities (foxes, molecules, human beings, etc.) and manipulations that affect
concentrations, populations, and other aggregate entities. For this reason, it
is useful to integrate extant difference-making theories with new concepts that
distinguish between actual vs. potential difference makers (Waters 2007) and
that capture how aggregative entities can causally affect the actual patterns
of interactions between their components (Strevens mingb, see also Chapter
Two of the present dissertation).25
With all of this in mind, let us return to processes. Despite the problems
individuating the causal role of aggregative entities, process theories and ac-
tualist mechanistic accounts capture an important feature of causality: the
enduring, process-like (or activity-like) character of long-lived causal events
that produce and maintain variation. It should be noted, however, that these
processes cannot be reduced to actuality. Consider, once again, the differen-
tiation of nuclei in Drosophila, where variation depends on the specificity of
25To be sure, what is required is not a novel theory of causation, but some auxiliary con-
cepts that integrate existing approaches by isolating various kinds of causal relations, such
as causation by concentration—a multiply-realizable, probabilistic, and redundant causal
relation, where the effect is triggered by changes in the number or quantity of actual and
potential causes (Chapter Two).
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the diffusion process. Such processes cannot be reduced to the precise trajec-
tory of every single molecule in the embryo, let alone to the trajectory of the
molecules that, in fact, interact with the nuclei. What makes the segmentation
of the fly robust is the diffusion of preempted molecules that would bind to
the DNA under slightly different circumstances. In short, the variation effect
is the result of long-lived events, dynamic processes that, like their triggering
causes, are irreducibly redundant.
These considerations suggest that concepts such as causal process, activ-
ity, and productivity, which are presently developed and understood within
the actualist framework, are overly narrow. A general notion of process that
coincides with the actual activity of its components leaves out an important
aspect of productivity, namely the stability of the process itself. This feature
is hard to appreciate in the unicellular models, where the diffusion process
generates a (for all purposes) homogeneous distribution of molecules that does
not produce any variation, and can thus be set aside. The importance of
the robustness of causal processes, however, becomes evident in multicellular
models, like the fruit fly larva, where the mode of diffusion itself is respon-
sible for actual variation. In order to causally explain the differentiation of
the segments, it is not sufficient to consider the actual trajectory of molecules
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that interact with the nuclei. In addition, we must also consider the diffusion
of redundant preempted molecules that do not end up binding to DNA, but
make the formation of the concentration gradients robust.
Can we make the general notion of redundant causal process more precise?
Mirroring Garfinkel’s definition of redundant causality, I suggest the following
account:
(RCP) An effect Q is produced by a redundant causal process if there is a
bundle of processes Pi such that (i) if any one of the Pi occurs, so will
Q; and (ii) if any one Pi should not be the case, some other is likely to
occur.
The general underlying intuition is fairly straightforward. We begin with an
effect Q and an activity or process that is sufficient to bring it about—this
corresponds to the traditional notion of production. Next, we enrich the causal
structure and make the process more robust and counterfactual supporting
by integrating the actual causal interactions that produce the effect of the
actual with an appropriate number of preempted (inert) potential processes,
which ensure that the effect produced by the preempting process is stable
under relevantly similar circumstances. This general RCP definition is broad,
somewhat vague, and intentionally so. In particular, it poses no restrictions
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on how the preempting process should be intended and spelled out. For the
purposes at hand, it makes no difference whether we conceive each process as a
causal interaction that is capable of transmitting a mark, as an interaction that
conserves a quantity, or something else, as long as it is not an instantaneous
event, but rather an enduring activity. To be sure, additional details need to
be applied to these general schema, depending on the particular circumstances
of the concrete case at hand, in order to determine what goes in the bundle.
Yet, it is important to note that this definition of redundant process avoids
the trivialization worry mentioned above, because it does not constitute an
attempt to define causation; it rather assumes an independent notion of cause.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter explored an alternative perspective on two features of causa-
tion that have been widely discussed within the philosophical literature: re-
dundancy and processes. Redundant causality generates substantial problems
that challenge many theories of causation. Distinguishing between preempt-
ing and preempted causes, in particular, remains an open philosophical issue.
The biological examples discussed here, however, make it harder to simply
dismiss preempted causes as “pseudo-causal” relations. Indeed, redundancy is
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especially important in molecular-developmental biology, since the ontogeny
of organisms depends on the fine-tuning of extremely sophisticated and precise
mechanisms, which need to function across a variety of conditions. Hence, in-
sofar as we believe that the natural sciences provide us with some of the most
clean-cut instances of causal relations, the issue of preemption must be taken
at face value, not set aside.
Processes have traditionally been treated as a hallmark of causality and em-
ployed as criteria that discriminate between genuine-causal and pseudo-causal
relations by identifying the former with actual causal interactions. While ac-
tualism is too strong a requirement on causality, processes and activities play
an important causal role that should not be set aside. Processes and activities,
however, as presently conceived, are too narrow for this task. The complexities
of biological systems require an account of causation that incorporates redun-
dancy and processualism into a redundant causal process that encompasses
both preempting and preempted variables, whether these variables range over
individual entities, aggregates, or processes. Needless to say, this concept of
redundant causal process needs to be refined and developed much more sys-
tematically than has been done here. The much more modest aim of this
chapter was to argue that process theories of causation and causal explana-
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tion that purport to reduce all causal relations to actual interactions leave out
an important aspect of causal explanation.
Chapter 4
The Varieties of Molecular
Explanation
Abstract
Reductionists in biology claim that all biological events can be explained in
terms of genes and macromolecules alone, while antireductionists argue that
some biological events must be explained at a higher level. The literature,
however, does not distinguish between different kinds of molecular explanation.
The goal of this chapter is to identify and analyze three such kinds. The
analysis of molecular explanations herein carries an important philosophical
implication; in shunning crude reductionism and extreme versions of holism,
we can combine the insights of thoughtful reductionists with sophisticated
antireductionism. When this is done, the question of explanatory reductionism
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becomes less substantial than often supposed.
4.1 Introduction. Two Strands of Reductionism
The debate between reductionists and antireductionists in biology hinges on
two related but distinct theses. The first is genetic reductionism, defined by
Sarkar (1998) as the claim that all phenotypic phenomena can be reduced
to facts at the genotypic level. The second thesis is what I will refer to as
molecular reductionism, the claim that the whole of biology can be reduced
to molecular biology. In spite of decades of discussion, both strands of reduc-
tionism continue to remain obscure. The problem is due in part to a general
lack of clarity concerning the heart of the disagreement, and in part to the
difficulties of effectively subsuming the fine-grained distinctions of molecular
research under overarching labels such as “holism” and “reductionism”. It is
time to revise some of these questions from the standpoint of contemporary
experimental science.
Reductionism is a multifarious concept that has acquired different mean-
ings in the philosophical literature and thus requires some clarification. Fol-
lowing a common trend, throughout this chapter reduction will be given an
epistemic interpretation according to which theory T is reducible to theory T*
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if and only if there is an explanation of all T-events that employs solely the lan-
guage and concepts of T*. As a result, genetic reductionism can be interpreted
as the claim that facts at the level of the genotype, and these facts alone, can
explain the regularities of biological processes. In turn, macromolecular reduc-
tionism becomes the thesis that there is an explanation of every biological fact
that mentions only biochemical properties of molecules and their interactions.1
Philosophers often refer to the explanations given by geneticists and de-
velopmental biologists as “mechanistic” (Machamer et al. 2000; Darden 2008)
or “causal-mechanical” (Schaffner 2006) but, for the most part, fail to distin-
guish between kinds of molecular explanation. The goal of this chapter is to
isolate and discuss different explanatory models in molecular biology and iden-
tify their nature, form, and characteristic features. The next three sections
individuate three independent explanatory paradigms in molecular biology. It
is important to stress right away that the aim is not to provide an exhaus-
tive list, but rather to present distinct and important forms of explanation,
1This preliminary characterization is not intended as a precise definition of reductionism,
but rather as a way to narrow the scope of the discussion. For example, in what follows
we shall not be concerned with ontological theses, such as the uncontroversial fact that
organisms are constituted by molecules, or the rejection of vitalism, the discredited doctrine
that biological systems are governed by forces other than physico-chemical ones. Moreover,
we should note that our general statement of explanatory reductionism is broader than
classic formulations of theory reduction (Nagel 1961; Schaffner 1967) since here we place no
constraints on the structure of theories and correspondence rules connecting them, or on the
form of the explanation. For an excellent critique of the logical empiricist view of reduction
applied to biology, see (Hull 1974).
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emphasizing differences that have generally been overlooked. In the final sec-
tion, these distinctions are applied to the question of reductionism. As I will
argue, we can integrate the insights of thoughtful reductionists with a sophis-
ticated form of antireductionism, while avoiding both crude reductionism and
extreme versions of holism. When this point is appreciated, the debate over
explanatory reductionism becomes less substantial than often supposed.
In what follows, I shall not attempt to specify general necessary or sufficient
conditions for explanation, an important philosophical endeavor that, however,
transcends the scope of the present work. Throughout the paper, instances of
successful explanations are individuated by glossing scientific practice. More
specifically, I assume that for an explanation to be adequate is for it to satisfy
current scientific and philosophical standards: it must provide a satisfactory
answer to questions posed by the appropriate portion of the biological com-
munity and appeal to their language, concepts, and methodology. In addition,
it must also satisfy general philosophical requirements, such as being counter-
factual supporting.
CHAPTER 4. VARIETIES OF MOLECULAR EXPLANATION 117
4.2 Genetic Explanation
Drepanocytosis, a genetic disease commonly known as sickle-cell anemia (SCA),
can be subsumed under an explanation that cites only genetic and biochemical
facts. Why do human beings who are homozygous for the sickling allele expe-
rience crises at low levels of oxygen? The answer lies in the role of Hemoglobin,
a protein contained in erythrocytes (red blood cells) that binds to oxygen in
the lungs and transports it to the rest of the body. When blood reaches an
organ, Hemoglobin releases oxygen, collects carbon dioxide, and brings it back
to the lungs, where it is exhaled, and the cycle begins again. SCA is triggered
by a point mutation, a single-base substitution in the chain of nucleotides in
the hemoglobin gene,2 which leads to a single amino acid substitution in the
encoded molecule. This recessive mutation, under conditions of low oxygen,
causes red blood cells to assume a rigid crescent shape, which reduces their
flexibility and elasticity, and affects their ability to dilate capillaries to facili-
tate their passage. As a result, abnormal erythrocytes tend to block capillar-
ies, thereby restricting blood flow to organs. These vaso-occlusive crises may
2Throughout the chapter, I shall follow the convention of italicizing gene names and
capitalizing the name of proteins, in Roman typeface. Thus “hemoglobin” refers to the
gene, while “Hemoglobin” refers to the protein coded by the gene. In a context where the
distinction does not matter, “hemoglobin” (in lowercase Roman typeface) refers indifferently
to either the gene or the protein.
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result in potentially lethal consequences, such as strokes, decreased immune
reaction, pulmonary hypertension, and chronic renal failure. In addition, the
sickling allele, when homozygous, disrupts the normal asymmetrical distribu-
tion of lipids in the layers of the cell membrane, a change that leads white
blood cells to attack the affected erythrocytes. This secondary effect results in
a drastic reduction of the erythrocyte life (from the normal 90-120 day cycle
to 10-20 days), which affects the turnover rate of bone marrow, with serious
pathological consequences.
Our initial claim that the above explanation of SCA cites only genetic and
biochemical facts requires substantial clarification: a few qualifications are thus
in order. First, we should emphasize right away that not all the consequences
of the disease are determined by properties of genes and gene products. The
effects of the abnormal Hemoglobin molecule depend on many variables, such
as capillaric structure and timing of exposure to low oxygen tension in the life
of the individual, which are influenced by cellular and environmental factors
that are not coded in the genes. A second and related point is that not all
causes of SCA occur at the genetic or molecular level. The mutated allele, by
itself, is not sufficient for anemia to occur, in the absence of other cytological,
physiological, and environmental background conditions. Indeed, the mutation
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is not even necessary since, in principle, it would be possible to trigger SCA
by intervening on the structure of the Hemoglobin molecules while leaving the
gene untouched. In short, the occurrence of SCA in an individual or population
may have proximate (e.g. physical) as well as ultimate (e.g. evolutionary,
ecological, social, political) causes, effects, and background conditions that
are not captured or entailed by the aforementioned explanation.
The crucial feature of the disease, which allows the oxygen crises to be
explained by focusing on the structure of the gene, is that the presence of
the mutated allele, when homozygous, determines the occurrence of the dis-
ease in an otherwise healthy human being, when the organism is exposed to
low oxygen conditions. Now, surely this is far from a complete explanation.
Processes such as the sickling of mutated cells when oxygen is scarce or the
alterations in capillaric interactions are excluded from the analysis, and filling
out these details requires attending to the complex secondary effects of the
presence of the Hemoglobin molecule crossed with the relevant background
conditions. Nevertheless, a precise account of how the genetic changes are
produced or how they are reflected in the organism is unnecessary in order
to effectively isolate the mutation as the difference-making cause of SCA; in
doing so, phenotypic effects and environmental conditions can be effectively
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black-boxed.3 The reason for this is that once we assume a set of background
conditions, which are generally invariant across individuals, the structure of
the hemoglobin gene becomes the triggering cause that determines the sickling
of erythrocytes when the organism is exposed to low oxygen levels.4 As a
result, we can reliably predict whether an individual will experience anemia
when oxygen is scarce by focusing solely on the sequence of nucleotides. In
general, when a biological event has an actual difference-maker that can be
described in genetic or molecular language,5 we shall say that the event can
be subsumed under a “genetic-molecular explanation”, genetic explanation, for
short.
While the genetic explanation of SCA is relatively straightforward, bio-
chemical difference-makers can be extremely complex. In such cases, the im-
portance of functional and dispositional properties of genes and molecules be-
3The concept of “difference making” in molecular biology was developed by (Waters 2007)
to defend the primacy of the causal role of genes against the “parity thesis” that downgrades
DNA as only one among many causes of biological processes and events.
4The relevant distinction here is between causing a trait and causing a difference in
a trait. Failure to keep these two concepts separated has caused much confusion in the
biological literature (Keller 2010).
5The notion of molecular language should be intended broadly. In what follows, I shall
call “molecular” any description that appeals only to properties of macromolecules (as op-
posed to properties of larger systems, such as cells, organisms, or the environment), whether
these are categorical, dispositional, functional, or something else. This point will become
central for reassessing the debates on reductionism, an endeavor to which I shall turn in the
final section of the chapter.
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comes even more prominent. This point can be appreciated by comparing SCA
with another genetic pathology, Huntington’s disease (HD), a neurodegener-
ative disorder caused by an unstable expansion of a CAG repeat within the
coding region of a single gene.6 Although SCA cannot be permanently cured,
crises can be partially controlled and affected patients can be monitored to pre-
vent devastating consequences. In contrast, despite the fact that the sequence
of both the wild-type and the mutated alleles of the huntingtin gene and the
structure of the encoded protein have been known since 1993, HD-related neu-
rodegenerative disorders cannot yet be cured, prevented, or even effectively
controlled. What explains the asymmetry? Both diseases are genetically de-
termined (in the sense made clear above) and depend on a single mutation in a
single gene. The relevant difference, I suggest, lies in the functional difference
between the two encoded proteins. The mutation causing SCA occurs in a gene
coding for a protein—Hemoglobin—that has a precise physiological function,
and thus the mutation triggers a single major effect. Nothing changes in the
erythrocytes except the substitution of a different molecule for the one they
normally contain: instead of a molecule that is able to perform the function of
transporting oxygen, the mutated Hemoglobin present in the erythrocytes now
6For a comprehensive and up-to-date review of research on HD, see (Zuccato et al. 2010).
A philosophical discussion can be found in (Kitcher 1997, 2001).
CHAPTER 4. VARIETIES OF MOLECULAR EXPLANATION 122
causes the capillaries to be clogged when oxygen supply is low. In contrast,
the Huntingtin protein has thousands of possible transcription dysfunctions
and it is proving to be a daunting task to determine all the devastating effects
on the organism. Hence, whereas most developmental processes can be brack-
eted in the case of SCA, they are required to understand differences in neural
functioning.7 Nevertheless, in both pathologies the difference-maker lies in the
structure of the gene: both diseases have a genetic trigger.
4.3 Morphological Explanation
The examples of SCA and HD support the reductionist claim that biological
events can be subsumed under genetic explanations, which cite only struc-
tural and functional properties of nucleic acids and coded proteins. But, as
many scholars are quick to point out, biochemical properties are insufficient
for explaining all biological facts. In order to rebut the claims of radical re-
ductionism, developmentalists can appeal to sophisticated molecular findings,
such as mechanisms of DNA editing and repair, gene splicing, or to networks
7The fact that, in spite of substantial curative difficulties, SCA is much more tractable
than HD suggests that, while explaining a phenomenon does not necessarily—or even
typically—translate into a program of intervention, tractability and simplicity of expla-
nation tend to be correlated. In general, the more complex the explanation, the harder the
translation into intervention.
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of epigenetic interactions (Keller 2001). Some authors, however, have followed
the antireductionist path to much more extreme forms of holism. For instance,
the “dialectical approach to biology” inspired by (Lewontin and Levins 1985)
and Developmental Systems Theory (Oyama 1985; Griffiths and Gray 1994;
Oyama et al. 2001) reject interactionism, the conventional view that pheno-
types are determined by the interaction of genotype and environment (at least
when these interactions are given a narrowly molecular interpretation) and
focus instead on complex systems as basic developmental units. Even if suc-
cessful, the strategy of opposing genetic explanations with life-cycles is like
chasing a mole out of a garden with dynamite. Crude reductionism can be un-
dermined within the confines of molecular developmental biology. By focusing
on an important class of comparative biological explanations, in this section, I
shall argue for a stronger thesis, namely that biochemical details are not just
insufficient; they are sometimes irrelevant for developmental explanations. Bi-
ological explananda that lack molecular difference-makers require a different
kind of explanantia.
Reaction-Diffusion Systems (RDSs)—mathematical models spawned from
the seminal work of Turing (1952)—can be used to explain a whole array
of phenomena by showing how the interaction of homogeneously distributed
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substances produces stable patterns. More specifically, RDSs capture how
two distinct processes influence the distribution of substances within systems:
chemical reactions between molecules and their diffusion in the system.8 To
illustrate, consider the action of two morphogens (substances that govern tissue
formation by regulating cell differentiation), an activator A and a repressor R,
which diffuse in an embryo and react with one another. Activator A induces
the production of both A and R; R, in turn, inhibits the production of A. As
predicted by Turing, if the morphogens diffuse at equal rates, spatial variation
from the initial homogeneous state is eventually smoothed out and disappears.
However, if the rates of diffusion are not identical and the reaction rates do
not adjust quickly enough to reach equilibrium, sharp waves of concentration
differences will appear and generate stable patterns.
In developmental biology, RDSs can be employed to model and explain how
various organisms employ the same processes to generate different patterns.
Moreover, RDSs can also be employed, at a more abstract level, to subsume a
variety of related processes under a single family of models, well-instantiating
8What constitutes a “system” is an important question that deserves more attention than
it has received in the literature, but which cannot be addressed in full in the present work. In
what follows, I generally assume that systems are limited, for example by the boundaries of
an embryo or an organism. Some systems that count as “developmental systems”, however,
are not bounded this way. Whether the term “system” refers to systems of the former or
the latter kind should be made clear by the context.
CHAPTER 4. VARIETIES OF MOLECULAR EXPLANATION 125
Sober’s (1999) remark that it is sometimes more illuminating to show that
the same effect is reached by different causal pathways than to subsume dif-
ferent phenomena under a unified explanation. The first kind of explanation
is instantiated by J.D. Murray’s study of pattern formation on mammalian
coats. A clear illustration of comparative explanations of the second kind is
Meinhardt’s work on the coiling of seashells. Let us discuss these examples, in
turn.9
Murray (1988, 1989) shows that the formation of patterns on the coats of
various mammals, such as leopard spots and zebra stripes, can be predicted
and explained in terms of an RDS in which an activator induces melanocytes
(cells that are responsible for the pigmentation of the epidermis) to pro-
duce melanin (pigment), and a repressor inhibits the production of that same
melanin. We need not concern ourselves with the precise mathematical equa-
tions that underlie these systems. The important point, for present purposes is
that, provided that Murray’s models are roughly correct, a comparative expla-
nation of coat pattern formation across organisms and species requires only a
specification of basic dispositional properties of activators and inhibitors, the
9In this section I borrow two examples discussed by Kitcher (1999a) in an essay defending
a multileveled picture of theorizing about development, and I elaborate on his conclusions
on the role of mathematical models in molecular explanations.
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initial concentration of reactants together with the basic geometrical struc-
ture of the system, and the differential equations governing the diffusion of
molecules. Biochemical properties, such as the structure of protein chains or
the identity of genes involved, do not add anything essential to the explana-
tion.10 As we shall see, they only muddy the waters.
Meinhardt’s (1998) study of seashells displays many similarities with Mur-
ray’s work. As in the case of coat patterns, cellular interactions that govern
shell coiling are modeled in terms of activator-inhibitor systems and rates of
diffusion. The crucial difference is that coat patterning involves the same kind
of cells (melanocytes) in most mammals. In contrast, the coiling of seashells
reveals that the same family of equations can be applied to different types of
molecules that instantiate activators and inhibitors in a wide array of cells,
forming various patterns (e.g. patterns of pigmentation and patterns of relief)
on the shell surface. In other words, while Murray shows that the same RDS
explains variations of the same process in different organisms, Meinhardt shows
that a single mathematical model explains similarities in patterns produced
by various processes.
The important feature exhibited by both these examples is that the ex-
10As a matter of fact, when Murray published the cited works, many biochemical features
of melanocytes were still unknown.
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planans is an RDS in which the precise identity and biochemical properties
of the involved proteins are abstracted away. Molecular details, beyond basic
dispositional properties of activators and inhibitors, are neither necessary nor
relevant to the explanation. In order to understand why this is the case, it
is important to focus on the respective explananda. In the case of Murray’s
models, the goal is to explain why the outcome of the pigmentation process
is different across mammals (zebra stripes vs. leopard spots) in spite of the
fact that they are formed through a similar process that involves the same
kind of cells (melanocytes) and many of the same proteins (e.g. Tyrokinase).
Given that these mammals employ the same cells and molecules in pigment-
ing their coats, it would be utterly surprising if differences in pattern could
be explained by appealing to biochemical facts. And indeed they cannot. As
Murray shows very clearly, the key difference between the coat patterns of
zebras and leopards lies in the geometries of the bodies: the parameters of
scale yield different equilibria for the diffusion of the same type of molecules.
In short, with respect to differences in mammalian coat patterns, molecular
details are largely irrelevant to the explanation. The difference maker is the
geometry of the system through which the molecules diffuse. Now, surely bio-
chemical processes constitute background conditions that are important from
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a causal perspective. For example, the response units must be appropriately
“tuned” to morphogen signal in order for the process to yield the pattern pre-
dicted by the equations.11 However, once these parameters are factored within
the model—abstracting away from irrelevant differences across individuals and
species—their specification is not required to predict the patterns, and they
need not be included within the explanation.
In the case of seashells, molecular details are likewise irrelevant to the ex-
planation, and for similar reasons. The explanandum of Meinhardt’s Turing-
style model is the similarity in coiling patterns, which can be described by the
same family of equations despite the fact that the biochemical processes that
generate them are very different from each other. Pigmentation patterns and
patterns of relief (ridges and valleys) are clearly produced by different types of
cells and proteins. Thus, the striking similarities in coiling emerge only once
we abstract away from the precise identity of the morphogens (activators and
repressors) that diffuse and interact with one another to generate the patterns.
Once again, the difference-making factors that account for the relevant analo-
gies across organisms and species are the spatial parameters that determine
11Fixing diffusion rates, relative concentrations, and thresholds of morphogens and re-
sponse units is no trivial matter. The determination of these parameters, necessary for
the model to effectively capture the underlying cytological mechanisms, requires various
trade-offs and adjustments (Murray 1989).
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the geometry of the field over which the molecules diffuse.
An appeal to spatial organization is a classic antireductionist strategy.
Mayr, Bernard, and Weiss’ defenses of emergent properties hinge precisely on
the claim that the structure of the whole is not predictable from the proper-
ties of its parts alone (see Schaffner 1993, esp. ch. 9). Kitcher (1984) notes
that geometrical properties of the system play an important role in biological
explanations. Along similar lines, Kincaid (1990) poses some problems for
reductionism related to biochemical diversity and multiple realizability by fo-
cusing on examples such as cell communication and signal sequences that code
information and determine protein transport.12 More recently, Laublicher and
Wagner (2001) have questioned the possibility of describing spatiotemporal
properties of a system at the molecular level. Others reply that spatiotem-
poral properties of molecules alone are sufficient for describing the system
(Frost-Arnold 2004) or that the notion of positional information is in itself
“almost completely nonexplanatory” (Rosenberg 2006).
Is my emphasis on mathematical models a mere reprise of an old debate?
My claim is slightly different and, in an important sense, stronger. This is be-
cause, even granting that the language of molecular biology has the resources
12For a discussion of multiple-realizability in biology, see also (Rosenberg 1978) and (Sober
1999).
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to describe the geometry of developmental systems (a point that many de-
velopmentalists would not concede),13 we still lack a molecular explanation
of intra-specific differences in pattern formation. The reason is that it is
geometrical—not biochemical—properties that deliver the explanation of how
different patterns are reliably generated and organized within clusters of cells.
To illustrate, imagine a complete description of all the molecules that con-
stitute the epidermis of two mammals, a leopard and a zebra, during coat
pattern formation, together with their distribution within the system, i.e. the
position of every molecule in the embryo, at every instant. Assuming that we
have sufficient computing power, by checking all the snapshots we can predict
the patterns that will form on each coat due to the interactions between acti-
vators and repressors. But do these detailed descriptions explain the relevant
differences in pattern? Do we have a general explanation of why the zebra
forms stripes while the leopard forms spots? The answer is negative. Even
assuming that the structural properties of the two systems are predictable
and computable from the molecular description, biochemical features are too
fine-grained to account for general variation in pattern in a counterfactual-
13The tenability of this assumption hinges on whether geometrical properties can be
reduced to their molecular basis, a controversial issue that we shall set aside for the moment
and to which I shall return in the final section of the chapter.
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supporting way. As a result, when we focus on molecular properties, we obtain
an explanation that is not robust.14 Now, surely, this is not to deny that coat
patterns supervene on the distribution and biochemical structure of molecules.
Changes in the initial distribution of molecules in a leopard are likely to alter
the spots, but the resulting coat will still be spotted, not striped. Likewise,
a change in the biochemistry of reactants is likely to affect the final outcome;
for instance the coat might change color tone or the spots might not form due
to an alteration of reaction rates. However, the difference between spots and
stripes do not depend on these characteristics (that, to emphasize, constitute
important background conditions). We can make the explanation of patterns
counterfactual-supporting by focusing on the geometry—the general spatial
parameters of the system through which the molecules diffuse—and the equa-
tions governing diffusion. When we do this, we can explain why under normal
circumstances leopards develop spotted coats while zebras have stripes, as well
as more general regularities that transcend inter-specific differences. For in-
14Following Woodward (2010), let us say that a causal relation is “robust” if it would
continue to hold in a range of potential background circumstances. In other words, a robust
relation would still hold even if the background circumstances were slightly different from
the actual ones. To illustrate, Ann winning the lottery is unstable because, under slightly
different circumstances, a different ticket would have been drawn. In contrast, the fact that
someone wins the lottery is robust because, if Ann’s ticket had not been extracted, another
one would have been. My considerations concerning robustness of explanation are related
to Wimsatt’s (1976; 1994; 1997) discussions of aggregativity, complexity, and reductive
explanation.
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stance, Murray shows quite elegantly that while it is possible to have spotted
animals with striped tails, there cannot be striped animals with spotted tails.
In short, in these comparative explanations, the molecular details do not ex-
pose the crucial explanatory facts: the factors that make a difference toward
the production of an effect are geometrical, not biochemical.15 What is neces-
sary is an account of how regular patterns emerge from an initial distribution
of molecules in a confined space.
At this point, one might object that, even if we concede that the molecular
details are not strictly speaking necessary, they are nevertheless not detrimen-
tal: if anything they make the explanation more complete. Yet this response
overlooks the fact that providing irrelevant details often makes an explanation
unnecessarily obscure and, more importantly, in many cases it will obliterate
analogies and disanalogies between different processes.16 Unnecessary details
should not be included when multiple processes have a common explanation,
15In a recent paper, Bogen argues that mathematical equations do not directly explain
biological phenomena, but rather indicate “features of the phenomena of interest which
mechanist explanations should account for.” (Bogen 2005, 403) Note, however, that in
the example he examines—Hodgkin and Huxley’s classic essay on action potentials—the
equations play no role in determining the spatial parameters of the system’s components.
For an independent defense of the explanatory role of mathematics, see (Strevens 2008,
329-31) and (Huneman 2010).
16Consider a related example from a different area of science. In quantum mechanics, the
structural differences between photons and electrons are not just irrelevant in describing the
results of the “double slit experiment”. More importantly, they are misleading, since they
potentially obscure the fact that the wave-particle duality applies to both light and matter.
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or when a single process is realized in various ways, a point that is related to
Woodward’s (2010) discussion of perspicuity of causal effects and to the fact
that causes should be proportional to their effects (Yablo 1992).
The examples of coat patterning and shell coiling discussed in this sec-
tion show that, just as some biological events can be subsumed under genetic
explanations which abstract away from important developmental and environ-
mental factors, such as spatial parameters and diffusion processes, others are
best explained when the biochemical details are abstracted away. In these
cases, the explanatory work is fulfilled by mathematical models that deliver
an account of the spatial parameters that determine the geometry of the field
over which the molecules diffuse, generating stable patterns. Let us call mor-
phological these explanations, which lie at the opposite side of the spectrum
from genetic explanations. Neither genetic nor morphological explanations,
however, constitute the paradigmatic explanatory model of current molecular-
developmental biology. In the following section, I shall turn to a discussion
of a third kind of molecular explanation that combines genetic and molecular
details with mathematical models to provide an accurate and robust account
of the development of organisms.
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4.4 Morphogenetic Explanation
The interplay of molecular details and mathematical structures is well illus-
trated by the standard textbook explanation of axis formation in Drosophila.
The choice of this example is motivated by two considerations. First, the de-
velopment of the fruit fly has been studied to a greater extent than any other
biological organism and, as a result, we are in an ideal position to assess the
depth of the presented explanation. Second, some philosophers employ the
development of the early Drosophila to support reductionism (e.g. Rosenberg
1997, 2006), while others take it to vindicate antireductionist conclusions (e.g.
Laublicher and Wagner 2001)). In the course of the following analysis, I shall
attempt to capture the protean nature of this case study.
In the early stages of development, embryos specialize their cells, orienting
them towards different fates. In dipterans like Drosophila, the differentiation
of cells occurs through a process called syncytial specification. In short, cell di-
vision is not completed: instead of being embedded in individual membranes,
nuclei are divided directly within the egg cytoplasm. The result is one large
oocyte (immature egg cell), called a syncytium, containing many nuclei that
develop into various types of cells depending on their position within the syn-
cytium. This is possible thanks to the presence of morphogens that, once
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synthesized in specific sites, diffuse throughout the embryo and form concen-
tration gradients that break the uniformity of the oocyte cytoplasm. The
relative concentration of morphogens provides a signal that determines the
fate of the nuclei according to their position relative to the source of the mor-
phogen: the lower the morphogen concentration, the farther the nucleus is
from the source.17 The signals provided by various morphogen concentrations
interact to form a fine-grained coordinate system that specifies the position of
nuclei and selectively triggers the activation of the genes that govern the fate
of the cell.18
A concrete example should make the process clearer. In order to account
17The relation between signals and position requires some clarification. From a causal
perspective, the determination of the cell fate depends primarily on the signal it receives
and secondarily, on its position within the embryo. This is because, if we vary the signal
received by a nucleus without altering its position, the fate of the cell will change. In
contrast, if we vary the position of the nucleus within the embryo without altering the
signal, the cell will not develop differently. However, in normal (i.e. non-experimental)
conditions, the diffusion of morphogens and the formation of gradients in the embryo are
fixed: a change in signal never occurs without a corresponding change in position; the two
parameters co-vary. Thus, I shall treat signals and position, indifferently, as primary causes
of cellular specification.
18I should stress that this form of cellular differentiation cannot be generalized and applied
to all insects, let alone all organisms. Dipterans (long germ band insects) are unusual in
forming a syncytium. Invertebrates typically employ a form of autonomous specification, in
which morphogenetic determinants are apportioned to the cells as the embryo divides. As
a result, cell specification is independent of their position in the embryo, giving rise to a
pattern of embryogenesis called mosaic development. In contrast, short germ band insects
(e.g. grasshoppers), intermediate germ band insects (e.g. crickets), and most arthropods
develop complete cells before specification begins and thus the fate of their cells is determined
through a process called conditional specification, giving rise to a pattern of embryogenesis
called regulative development, which depends on interactions between neighboring cells, as
opposed to nuclei-morphogens interactions.
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for the segmentation of the Drosophila larva, two processes need to be ex-
plained: the specification of concentration gradients and the differentiation of
cells along the axes. Let us consider them in turn.19 The localized produc-
tion of morphogenetic signals that specify positional information occurs before
the moment of fertilization, at a stage called oogenesis in which the oocyte
is formed. The fruit fly oocyte develops within a cyst of 16 germline cells,
surrounded by an epithelium (a sheet or tube) or somatic follicle cells, which
secrete the eggshell. Each 16-cell cyst derives from a single cell, the cyto-
blast, through four division cycles (with incomplete cytokinesis). One of the
cells, located at the future posterior end of the embryo, becomes the oocyte
precursor, while the other 15 cells become nurse cells, which supply essential
components to the oocyte. Initially, the nurse cells are non-differentiated, in
the sense that each of them can potentially acquire the same fate. The first
task of the oocyte precursor is thus to differentiate the instructions for the
development of these nurse cells.
The preliminary organization of the cytoskeleton is determined by two
distinct signals governed by the same gene, gurken. The gurken message is
19In what follows, we shall abstract from many complex details that are largely irrelevant
for present purposes. A comprehensive description can be found in Davidson (2005) and
Gilbert (2006a) .
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synthesized within the nurse cells, but is transported inside the oocyte nucleus
through cytoplasmic channels, microtubules that connect nurse cells to each
other and to the oocyte, allowing cytoplasmic material to pass from one cell to
the other. Inside the nucleus (more specifically, between the nucleus and the
cell membrane) this message is translated into the Gurken protein. Since, as
said, at this time the oocyte nucleus is located at the posterior end of the folli-
cle, the nurse cells located at that position receive the gurken signal (through
a receptor coded by the torpedo gene) and, as a consequence, undergo a pro-
cess called “posteriorization”. In turn, these nurse cells, which are provided
with posterior identity, send a feedback signal to the oocyte that reorients its
cytoskeleton, establishing a preliminary anteroposterior polarity in the oocyte.
While the cytoskeleton is rearranging its structure, cytoplasmic components—
which include maternal messengers such as bicoid and nanos mRNAs that, as
we shall see, play a central role in the segmentation process—are carried by
motor proteins along the microtubules from the nurse cells into the oocyte, at
specific sites. At the end of oogenesis, after emptying their contents into the
oocyte, the nurse cells die. In short, the localized production of morphogens
and the resulting formation of concentration gradients is established by gene
products that govern interactions between the syncytium and follicle cells al-
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tering the oocyte’s cytoskeleton and organizing the distribution of maternal
mRNAs in the early embryo.
In the second process, the specification of syncytial cells depends on the
interaction between morphogens and nuclei, which selectively regulates gene
expression, according to the position of the nucleus along the axis. The differ-
entiation of the Drosophila larva along the anteroposterior axis is determined
by the relative concentration of two morphogens: Bicoid and Nanos.20 During
the initial organization process described above, bicoid mRNA is transported
to the anterior portion of the embryo, where the Bicoid protein is synthesized
and diffused. As a result, the concentration of Bicoid is higher in the anterior
part and gradually declines the further along we move towards the poste-
rior tip. Precisely the opposite is true of nanos mRNA, which is transported
to and synthesized in the posterior regions. Consequently, the concentration
of Nanos protein is higher in the posterior regions and gradually reduces the
closer we get to the anterior portions. Oversimplifying a bit, Bicoid and Nanos
are, respectively, an activator and a repressor. Bicoid induces the action of
a gene, hunchback, which triggers the development of the anterior segments
20The determination of the dorsal-ventral axis is, likewise, established by the diffusion of
morphogens throughout the embryo, but is more complicated from a molecular perspective.
Given that these complexities are not essential to the philosophical argument, in what
follows, I shall focus solely on the formation of the anteroposterior axis.
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of the embryo. In contrast, the maternal-effect gene nanos encodes a pro-
tein, Nanos, whose main function is to bind to sequences in the trailer region
(“Nanos-response elements”) of the hunchback mRNA and prevent its transla-
tion into protein.21 As they divide, nuclei will be found in different regions of
the syncytium. In nuclei located in the anterior areas of the embryo, where
the concentration of Bicoid is high and the concentration of Nanos is low, the
Hunchback protein activates the genes necessary for developing the head. Con-
versely, in posterior regions with little or no Bicoid but plenty of Nanos, Nanos
inhibits the translation of the Hunchback protein, generating the abdominal
structures. Finally, nuclei found in the central regions, where the Bicoid :
Nanos ratio approaches, 1 : 1, the complex interactions of these morphogens
with hunchback mRNA activates the genes that produce the thorax. (See Fig-
ure 4.3.1 for a graphic illustration.) This account of cellular differentiation is
known as the “French Flag model” (Wolpert 1969), since the three specified
regions (anterior, central, and posterior) are reminiscent of the stripes of a
French flag.
The explanation of axis formation in Drosophila bears both important
analogies and significant differences with genetic and morphological explana-
21Hence, Nanos is a repressor not at the transcriptional, but at the translational level.
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Figure 4.4.1: Bicoid, Nanos, and hunchback gradients in the Drosophila em-
bryo.
tions discussed in the previous sections. Compare first axis formation with
coat patterning and shell coiling. As in the case of Murray and Meinhardt’s
work, rates of diffusion, geometrical properties of the system, and dispositional
properties of reactants (activators and repressors) play a fundamental role in
the explanation of segment specification, as reflected by the analogies in the
corresponding RDS. However, while a relatively abstract mathematical model
is sufficient to explain differences in coat pattern formation across mammals
and similarities in the coiling of shells, the explanation of axis formation also
requires a specification of molecular details, because the identities and struc-
tural properties of genes, RNAs, and molecules (bicoid, nanos, hunchback,
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gurken, etc.) make a difference to the outcome of the diffusion process.
Next, compare the explanation of Drosophila segmentation with genetic ex-
planations. In both types of explanation, molecular properties are important
difference makers. As said, the structure of the hemoglobin gene determines
the disposition to experience crises at low oxygen levels. Likewise, the dif-
ferentiation of fruit fly cells is governed by a chemical signal that selectively
activates genes depending of the nucleus’ position in the embryo. However,
while the structure of the hemoglobin gene is sufficient to determine whether
or not the erythrocytes will sickle in an organism (against a background of
“normal” physiological conditions), here the variable parameters that control
the fate of each nucleus include both the interactions of genes and gene prod-
ucts and the spatial organization of the embryo that governs the concentration
of morphogens in the oocyte. In short, both molecular details and geomet-
rical properties of the system are necessary to explain the segmentation of
Drosophila, but neither is, by itself, sufficient. To refer to explanations of this
kind, where difference makers occur both at the molecular and the morpho-
logical level, I introduce the term morphogenetic explanation.
The expression “morphogenetic explanation” alludes to the old concept
of the morphogenetic field : a group of cells responding to discrete localized
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biochemical signals that govern the development of morphological structures.
Once a prominent postulate of embryology, morphogenetic fields were later
set aside with the development of molecular genetics. The reason is that the
discovery of the structure and causal role of genes led many scientists to be-
lieve that all developmental processes could be explained in terms of genetic
or cytological mechanisms. Progress in the study of gene regulation and ex-
pression, however, has made it clear that this is not the case. In particular,
the discovery that many developmental processes are regulated by signals that
diffuse throughout the embryo, interact with cells, and assign them a position
within coordinate systems revived interest in patterns formed by spatially co-
ordinated and temporally synchronized patterns of cells. Interestingly, these
clusters often coincide with the embryonic fields identified and studied in the
first part of the 20th century (e.g. the limb field, the eye field, and the otic
field). Seventy years after the golden age of embryology, morphogenetic fields
have reemerged as a valuable scientific concept, albeit with a remarkable dif-
ference. Whereas the original embryonic fields were defined anatomically or
cytoplasmically, cellular interactions are now known to be regulated by gene
action. In other words, the old field concept was completely independent
of genes. In contrast, the epithelial units of current developmental biology
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are governed and determined by sequences of nucleotides and their products,
which constitute a regulative and responsive cytological apparatus involving
complex forms of redundant controls and negative and positive feedback loops
that modulate the response of the received signals. The anatomically-defined
fields of Spemann, Needham, and Weiss have thus been “molecularized”, i.e.
transformed into a network of cells whose time evolution is governed by the
partial differential equations of diffusion processes regulating gene networks
(Gilbert et al. 1996). In a sense, this transformation is just a matter of recov-
ering an older concept and attuning it with contemporary molecular findings.
Nonetheless, as Wolpert and Nüsslein-Volhardt understood long ago, these
redescriptions play an important explanatory role in scientific practice.
4.5 Reframing Reductionism
Let us take stock. I identified three paradigms of molecular explanation: ge-
netic, morphological, and morphogenetic. Genetic explanations, where genes
and gene products do all the explanatory work, are possible when the difference-
maker(s) occur at the biochemical level, broadly construed, so as to include
functional and dispositional properties of nucleotides and proteins. As noted
in the discussion of sickle-cell anemia and Huntington’s disease, the genetic ex-
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planans does not necessarily—or even commonly—capture all the causes and
effects of the disease. However, when biochemical difference-makers deter-
mine the occurrence of an event against a set of fixed background conditions,
we can provide a relatively straightforward genetic explanation that abstracts
away from further causes and effects. In the second paradigm, morpholog-
ical explanation, the difference-makers that explain a phenomenon occur at
the level of the geometrical structure of the system and its patterns of vari-
ation. Mathematical models that largely abstract from molecular details are
especially useful when comparing processes across organisms and species, be-
cause they provide an effective means to explain similarities in the outcome
of different molecular processes and variety in patterns that are generated by
analogous biochemical apparatuses. Finally, when the parameters that make
a difference to the outcome of a process occur both at the biochemical and
the geometrical level, we have morphogenetic explanations, where genes and
molecules are brought together in a morphogenetic field so as to account for
the formation of biological traits. This third paradigm of explanation is the
most widely adopted in current molecular-developmental biology, where it is
applicable to a broad range of explananda. However, the importance of mor-
phogenetic explanations should not obscure the significance of the two other
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paradigms, which play an important role in areas of the life sciences and clin-
ical research such as genetics, genomics, evolutionary-developmental biology,
and systems biology. The boundaries, limits and characteristic features of
these paradigms, as well as their relations,22 deserve to be investigated more
thoroughly and systematically than has been done here and, perhaps, further
varieties of molecular explanation can be isolated. The explicit aim of the
above discussion was not to provide an exhaustive list but, much more mod-
estly, to emphasize important distinctions between models of explanation that
should not be obliterated.
With all of this in mind, we can now return to the two strands of reduction-
ism mentioned at the outset. Despite their superficial perspicuity, substantial
issues in both theses are obscured by ambiguities of scope and terminology.
Consider, first, genetic reductionism, the claim that the genetic program alone
is able to explain the regularities of development. What is, precisely, the “ge-
netic program”? Antireductionists often adopt—more or less explicitly—a re-
strictive definition that makes the genetic program coextensive with sequences
of nucleotides. If we adopt this narrow definition, then the answer to the
22Indeed, explanations occurring at different levels can be mutually relevant and can be
jointly employed to narrow the gaps in our understanding of development. While a fuller
account of the relation between types of molecular explanation must be left for another
occasion, these interactive modes of investigation can be fruitfully described in terms of
“exploration, iterativity, and kludging” (O’Malley 2011).
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reductionist challenge is clearly negative: DNA alone cannot explain develop-
ment. But is this really a victory for antireductionism? Does any biologist
worth her salt believe that DNA is the complete, all-determining program for
the construction of an organism, or that genes are the only important develop-
mental resource? In contrast, reductionists tend to attribute a much broader
scope to the genetic program and include in its domain RNAs, proteins, and
other macromolecules (Rosenberg 2006). If we accept this extended geno-
type, genetic reductionism becomes a much more plausible thesis.23 However,
once we endow sequences of nucleotides with epigenetic processes, cytoplas-
mic molecules, and other gears of the cellular machinery, genetic reductionism
turns out to be coextensive with molecular reductionism, the thesis that every
biological event can be explained in terms of biochemical facts alone. In short,
the plausibility of genetic reductionism and its autonomy from its molecular
counterpart are jeopardized by ambiguity: the thesis teeters on a false claim
or, alternatively, tends to overlap with molecular reductionism, depending on
how rich we allow the genetic program to be.
23This applies only to modest reductionist frameworks that place no restrictions on the
form of the reduction. Rosenberg (1997) advocates a more ambitious project that integrates
into reductionism a “simplicity requirement” according to which development must be ex-
plained by a small number of genes and molecules. Given that such a desideratum can
hardly be fulfilled (Frost-Arnold 2004; Franklin-Hall 2008), Rosenberg (2006) subsequently
articulated a less radical version of reductionism that drops simplicity.
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The crucial issue for settling the debate thus becomes the tenability of
molecular reductionism, which hinges on the range of phenomena that can
be described and explained by molecular biology in purely biochemical terms.
The problem is that the expressions “molecular biology” and “purely biochem-
ical language” are, in and of themselves, dangerously ambiguous; precise, un-
controversial definitions have seldom (if ever) been articulated. As a result,
even in the case of genetic explanation—which constitutes the form of expla-
nation closest to the molecular-reductionist framework—the claim that only
pure biochemical facts figure in the explanans can be questioned. Genetic
explanations in current biological practice constantly appeal to dispositional
properties, such as flexibility or elasticity, and terms like “transcription factor”
that involve an implicit appeal to function, which would be extremely hard, if
not impossible, to specify in structural terms. And once we move away from ge-
netic explanations and focus on morphological and morphogenetic models, the
need for enriching a strictly biochemical language becomes even more evident.
Even a cursory glance at current molecular research reveals that structural
properties of genes and gene products, functional and dispositional features of
reactants, spatial and geometrical parameters of systems, and diffusion pro-
cesses all play a central role in developmental explanations. Thus, unless the
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reductionist is willing to hedge her bets and argue that, in principle, we can
dispose of this whole explanatory apparatus,24 the standard reductionist move
is to acknowledge the explanatory importance of all this extra stuff, but also
to contend that it all part of molecular biology and its language.25 In turn,
antireductionists, with the exception, perhaps, of radical holists, accept the
primacy of this explanatory apparatus, but contend that it transcends the
molecular realm since the constant appeal to teleological concepts renders the
molecular language not “fully molecular” (Culp and Kitcher 1989; Kincaid
1990; Franklin-Hall 2008).
So, who wins, the reductionist or the antireductionist? Some readers might
view the paradigms of molecular explanation isolated above as a rephrasing of
the reductionist framework. Granted, the explicit acknowledgment of the im-
portance of functional-dispositional concepts and positional information makes
the reduction of developmental processes to a molecular basis less brutal, but
it is still reduction after all. Others might interpret my emphasis on the inter-
action of biochemical details with spatial properties of the system as providing
24Perhaps philosophers of science who believe that all scientific explanations can be pro-
vided at the level of fundamental physics would sympathize with this view. To the best of
my knowledge, very few (if any) students of biology, however, would be willing to endorse
and defend such a radical form of reductionism, which runs contrary to the theory and
practice of current molecular biology.
25This more modest approach seems to be the path followed by most philosophers of
biology with reductionist inclinations (e.g. Rosenberg 2006; Schaffner 2006).
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(another!) defense of antireductionism, albeit in a softer form. In a sense, both
parties are right. The three paradigms of molecular explanation isolated here
are inconsistent with both radical reductionism—the thesis that everything
can be explained in terms of biochemical properties and fundamental laws—
and, radical holism, according to which complete developmental explanations
must focus on macro-systems involving organisms embedded in their environ-
ments for entire life-cycles. Once we set these extreme views aside, however,
it becomes apparent that modest reductionism substantially overlaps with so-
phisticated forms of antireductionism.26 Thus, if there is substantial agreement
among both parties concerning the range of explananda and the required ex-
planantia, then perhaps the dispute is less substantive and more verbal than
many disputants are likely to admit. Whether the paradigms of molecular
explanation isolated here are better classified as falling under reductionism or
antireductionism is ultimately an issue that depends more on terminological
convention than metaphysical or methodological distinctions.
Should we conclude, then, that the whole reductionist-antireductionist de-
bate ought to be abandoned? This might be too strong. Perhaps there are
26The modest (anti)reductionism articulated here bears significant analogies to Wimsatt’s
view of reductionism and holism as complementary perspectives (see the essays collected in
Wimsatt 2007), explanatory extensions (Kitcher 1984), interfield theory (Darden and Maull
1977; Maull 1977), and partial reductions (Schaffner 2006).
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other ways of reconstructing the dispute to make it more substantive by fo-
cusing on issues other than the extent of the explanatory basis such as, for
example, causality.27 The above discussion suggests that one way to recon-
struct the opposition is to concentrate on difference-making, a concept that is
central to many biological explanations and deserves more attention that has
been accorded so far. Waters (2007) is right to point out that, in many biologi-
cal contexts, genes are the causes that make an (actual) difference. As a result,
there is an important subclass of causal explanations in biology—those that
we identified here as genetic explanations—where genes play a more promi-
nent causal role than other processes and background conditions. However, as
shown in this chapter, in other biological contexts the difference-making role
is fulfilled by morphological properties (morphological explanations) or by a
combination of molecular-genetic and geometrical properties (morphogenetic
explanations). In this respect, the reductionist might claim that all biological
difference-makers are reducible to the causal properties of genes and molecules.
This would involve, for example, showing that geometrical and morphological
features of developmental systems inherit their causal powers from their funda-
27Some passages in the literature suggest that this is what many philosophers have in
mind: “What reductionism denies is that there are distinct causal properties of [items such
as cells] that are not open to identification in macromolecular terms.” (Rosenberg 2006, 84).
(See also Kincaid 1990; Sober 1999; Schaffner 2006).
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mental constituents. The antireductionist, in turn, could respond that causal
relations occurring at a higher-level cannot always be reduced to a lower level,
and defend some form of “downward causation”, according to which devel-
opmental systems (or other supra-molecular units) are causally efficacious in
ways that cannot be given a strictly molecular analysis.
These considerations raise some deep and substantial philosophical issues
(What is a cause? What assigns causes to different levels? What is the re-
lation between causation and explanation?) that cannot be addressed in full
in the present chapter. The moral that we ought to draw from the discussion
above is that “reductionism” and “antireductionism” are not the right cate-
gories for classifying explanation because these frameworks, as they are cur-
rently intended, are too coarse-grained and ambiguous. Presenting the dispute
as hinging on the claim that there is an explanation of every biological event in
a purely molecular language obscures subtle but significant distinctions among
the varieties of molecular explanation.
Chapter 5
The Interdisciplinarity of Science
(As a Working Hypothesis)
Abstract
Philosophers have traditionally addressed the issue of theory unification in
terms of theoretical reduction. Reductive models, however, cannot explain
the occurrence of unification in areas of science where successful reductions
are hard to find. The goal of this chapter is to discuss a concrete example of
unification in biology—the Developmental Synthesis—and to present a general
model of scientific unification, according to which two fields are in the process
of being unified when they become explanatory relevant for each other. I
conclude by suggesting that this methodological conception of unity, which
is independent of the debate on the metaphysical foundations of science, is
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closely connected to the notion of interdisciplinarity.
5.1 Introduction
Philosophers of science have traditionally addressed the issue of theory uni-
fication in terms of theoretical reduction. The general assumption was that
two scientific theories can be said to be unified when one is successfully re-
duced to the other, or both are subsumed under a broader, more general
theory. Now, surely, the exact formulation of the conditions for reduction, and
whether these conditions hold, are important questions that spurred lengthy
debates. However, for a long time the unity of science was treated—more or
less explicitly—as the result of a series of intertheoretic reductions.
“[W]hen we ask about whether there is a unity in science, we mean this
as a question of logic, concerning the logical relationship between the
terms and the laws of the various branches of science.” (Carnap 1938,
397).
“The only method of attaining unitary science that appears to be seri-
ously attainable at present is microreduction.” (Oppenheim and Putnam
1958, 408).
Biology constitutes a notoriously challenging terrain for reduction and, con-
sequently, for unification. Whether we conceive theory reduction as founded
on the (in)famous framework of Nagel (1961)—according to which theory A is
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reduced to theory B if the laws of A can be logically derived from the laws of B
by means of bridge principles—or on less demanding accounts (e.g. Schaffner
1967), concrete examples of successful theoretical reductions in the biological
sciences are hard to find. Consequently, traditional reductive models of uni-
fication leave us facing a problem. If reduction is a necessary and sufficient
condition for unification, then we ought to conclude that in areas of science,
such as biology, where there are no theoretic reductions, there is no unification.
This, however, flies in the face of many scientists, philosophers, and historians
of science who have celebrated the unification of genetics and evolution in the
so-called Evolutionary Synthesis (Mayr and Provine 1980) and, more recently,
the unification of developmental and evolutionary biology in the Developmen-
tal Synthesis (Carroll 2005). To avoid this conclusion, one can legitimately
question whether theory reduction constitutes the right framework to assess
real or alleged cases of unification that occur in the biological sciences.
The increasing philosophical interest for the special sciences as an inde-
pendent object of study, encouraged the development of various non-reductive
models of unification.1 Authors such as Maull (1977), Darden and Maull
1It should be noted that the existence of alternative conceptions of unification was al-
ready acknowledged—but quickly dismissed—by philosophers working within the logical
empiricist framework (e.g. Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). A notable exception is Neu-
rath, who endorsed a particular view of unified science as the practical aim of bringing
together researchers working in distinct fields to facilitate communication and interconnec-
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(1977), Bechtel (1984), Kincaid (1990, 1997), Wylie (1999), Mitchell (2003),
Grantham (2004), and Potochnik (2011) have discussed at length how scien-
tific fields can be synthesized without thereby being replaced or reduced to one
another.2 However, fundamental issues remain unresolved. The aim of this
chapter is to examine a concrete example of biological unification and employ
it as a model for an alternative account of scientific unification according to
which two fields are in the process of being unified when they become explana-
tory relevant for each other. I should emphasize right away that the connection
between unification and explanation is of old vintage. Friedman (1974) and
Kitcher (1981) famously sketched and defended a general approach to explana-
tion that focuses on the capacity of arguments to subsume different phenomena
under a single account, and the converse relation—the significance of expla-
nation for unification—has sometimes been acknowledged as one among many
potential conditions of unification. Nevertheless, the centrality of explanation
in scientific unification has been vastly underestimated and not sufficiently
explored.
tion (Cartwright and Cat 1996; Cat et al. 1996; Potochnik 2011).
2From a historical perspective, unity and synthesis have often been treated as distinct
concepts (Kant constitutes a noteworthy example). However, following contemporary philo-
sophical and scientific practice, which treat the two terms as synonymous, I will use “unity”
and “synthesis” interchangeably.
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To begin, it will be useful to review some familiar problems that concern
both components of theory reduction: theories and reductions. These ar-
guments have been extensively discussed; nevertheless, a brief recapitulation
of the shortcomings of the traditional approach will suggest some guidelines
for moving forward. Next, I shall consider some existing accounts of non-
reductive unification, exposing some limitations. The rest of the chapter is
devoted to drawing some more systematic relations between explanation and
unification, using evolutionary developmental biology as a case study. I argue
that the foundations of the ongoing Developmental Synthesis lie in a shared
explanatory basis that makes molecular and evolutionary biology explanatorily
relevant for each other.
5.2 Problems with Theory Reduction
Classic formulations of theory reduction presuppose a conception of theories
as consisting of collections of statements, which must include both general
laws and empirically testable conclusions derivable from them. This syntactic
account, a legacy of logical empiricism, is especially inadequate to character-
ize theories in the special sciences. Restricting our attention to biology, the
complex structure of fields like cytology, genetics, biochemistry, and evolution
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is hard to capture in syntactic terms, on pain of trivialization or generating a
dramatically impoverished reconstruction. Effective arguments have been de-
veloped in detail with respect to genetics (Kitcher 1984) and Darwin’s theory of
evolution (Kitcher 1985), but analogous conclusions can be straightforwardly
extended to other areas of the biological sciences and, more generally, of the
special sciences.
There are two alternative ways of responding to the problem. One solution
is to revise the definition of scientific theory, for example, by replacing the
syntactic conception with a semantic approach that identifies theories with
collections of models.3 Several authors have pursued a different strategy, that
is, to deny that areas of science such as genetics, biochemistry, and evolu-
tion, count as “theories” at all, and replaced the term with various alterna-
tive characterizations, including paradigms (Kuhn 1970), disciplines (Toulmin
1972), research traditions (Laudan 1977), or fields (Darden and Maull 1977).
Whether genetics, biochemistry and evolutionary biology are better defined as
“theories” or as something else is an interesting question that, however, I shall
3The semantic approach—pioneered by Suppes (1960) and later developed by others
(e.g. van Fraassen 1980)—was originally introduced with respect to physics, but is applica-
ble to the special sciences as well. Kitcher (1985), for example, describes Darwin’s theory of
evolution by natural selection as an explanatory device that answers questions that had pre-
viously seemed inaccessible to science. Whether this account of theories as problem-solving
patterns is a version of the semantic approach or an alternative conception is irrelevant here;
the point is that it attempts to capture biological theories in non-syntactic terms.
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set aside. The important point, for present purposes, is that these areas of
science cannot be adequately captured and described in terms of interpreted
axiomatic systems.
Independently of the shortcomings of the syntactic conception of theories,
theory reduction also fails as a characterization of actual scientific practice.
Fodor (1974), among many others, has argued that the relation between the
special sciences and fundamental physics is not a reductive one and—perhaps
with a few trite examples, such as thermodynamics and statistical mechan-
ics4—genuine instances of theory reduction are hard to find in physics as well.
The situation is even more troublesome in the context of biology, since even
the best candidates for theoretical reduction, such as Mendelian genetics and
molecular biology, have been shown to fail (Kitcher 1984). Finally, not only is
derivational reduction descriptively inaccurate; even its normative significance
as a goal for scientific practice has been seriously questioned (Maull 1977).
In sum, theory reduction has fallen on both fronts. The traditional syn-
tactic conception of theories is drastically limited in scope, and the logical
reduction of theories lacks both normative and descriptive force. To be sure,
the plausibility of reductionism is still lively debated across several areas of
4But see Sklar (1993) for some difficulties and qualifications.
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philosophy, and even in areas, such as the philosophy of biology, where a gen-
eral antireductionist consensus reigns, reductionism has feisty defenders. Yet
the question of reductionism has assumed a different form: the current debate
largely focuses on epistemic rather than logical relations between areas of sci-
ence. Theory reduction—at least in the traditional guise—has been beaten to
death.
5.3 Interfield Connections
The limitations of theory reduction exposed in the previous section raise a
specific problem for unification: if reduction is not a necessary and sufficient
condition for synthesis, then what does it mean for two branches of science
to be unified? This question can be divided in two parts, which should be
addressed independently. First, what kind of relations can be established
across various scientific disciplines, other than reductions? Second, can these
relations be employed to redefine unification? The present section is concerned
with the former question; the latter problem will be addressed in the following
one.
A good place to start examining the various kinds of non-reductive relations
that connect different branches of science is Nancy Maull and Lindley Darden’s
CHAPTER 5. THE INTERDISCIPLINARITY OF SCIENCE 160
seminal work on interfield theories (Maull 1977; Darden and Maull 1977). To
begin, we should note that Maull and Darden focus on fields rather than
theories. In explicit opposition to the syntactic conception of theories, they
define a field as:
“an area of science consisting of the following elements: a central prob-
lem, a domain consisting of items taken to be facts related to that prob-
lem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to
how the problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and, some-
times, but not always, concepts, laws and theories which are related to
the problem and which attempt to realize the explanatory goals. A spe-
cial vocabulary is often associated with the characteristic elements of a
field.” (Darden and Maull 1977, 44).
Fields in molecular biology include genetics, biochemistry, physical chem-
istry, and cytology. As a concrete example, consider cytology:
“Cytology in its early days has the central problem—what are the ba-
sic units of organisms? This problem was solved by the postulation of
the cell theory and its subsequent elaboration and confirmation in the
nineteenth century. Afterwards, the problem for cytologists (or cell bi-
ologists as they have come to be called) became the characterization
of different types of cells, of organelles within cells, and of their vari-
ous functions. The problem is tackled primarily with the technique of
microscopic analysis.” (Ibidem, 46-7)
Theories (or collections or theories) belonging to different fields do not com-
pete and cannot be logically reduced to one another; yet, fields and theories
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therein may be connected in various ways. A general account that conceptual-
izes and makes explicit the non-mutually-exclusive relations between scientific
fields is called an interfield theory. To illustrate the sort of intertheoretic
relations that can be established, Darden and Maull provide the following ex-
ample. Classical genetics lacked the conceptual and experimental resources
to determine the molecular structure and function of genes, or to causally ex-
plain the process of heredity. It was only with the advent of molecular biology
and biochemistry that the chromosomal location of genes, their double-helical
structure, their function as protein templates, and many of the details of gene
expression were finally uncovered. Yet, the existence of Mendelian factors,
their relevance for heredity, and even their relation to chromosomes, was al-
ready postulated by classical geneticists. This goes to show that new fields
can sometimes specify the location, structure, function, and causal relations of
entities and processes postulated in a different discipline. It should be noted
that none of these relations is reductive: there is no attempt to reduce classical
genetics to cytology, in any sense of “reduction.” Even once the connections
between these fields are made explicit, the fields themselves remain largely
independent and distinct. Nevertheless, the resulting interfield theory—the
chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity—effectively unified the fields of ge-
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netics and cytology:
“[The chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity] was generated to unify
the knowledge of heredity found in both fields and thereby to explain
the similar properties of chromosomes and genes. It functioned to focus
attention on previously neglected items of the domains and to predict
new items for the domains of each field. It further served to generate
a new line of research coordinating the fields of cytology and genetics.
Success in finding the predictions of the theory and in developing the
common line of research resulted in the confirmation of the theory and
the fruitful bridging of two fields of science.” (Darden and Maull 1977,
54)
The idea that a new field can illuminate the foundations of a prior theory
and extend its range of explananda was further developed and clarified by
Kitcher (1984) in terms of “conceptual refinements” and “explanatory exten-
sions.” Again, the core insight is that scientists often postulate entities whose
structure and function is not yet fully understood, and formulate questions
that cannot be answered by the concepts and technology presently available
in their fields. When this is the case, the relevant answers and explanations
can sometimes be found in a neighboring discipline. If theory T* provides an
illuminating description an entities that fall within the domain of theory T ,
Kitcher says, T* provides a conceptual refinement of T . Similarly, when T*
sheds light on some schematic premise of a problem-solving pattern in T , T*
is an explanatory extension of T . Going back to our previous example, molec-
CHAPTER 5. THE INTERDISCIPLINARITY OF SCIENCE 163
ular genetics uncovered the structure of genes and genetic processes, which
figured as crucial premises in Mendelian genetics, but were left unexplained.
As a result, molecular genetics provides both a conceptual refinement and an
explanatory extension of classical genetics.
In conclusion, Maull and Darden’s observation that scientific fields can be
related without replacing them or reducing them to one another has been de-
veloped in various ways. The idea that the unification of fields increases the
breadth and depth of possible explananda has been sharpened and developed
by Kitcher in terms of conceptual refinements and explanatory extensions. Fur-
thermore, the range of interfield connections—which, in Darden and Maull’s
original formulation, were limited to the location, nature, structure, and causal
relations between entities and processes—has been substantially broadened by
other authors, such as Kincaid and Grantham. Kincaid (1990) individuates
seven kinds of intertheoretic relations: (i) The ontology of one theory may
exhaust that of the other; (ii) The two two theories may be irreducible yet
logically compatible; (iii) One theory may supervene upon another; (iv) One
theory supervenes upon another, and it is not just the case that supervenience
holds, but we can also explain how it does; (v) One theory may be heuristically
dependent upon another; (vi) One theory may be “confirmationally” dependent
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upon another; (vii) One theory may use, explicitly or implicitly, explanations
from the other. While explicitly stating that the list is not meant to be ex-
haustive, when all these requirements are met, Kincaid notes, unity reaches
its pinnacle and the two theories are said to be incorporated into an integrated
interlevel theory. Further elaborating on the work of Maull, Darden, Kitcher,
and Kincaid, Grantham (2004) recognizes a similar array of interfield con-
nections, and classifies them in two categories. Theoretical interconnections
involve conceptual, ontological, and explanatory relations; practical intercon-
nections involve relations of heuristic dependence, confirmational dependence,
and methodological integration.
5.4 Non-Reductive Unification
With all of this in mind, we can now return to the problem of unification.
More specifically, let us focus on the second question isolated above: whether
interfield connections can be employed as a viable and fruitful model of (non-
reductive) unification. Darden and Maull’s working hypothesis is that inter-
field theories are the key to understanding synthesis: to unify two fields simply
is to connect them via an interfield theory.
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“The unity of science analyzed as a hierarchical classification scheme of
scientific theories, graded according to generality, is precisely the picture
provided by Oppenheim and Putnam as a ‘working hypothesis.’ Our
preliminary analysis suggests another, new working hypothesis: unity
in science is a complex network of relationships between fields effected
by interfield theories.” (Ibidem, 61)
Despite Darden and Maull’s illuminating discussion of the historical and
contemporary relations between various subfields of biology, and Kincaid and
Grantham’s refinements, I argue that unity-as-interconnection models leave
two fundamental issues unresolved.
The first problem with taking interfield theories as a model of unification
is that, even granting that they provide an accurate description of the main
connections between areas of science, they lack normative force: they fail to
explain why unification is (or should be) an explicit goal of scientific research.
As Grantham notes, scientists have often sought and sometimes achieved the
integration of scientific knowledge and, as philosophers of science, this pur-
suit of unity is important to analyze. However, as philosophers of science,
we should also be motivated to understand why unification is an important
scientific enterprise. And, in this respect, the unity-as-interconnection models
leave us wanting. To appreciate this point, it is instructive to compare these
non-reductive approaches to unification with previous accounts. The tradi-
tional reductive model intended to provide more than a descriptive account of
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an alleged general trend towards unification. Oppenheim and Putnam’s “unity
of science as a working hypothesis” also captured an important epistemic goal:
science should attempt to reduce (i.e. unify) theories because science has a sin-
gle and coherent metaphysical foundation. In other words, on the reductionist
picture, unification is a way of furthering scientific progress. This picture of sci-
ence as globally and fundamentally unified, however, has been challenged both
as a suitable foundation for science, and as an attainable epistemic goal. For
one thing, arguments defending unity as an actual scientific trend by means of
an inductive argument over past success have been challenged on the grounds
that “[t]he development of science has witnessed the proliferation of special-
ized disciplines at least as often as it has witnessed their reduction to physics”
(Fodor 1974, 97). Moreover, members of the so-called “Stanford School,” such
as Dupré (1993), Hacking (1996), Galison (1996), and Cartwright (1999), have
challenged the unity of science even more radically, advancing an opposing
metaphysical view according to which science is fundamentally “disunified.” A
comprehensive overview of the debate on the foundations of science lies beyond
the scope of this work. The important point, for present purposes, is that the
unity of science is not something that we can take for granted; it requires inde-
pendent justification. In other words, once we abandon the layer-cake model
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of sciences organized in a nested hierarchy, we are left without an account of
why unification matters. Consequently, describing interfield connections is not
sufficient; we also need to motivate the significance of these connections for
the advancement of science.5
We shall return to the question of why unification is an important scien-
tific endeavor in the second part of this chapter. For the moment, let us focus
on a related—but independent—problem: the fact that extant non-reductive
accounts are of little use for judging when two fields can finally be said to be
unified. For example, taken as a whole, Kincaid and Grantham’s intertheo-
retic relations, constitute an upper bound for unification. When two theories
satisfy all of them, they are connected by an integrated interlevel theory, which
constituted the “pinnacle” of unification. But is there a lower bound for uni-
fication? Can we say that two theories or fields are unified when they satisfy
some, but not all, of these conditions? If so, which ones? Requiring that
all conditions are met is clearly too strong. Fields can be effectively unified
without exhausting each other’s ontology or without one supervening on the
5Philosophers have sometimes argued that scientific progress requires a distinctive con-
nection between different fields (Potochnik 2011). While this is surely true, a satisfactory
account of unity needs to explain why these interconnections are necessary for scientific
progress.
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other.6 At the same time, merely requiring the satisfaction of any condition as
a sufficient criterion for unification is clearly too weak. The definitive rejection
of vitalism entailed an uncontroversial sense in which biology supervenes on
physics, since all organisms are composed of atomic and subatomic particles
subject to physical laws. But it would be preposterous to maintain, on this
ground alone, that biology and physics are currently (being) unified. Likewise,
it is plausible to say that the logical consistency of two theories is a necessary
condition for unification, but it can hardly be treated as sufficient.
A general account of unification must fulfill two independent desiderata.
First, it needs to motivate the significance of unification for scientific progress;
second, it must provide precise conditions for establishing when two fields are
unified, or are in the process of being unified. Existing unity-as-interconnections
models fail to satisfy both desiderata. In an attempt to articulate an alterna-
tive account that meets these standards, throughout the rest of this chapter
I focus on the significance of explanation in the unificationist enterprise. To
be sure, the idea that explanation plays a central role in unification is neither
6Dupré (1993) argues that different fields of science cross-classify entities in a way that
makes them irreducible to one another. The genes postulated by molecular biologists, for
example, are not the same entities that one finds in population genetics or Mendelian ge-
netics. Without entering into the details of the incommensurability of kinds across fields,
the important point is that the ontology of theories needs not coincide in order for the two
fields to be interconnected.
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original nor particularly controversial. It was already implicit in Darden and
Maull’s remark that one of the goals of interfield theory is “[t]o answer ques-
tions which, although they arise within a field, cannot be answered by using
the concepts and techniques of that field alone” (1977, 59). A similar idea
is also present, in a more explicit form, in Kitcher’s explanatory extensions,
and it also figures as one of Kincaid and Grantham’s criteria for unification.
Yet, I maintain that the significance of explanation for unification has been
vastly underestimated. In order to substantiate my claim, in the following
two sections I shall consider, as a case study, an example of an ongoing bio-
logical unification: the Developmental Synthesis. In the concluding section, I
provide a general account of unification grounded in the notion of explanatory
relevance, according to which to fields A and B are in the process of being
unified if and only if conceptual advancements and empirical results in A can
be employed to draw explanatory inferences in B and, vice versa. Finally, I
will argue that this concept of methodological unity is closely related to the
notion of interdisciplinarity.
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5.5 The Developmental Synthesis
The last few decades of the 20th century have witnessed the emergence of a
new branch of the life sciences, called evolutionary developmental biology (“evo
devo,” for short), which aims at bridging the methodological and theoretical
gap that has separated development and evolution since the early 1900s. It
attempts to do so by uncovering the molecular processes and developmental
trajectories by which modifications of gene regulation processes trigger and
constrain phenotypic variations, originate in evolutionary novelties, and alter
body plans. A general overview of the massive evo devo literature is clearly
besides our purposes. The questions that I shall address here are: what do
researchers mean when they claim that a synthesis of developmental and evo-
lutionary biology is currently in progress?7 And what evidence do we have in
support of the thesis that these fields are finally being (re)unified?
The significance of these questions in motivated by two independent rea-
sons. The first is exquisitely philosophical: the relationship between develop-
mental and evolutionary biology cannot be captured in terms of theoretical
reduction and, thus, the so-called Developmental Synthesis a good case study
7Statements of this kind are widespread in the biological and philosophical literature.
Paradigmatic examples can be found in Hall (2000), Carroll (2005), and Sansom and Bran-
don (2007).
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for non-reductive models of scientific unification. Both disciplines are complex
fields—characterized by central problems, domains of accepted facts, explana-
tory goals, conceptual apparatuses, techniques, methods, etc.—which cannot
be captured in terms of interpreted axiomatic systems. Moreover, no matter
how loosely we interpret “reduction,” development and evolution are not being
reduced to one another. The second reason for focusing on evo devo transcends
purely philosophical reflection and cuts deep into actual scientific research. In
spite of widespread agreement on the fact that development and evolution are
finally being united again, a broad and clear consensus on the nature of this
synthesis is yet to be achieved. Researchers coming from a whole variety of
biological disciplines and philosophical traditions are united under the aegis of
evo devo, turning this newborn branch of the life sciences into a hodgepodge
of goals, methodologies, and research projects.8 Consequently, the precise re-
lation between the evo and the devo are often left unspecified, or described
with general, unilluminating terms such as “synthesis” or “integration.” To
wit, consider the following passage:
8Symptomatic of this variety of perspectives is Hall’s (2000) distinction between evo-
devo—a synthesis of evolution and development—and devo-evo, a new form of developmental
evolutionary biology that is supposed to modify or even replace the Modern Synthesis. As
Hall points out, trying to emphasize development in the light of evolution or vice versa,
could lead to very different results.
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“Synthesis in [the context of evo devo] means finding a way to inte-
grate the results from one discipline within the theoretical structure of
the other, whether as research in the evolution of developmental mecha-
nisms or as research into the evolutionary consequences of developmental
process.” (Laublicher and Maienschein 2007, 1)
Specifying, in precise terms, how this “integration of results from one dis-
cipline within the structure of the other” should be understood requires addi-
tional philosophical work. In sum, clarifying the structure of the Developmen-
tal Synthesis is an important philosophical and scientific endeavor towards the
achievement of a unitary methodological perspective in evo devo.
So, in what sense are developmental and evolutionary biology being uni-
fied? The first thing to note is that the two fields have been known to be related
for a long time. Biologists have been aware of the mutual relevance of develop-
ment and evolution at least since Darwin and Wallace, the founders of modern
evolutionary theory, who speculated that bringing to light the mechanisms of
development is the key to understanding evolution. The co-dependence of the
two fields was eventually crystallized in Haeckel’s (in)famous biogenetic law,
stating that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” (Gould 1977). It was not until
the second half of the 20th century, however, that scientists began to uncover
the nature developmental process. Up to that point, the mechanisms of on-
togeny had to be set aside and “black-boxed”: their presence was indisputable,
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but their precise identity and structure was—and to a great extent still is—
beyond our ken. In short, it was only with the advent and progress of molecular
biology that partial knowledge of these mechanisms could be obtained.
Next, consider the relations between the two fields. Given that the evolu-
tionary trajectory of a species supervenes on the development of its members,
the mechanisms of ontogeny constrain and (partially) determine phylogeny.
Whether this, by itself, is sufficient to conclude that there is a substantial
overlap between the ontology of developmental and evolutionary biology is a
substantial question that, however, I shall set aside. The important point,
for present purposes, is that, borrowing an expression from Brigandt (2007)
development and evolution are “two sides of the same coin.” Is this fact alone
sufficient for the unification of these fields? Many advocates of evo devo, more
or less explicitly, suggest that it is. On this view, the Developmental Synthe-
sis is motivated by the incompleteness of the Modern Synthesis, which fused
the sciences of genetics and evolution by showing that genes are the material
bases of the inherited traits on which natural selection acts, and that evolution
could be redefined and explained in terms of variations in allelic frequencies
(Dobzhansky 1937). As noted, while the Modern Synthesis accounted for evo-
lution in terms of gene pools, the mechanisms responsible for turning genetic
CHAPTER 5. THE INTERDISCIPLINARITY OF SCIENCE 174
mutations into changes at the phenotypic level were effectively black-boxed
and left unexplained. The nature of the Developmental Synthesis thus con-
sists in an attempt to close the gap that was left open by the founders of the
Modern Synthesis by addressing the fundamental issue that they set aside: the
nature and structure of the mechanisms of variation.
I contend that filling an important explanatory gap in the Modern Syn-
thesis is insufficient to warrant claims of unification between evolutionary and
developmental studies. Clearly, this is not to deny that the discovery of the
ontogenetic mechanisms of variation is a remarkable scientific achievement.
The point is rather that this abridgment, by itself, does not show that the
two fields are unified, give that the discovery of such mechanisms is a task
that falls beyond the scope of evolutionary biology and genetics, as tradition-
ally conceived (Amundson 2005). In other words, the Modern Synthesis had
nothing to say about the nature of variation, but this is hardly surprising,
given that classical genetics and Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion assumed—but did not attempt to explain—the mechanisms of variation.
At a more general level, the fact that a certain field addresses fundamental
questions assumed but left unexplained by a different field is not enough to
show that the two fields are synthesized. Having a shared ontology, a relation
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of supervenience, or broadening the range of explananda, by themselves, still
fall short of unification. As I shall argue in the following section, unification
requires explanatory relevance. Developmental and evolutionary biology are
in the process of being unified precisely because developmental concepts are
required for certain evolutionary explanations and, conversely, developmental
explanations only make sense within an evolutionary framework.
5.6 The Explanatory Basis of the
Developmental Synthesis
To motivate my thesis, I shall begin by considering the scientific break-
throughs that underlie the Developmental Synthesis. The aspirations of evo
devo stem from groundbreaking biological findings, such as the discovery that
organisms that are phenotypically very diverse and only loosely related from a
phylogenetic perspective, such as mice, flies, humans, and elephants, develop
in remarkably analogous ways. More specifically, the staggering discovery was
that virtually all multicellular organisms employ the same “genetic toolkit”
consisting of a handful of master control genes, which are in charge of orga-
nizing developmental pathways across a variety of clades. The realization that
developmental mechanisms are conserved (to a surprisingly degree of accuracy)
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across species—a feature of ontogeny that is typically referred to as molecu-
lar parsimony—opened up evolutionary questions that could not be addressed
with the standard concepts and methodology of evolutionary theory and, at
the same time, emphasized the importance of embedding developmental pro-
cesses within an evolutionary framework. As a result, it became necessary to
borrow a set of concepts and tools from each field to develop a new explanatory
basis of the Developmental Synthesis.
Since a comprehensive overview of the entire working apparatus of evo devo
would take us too far, I shall narrow the scope of the discussion by introducing
a concrete example. In what follows, I focus on Hox genes, a subset of master
control genes that govern the Bauplan of developing organisms. The signifi-
cance of Hox genes for the study of development is hard to overstate: these
genes are responsible for the specification of the identity and structure of entire
anatomical segments and functional traits. For instance, whether a particular
segment in a fruit fly embryo develops into a haltere, wing, antenna, or leg,
is determined by the expression of Hox genes in the segment in question.9 In
9To be sure, the presence or activation of these genes alone is not sufficient for the
development of the trait, in the absence of the whole developmental apparatus and the
relevant environmental conditions. The point is rather that these genes are the difference
makers that determine the identity of the segment in an physiologically “normal” organisms,
developing in an appropriate environment. For a discussion of the difference-making role of
genetic traits, see Chapter Four.
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a more metaphorical fashion, we can compare the development of an organ-
ism to a construction site where genes are “building” the embryo. Structural
genes code for proteins, which correspond to various kinds of bricks and other
building blocks that will constitute the building. In contrast, master control
genes play a functional role that is analogous to a masterplan—the instruc-
tions that determine how the particular blocks combine to form the embryo.
Consequently, just as substituting a building plan can turn a skyscraper into
a townhouse, Hox gene mutations result in structural changes to anatomical
traits. To emphasize their dramatic effect, mutations in Hox genes do not
just damage or stifle the development of an body part; what happens is rather
that the identity of a trait is transformed, so that, instead of an antenna, we
find a leg stemming from a fly’s forehead, or the organisms can form abnormal
number of wings.
In order to understand how master genes are able to perform this crucial
role in development, we need to take a deeper look into their molecular struc-
ture. All Hox genes, across organisms and species, have in common a short
(approximately 180 base pair) stretch of DNA—called the homeobox—that
encodes a protein domain, known as the homeodomain. Proteins in the home-
odomain are transcription factors, that is, molecules that bind to DNA sites
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to enhance or inhibit the transcription of genes. These proteins thus have a
regulatory function: they specify the identity of body segments by activating
the genes required to build a specific trait. The radical phenotypic effects of
Hox genes are a consequence of the particular way in which these genes are
arranged on the chromosome, which corresponds to the order in which they are
expressed along the anteroposterior axis of the organism, a disposition known
as the colinearity rule.10 Furthermore, the effect of Hox genes is cumulative,
in the sense that the same genes that are expressed in the anterior segments
are also expressed, in addition to other ones, in the posterior segments. As
a result, two different sorts of mutants may arise. Loss-of-function mutants
are organisms in which a gene is inactivated or deleted. Since, as noted, the
formation of posterior segments is determined by the cumulative expression of
genes, a consequence of the co-linear arrangement is that deactivating genes
that determine a posterior identity will change the identity of the segment
to one that develops when fewer genes are expressed (i.e., segments that are
normally expressed in the anterior portion of the embryo). The second type
of mutation, so-called gain-of-function mutation, is diametrically opposite, re-
10In the case of Drosophila, Hox genes are located on the fly’s third chromosome, clustered
in two complexes: the Bithorax complex, that contains the genes controlling the development
of the posterior half of the embryo, and the Antennapedia complex, affecting the anterior
half.
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sulting in a segment which resembles one that normally develops in an anterior
region, where more genes Hox genes are expressed. This model is often referred
to as the Lewis model of master control gene regulation, after the seminal work
of the American geneticist Ed Lewis (1992).
Setting the developmental significance of Hox genes aside, where does evo-
lution come into the picture? Genetic and molecular similarities within and
across species raise developmental questions, which can only be addressed by
supplementing the framework with evolutionary concepts. Consider, first, in-
traspecific similarities, such as the fact that the homeobox sequence is found in
all Hox genes, regardless of the timing and location of their expression. The
universality of the homeobox raises deep and important problems: why do
different parts of the embryo develop in analogous ways? What explains this
molecular parsimony in the formation of traits? These developmental ques-
tions have evolutionary answers. Borrowing a somewhat technical term, Hox
genes are paralogues : they all derive from the duplication of an ancestral gene.
In other words, the specialized genes that govern development of various body
parts were not created from scratch; rather, they all derived from a single
ancestor through several rounds of duplication and random mutation, during
which they acquired new functions and specializations. In short, the Lewis
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model explains the generation of phenotypic diversity through a sequence of
duplication events and mutations. However—and this is the crucial point—it
is only once we introduce the evolutionary concept of paralogy (homology at
the genetic level) that similarities in molecular structures can be explained.
Analogous considerations apply to interspecific similarities, such as the con-
servation of the homeobox across different species. As noted, the homeobox
is universal: virtually all multicellular organisms have Hox -like genes. What
makes these similarities stunning is the degree of conservation of the signature
sequence (McGinnis et al. 1984). To provide a concrete example, sequence of
amino acids in the homeodomain proteins of mice and frogs are identical at up
to 59 out of 60 positions, despite the fact that the evolutionary ancestors of
these species diverged over 500 million years ago, before the famous “Cambrian
explosion” that gave rise to most animal types. In addition, these remarkable
interspecific similarities transcend the sequences of nucleotides, extending to
the arrangement of genes into clusters on the chromosomes and their patterns
of extension. This raises an obvious question: why do flies, elephants, and
humans, which are so distant from both a phenotypic and phylogenetic per-
spective, employ the same genetic sequences in their development? Again,
analyzing the problem from an evolutionary perspective suggests a straight-
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forward answer. The widespread diffusion of the homeobox is explained by the
fact that Hox genes are orthologous, that is, homologous across species. All
Hox genes were inherited from a common ancestor and subsequently modified
through mutations and duplication events.
In sum, the study of development requires an evolutionary framework in
order to be properly understood. Evolutionary concepts, such as homology,
are necessary in order to explain analogies and differences in the processes of
development across various organisms and species, and even between different
parts of the same organism. The fact that organisms are not the product of
rational engineering but are slowly moulded by the tinkering of evolution over
long periods of time, is another confirmation of Dobzhanky’s (1964, 449) fa-
mous dictum: “nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution,
sub specie evolutionis.”
Just as evolutionary concepts play a crucial role in developmental stud-
ies, developmental concepts have become essential for evolutionary studies.
Consider, for example, molecular phylogeny. By comparing orthologous genes
across species, biologists can infer phylogenetic relations and degrees of evo-
lutionary kinship, and, occasionally, the resulting molecular data has forced
scientists to rethink animal history completely. To illustrate with a concrete
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example, for a long time, the origin of insect wings was a matter of contention.
While some researchers believed that wings arose as independent outgrowths
of the thoracic body wall in wingless insects, others maintained that wings
derived from a branch of an ancestral leg, more specifically, from the gills of
an aquatic ancestor (Averof and Cohen 1997; Carroll 2005). How does one de-
cide between these mutually exclusive hypotheses? Molecular developmental
biology suggests a possible solution to this puzzle. Scientists have found that
some of the proteins involved in the construction of wings—most notably two
proteins called apterous and nubbin—are also selectively transcribed in the
respiratory lobe of the outer branch of crustacean limbs. Since it would be
an amazing coincidence if insects and crustaceans randomly picked the same
proteins out of a pool of over a hundred tool kit proteins for building, respec-
tively, wings and limbs, the reasonable conclusion to infer from this data is
that wings probably derived from the gills of an aquatic ancestor.11
The evidence that molecular developmental data provides in support of
phylogenetic classification, however, is too weak to sustain the thesis that these
two fields are currently being unified. If evidential support were a sufficient
condition for unification, then the fact that tidal motions can provide support
11The probabilistic qualification is necessary because the molecular evidence supporting
this conclusion is strong, but not yet conclusive.
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for general relativity should lead us to celebrate the synthesis of physics and
oceanography. What is required to justify the ecumenical claims of evo devo
is a stronger notion: explanatory relevance.
An area of contemporary evolutionary biology in which ontogeny plays
an indispensable explanatory role is the study of adaptive landscapes, where
developmental mechanisms indicate places where the application of natural se-
lection is constrained or limited. Developmental constraints—typically defined
as biases in the production of variant phenotypes or limitations of phenotypic
variability caused by the structure, character, composition, and dynamics of
the developmental systems (Maynard Smith et al. 1985)—limit the variation
in form and body plan. They prevent the evolution of populations from fol-
lowing certain trajectories and bias it in favor of others.12 The idea that
developmental constraints provides a bridge between development and evo-
12More specifically, we can distinguish between three different types of developmental
constraints (Gilbert and Epel 2009). First, physical constraints depends on physical laws,
such as laws of diffusion and hydraulics, that govern interactions between molecules. For
example, the size of terrestrial organisms is constrained by the laws of physics: a terrestrial
mammal the size of a blue whale would crush under its own weight. Second, morphogenetic
constraints govern the diffusion of molecules within a system. Thus, a gene cannot be
activated by a particular transcription factor if the required protein is synthesized too far
from the gene, or if the geometry of the system does not allow the process of diffusion to
bring a sufficient number of molecules in the neighborhood of the binding site. Finally, the
third class of constraints are phylogenetic constraints, which depend on contingent historical
restrictions. To illustrate, once a certain anatomical trait or molecular complex comes to be
generated, it is hard for a species to eliminate it and start again from scratch (a principle
knows as conservatism).
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lution is of old vintage, going back at least to T.H. Huxley and, later, to
Vavilov’s “law of homologous variation.” Yet, it is only in the last decades of
the 20th century that this idea became central to biological studies, sparked
by two seminal articles: Jacob’s (1977) model of evolution as “tinkering” with
the resources available at a particular place and time, and Gould and Lewon-
tin’s (1979) trenchant critique of the adaptationist program. Both articles
argue that viewing natural selection as a force fundamentally independent of
development is highly misleading; the moulding force of evolution on a pop-
ulation cannot be meaningfully separated from the developmental forces that
shape individual organisms. As a result, adaptive explanations that treat each
phenotypic trait as independently engineered by evolution, and developmental
studies that overlook the optimizing action of natural selection are doomed
to misunderstand biological processes.13 The pervasiveness of the homeobox
throughout the animal kingdom suggests precisely this, that there are certain
kinds of perturbation that nature just cannot make. Any substantial tinkering
13To be sure, Gould and Lewontin’s critique does not undermine the (uncontroversial) role
of natural selection in shaping phenotypes. Their target was rather the overly simplistic view
that organisms can be treated as mosaics of independent traits, engineered by the sole force
of natural selection. In contrast, they offered a picture that acknowledges the complexity and
holistic character of organisms, thereby limiting the reach of adaptive explanations that treat
each phenotypic trait as independent. This alternative analysis should take into account
the developmental processes that enable the formation of certain traits, while inhibiting the
development of other phenotypes (Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006).
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with homeoboxes and other regulatory sequences in master control genes is
more than likely to produce nonviable organisms.
In conclusion, development and evolution have long known to be related
and account for different aspects of the same phenomenon. However, it is the
fact that they are explanatorily relevant to each other that justifies the claim
that these fields are in the process of being synthesized: developmental stud-
ies are necessary for evolutionary explanations and, vice versa, developmental
studies needs to be embedded within an evolutionary framework. In the fol-
lowing section, I will refine this notion of explanatory relevance and provide a
general account of scientific unification.
5.7 Unity as Interdisciplinarity
Let us take stock. In the first part of this chapter, I reviewed two well-known
problems with theory reduction. First, many areas of the special sciences are
hard to capture syntactically, in terms of general laws and logically derivable
conclusions; second, successful theoretical reductions are scarce in actual scien-
tific practice. Next, I surveyed a number of alternative accounts that capture
how scientific fields can be unified without thereby being replaced or reduced
to one another. While these unity-as-interconnection models constitute an
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advancement over reductive models of unification, they lack normative force:
they fail to explain why unification is (or should be) an explicit goal for scien-
tific research. By discussing the emergence of the Developmental Synthesis, I
suggested that what underlies the unification of development and evolution is
the fact that these two fields are mutually explanatory relevant : developmental
concepts figure into evolutionary explanation, and developmental explanations
must be embedded within an evolutionary framework. These suggestions can
be moulded into a general criterion for scientific unification:
Explanatory Relevance: Two fields A and B are in the pro-
cess of being unified when they they are explanatorily relevant to
one another, i.e., when conceptual advancements and empirically
testable results in A are necessary for raising questions and pro-
viding explanations in field B and, vice versa, results from B are
required to raise questions and provide explanations in A.
At the end of Section Four, I listed two independent desiderata that must be
fulfilled by general accounts of scientific unification. First, any such account
needs to motivate the significance of unification for scientific progress; second,
it must provide precise conditions for establishing when two fields are unified,
or in the process of being unified. In this concluding section, I will show that
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the criterion above fulfills both desiderata, and argue that this notion of ex-
planatory relevance is what lies at the core of the notion of interdisciplinarity,
a term that is widely employed in a number of disciplines, but which is seldom
framed in precise terms.
Consider, first, the normative problem: why is unification an important
goal for scientific progress? As noted above, Darden and Maull’s original
interfield theory, and its more recent elaborations, provide an accurate de-
scription of various kind of non-reductive relations between areas of science,
but they fail to motivate the significance of unification. Our discussion of the
Developmental Synthesis suggested an answer to this problem. Unification
is important in science because it opens up new questions and provide the
means for answering them, broadening the range of explananda. In the case
study under present scrutiny, developmental studies provide fresh evidence for
phylogenetic classification and, more importantly, indicate some constraints
on possible evolutionary trajectories of populations. Similarly, an evolution-
ary understanding of genetic relations—such as paralogy and orthology—is
necessary to answer important questions regarding interspecific and intraspe-
cific similarities among the mechanisms of ontogeny. The important point is
that, without a synthetic framework including both evolutionary and devel-
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opmental concepts, these questions cannot even be meaningfully posed, let
alone addressed. These considerations provide a general answer to our nor-
mative problem: unification is an important scientific goal because it enables
researchers to formulate novel questions and indicates how these new puzzles
can be solved.
Moving on to the second desideratum, when can two fields be said to be uni-
fied? In order to address this question, it is important to note that unification
should not be viewed as an absolute “all or nothing” matter, but rather comes
in degrees. This fact was already recognized by both Kincaid and Grantham,
but the present account is different in two important respects. For one thing,
on the view defended here, the degree of unification does not depend on the
number or kind of intertheoretic connections, but rather on the number and
relative weight of intertheoretic explanations. As a result, unification has a
“lower bound”: the unification of two theories or fields begins as soon as a new
question is posed that requires an integrated framework, and the degree of uni-
fication increases proportionally to the number and significance of problems
and explanations. At the same time, on the present account, unification has no
“upper bound.” Since, in principle, there is no limit to the amount of questions
that can be addressed and explained, one never reaches a stage of maximal uni-
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fication: the connection between two fields can always be increased by posing
new problems and coming up with novel solutions. In this respect, unification
is best seen as an ideal limit for scientific research, not as a description of
the current state of science. Borrowing an expression from Kitcher (1999b),
unification should be seen as a “regulative ideal.” Hence, while we can meaning-
fully ask whether two fields are in the process of being unified, asking whether
two fields are unified tout court is an ill-posed question, since the complete
integration of fields occurs only in the limit. A second difference between
the present view and previous accounts is that, while unit-as-interconnection
models are necessarily symmetric, unity-as-explanatory-relevance allows for
weaker, asymmetric, unifications. Insofar as unity is measured in terms of
interfield connections, it is not possible for a field to be incorporated into an-
other, but not vice versa; if theory A is connected to theory B, it is also the
case that B is connected to A. In contrast, once we view unity as a matter
of explanatory relevance, it is possible for theory A to be relevant for expla-
nations in theory B, while A-concepts cannot be (presently) employed in field
B. While paradigmatic cases of unification in biology—such as the Develop-
mental Synthesis, the Modern Synthesis, or molecular genetics—are typically
symmetric, asymmetric incorporations are closely connected to instances of
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genuine reduction and explanatory extensions.
In sum, the centrality of explanation for scientific unification is an old and
well-established idea. Over three decades ago, Maull and Darden noted that
the enterprise of unification is motivated, at least in part, by the fact that
questions arising within a field cannot always be addressed with the concepts
and techniques developed in that same field. When this happens, it becomes
necessary to broaden the discipline by establishing interfield connections. A
similar intuition also lies at the core of Kitcher’s explanatory extensions, which
he employs to capture the relations between classical genetics and molecular
biology, while avoiding the troubles and restrictions of theoretical reduction.
By combining the two insights, we arrive at a notion of unification based on
explanatory relevance, which preserves the notion of scientific progress under-
lying the reductionist enterprise, while eschewing (at least some) problems.
Unification is a form of explanatory extension that not only uncovers the
schematic premises of a problem-solving pattern (the “axioms” of a theory),
but also poses and solves new problems on the field.
Let us conclude by addressing a potential worry. Throughout this chapter, I
proposed a way of thinking about unification in terms of explanatory relevance
that captures the significance of unification as a regulative ideal, and as a “lo-
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cal” phenomenon.14 Some authors might object that I am adopting on overly
restrictive interpretation of unification or, more seriously, that considerations
developed here are irrelevant for the problem of the unity of science.15 In order
to avoid getting entangled in a terminological dispute regarding what unity “re-
ally” means, perhaps it would be useful to start over and introduce a different
concept. Hence, I suggest that we shift the debate from the problem of unity
to a closely connected concept that is widely employed to characterize con-
temporary scientific practice: the concept of interdisciplinarity. It is common
to define an area of study as “interdisciplinary” when it transcends traditional
disciplinary boundaries, spanning across two or more fields. Yet, for a field
of research to be truly interdisciplinary it is not enough for it to span across
different disciplines; it must also integrate and advance the conceptual and
experimental knowledge of the fields that it combines. In other words, a truly
interdisciplinary area of study sheds light on problems that previously seemed
intractable, and poses new questions that could not be raised in the individual
14The present treatment of unification is “local” in the sense that it does not offer a picture
of science as a homogeneous, metaphysically unified enterprise. Following Wylie (1999), I
contend that alleged cases of unification should be investigated on a case by case basis, not
as a general scientific trend.
15Dupré (1993), for example, argues that interfield connections are irrelevant for the
problem of unity, which is really as metaphysical—as opposed to a methodological—issue.
A similar critique could be raised against the criterion of explanatory relevance developed
here.
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fields. It should be evident that interdisciplinarity, thus understood, is closely
connected to the notion of explanatory relevance that we employed above to
characterize the unity of science. Hence, the notion of unity developed here
can be used as a model of interdisciplinary research, a concept that is widely
employed across the sciences and in the arts, but seldom defined in precise
terms. Finally, I should note that this concept of unity-as-interdisciplinarity
has epistemic significance, but bears no metaphysical import. More specifi-
cally, it explicitly removes the question of the methodological unity of science
from the—related but distinct—debate regarding the metaphysical founda-
tions of science. The fact that developmental and evolutionary biology are
currently in the process of being unified is independent of whether one con-
ceives the entire scientific enterprise as metaphysically cohesive—as argued by
Carnap, Oppenheim, and Putnam—or as fundamentally fragmented, a picture
often associated with the Stanford School.
This unity-as-interdisciplinarity model has been developed by focusing on
unification in the biological sciences. The extent to which it can be applied
to other areas of science, such as physics, psychology, or the social sciences is
an important question that, however, transcends the scope of this work. For
the time being, the interdisciplinarity of science is best viewed as a “working
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hypothesis.” Yet, contrary to the “unity of science hypothesis” advanced by
Oppenheim and Putnam over half a century ago, the regulative idea presented
here seems to conform quite well to actual scientific practice.
Chapter 6
A Model-Theoretic Approach to
Dispositional Properties
Abstract
This chapter presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties,
according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities;
dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account
has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of disposi-
tions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and
regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual
regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of
dispositions under a unified framework.
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6.1 Introduction
Two distinct problems underlie the longstanding debate over the nature of
dispositions. First, there is the question of how to analyze sentences, such
as “salt is soluble,” which ascribe dispositions to entities. Second, there is
the question of how to explain the causal basis underlying a disposition, the
properties of salt that make it soluble. I refer to the former task as the analysis
of dispositions, and to the latter as their explanation.
These two problems have been addressed largely independently of each
other. Metaphysicians and philosophers of language working within the ana-
lytic tradition are generally concerned with the issue of analysis: their target is
to provide the truth conditions of disposition ascriptions through a specifica-
tion of their logical form. Note that this can be done without presupposing any
theoretical account of how dispositions are produced or explained. For exam-
ple, one can consistently hold that dispositions are irreducible or unexplainable
ontological primitives that are in need of no further or deeper explanation.1 In
contrast, philosophers of science are typically concerned with the explanation
of why an object x manifests a disposition to D under conditions C, without
1Cartwright (1989) argues that dispositions and capacities are more fundamental than
laws or regularities. Similar views are found in Lipton (1999) and Mumford (1998). Some
authors have also argued for the possibility of “bare” dispositions that completely lack any
categorical basis (Holton 1999).
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entering the dispute on the logical form of these statements.2 In this respect,
we can account for why salt dissolves in water by focusing on its chemical
structure, without providing a general account of the truth conditions of the
disposition ascription.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general account of dispositional
properties that addresses both their analysis and their explanation. The fol-
lowing section introduces three widespread theses concerning dispositions. I
then move on to challenge one of these theses, namely, that dispositions cap-
ture regularities in nature. The rest of the chapter sketches an alternative
view, according to which dispositions are, in fact, grounded in regularities,
but they are not ordinary properties of real objects.
6.2 Dispositions, Conditionals, Regularities
In spite of decades of discussion, little agreement has been achieved concern-
ing the nature of dispositions, how they should be analyzed, or how to explain
2Philosophers of science are generally interested in dispositions because of their connec-
tion to laws of nature. As emphasized by Drewery (2001), there is an interesting tension
regarding the properties that allegedly hold of laws. On the one hand, laws are traditionally
formulated as universal generalizations that satisfy additional requirements, such as being
counterfactual supporting. On the other hand, there are general regularities—particularly
in the special sciences—that play an explanatory and methodological role analogous to the
laws of nature in physics, but are not universally valid.
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them. Nevertheless, the following three theses are widely accepted as uncon-
troversial.
(1) Dispositions are properties of entities.
(2) Dispositions are connected with conditionals.
(3) Dispositions capture regularities.
Thesis (1) is usually taken for granted as a platitude that requires no
further motivation. Whether we view dispositions as properties of particulars
(e.g. Hütteman 1998; Mumford 1998; Lipton 1999) or properties of kinds (e.g.
Cartwright 1989; Lowe 1989), it seems a brute fact about glass and salt that
the former is fragile and the latter is soluble. In contrast, Theses (2) and (3)
are supported by philosophical arguments.
To begin, let us focus on the relation between dispositions and condition-
als. Carnap (1936) famously maintained that dispositions entail conditional
statements. For example, the fact that a glass is fragile entails that it would
shatter, if struck. Carnap also noted that the “if-then” sentence entailed by a
disposition cannot be a material conditional, because lack of manifestation is
not sufficient ground for attributing a disposition to an entity: a glass is not ro-
bust just because it is never struck. Dispositions entail subjunctive conditionals
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that describe the behavior of the entity under circumstances that depart—in
relevant respects—from actuality. Quine (1976) reiterates this point by saying
that the relation between the antecedent and the consequent in a disposition
conditional is governed by necessity : if the glass were struck, it would neces-
sarily shatter.
Carnap’s claim that dispositions entail subjunctive conditionals suggests
that dispositions can be straightforwardly analyzed in the following terms:
(SCA) x is disposed to D when C iff x would D if it were the case that C.
Indeed, many eminent philosophers, such as Ryle (1949), Goodman (1955),
Quine (1960), and Mackie (1973) have endorsed this simple conditional analy-
sis of dispositions (SCA). However, there is now a widespread consensus that
such analysis is fatally flawed because the connection between the disposition
and the entailed conditional breaks down in cases where objects temporarily
lose or acquire dispositions (“finkish dispositions”) or when the manifestation
of a disposition is “masked” or “mimicked.”3 These problematic cases triggered
3Martin (1994) considers a dead wire that is connected to a device that reliably senses
when the wire is about to be touched by a conductor and, under those circumstances,
makes the wire live by generating a flow of electrons. This finkish disposition constitutes
a counterinstance to the SCA because, in the imagined scenario, the wire is dead but the
conditional “if the wire were touched by a conductor, then it would conduct electricity”
is true. Martin also describes specular cases in which the conditional turns out false but
the disposition ascription is true, for example, were the finking-device to block the flow of
electrons in a live wire every time the wire is touched by a conductor. Cases of masking
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various reactions. Some authors responded by replacing the simple subjunc-
tive conditional with a more sophisticated one (Prior 1985; Lewis 1997; Mel-
lor 2000). Yet, all conditional analyses—of the simple or revised form—are
plagued by counterexamples: no matter how stringently we specify the stimu-
lus and response conditions, it seems that an object can always fail to manifest
a disposition (Manley and Wasserman 2008). Alternatively, one can explore
the possibility of non-conditional analyses (Fara 2005) or abandon altogether
the quest for analysis and focus on providing a non-reductive explanation of
dispositions (Bird 1998; Molnar 1999).
While an assessment of these routes lies beyond the scope of this work, we
should note that the (alleged) failure of conditional analyses does not entail
a rejection of Thesis (2). Indeed, most philosophers—including some who ex-
plicitly jettison conditional analyses of dispositions (e.g. Fara 2005)—recognize
that there is intimate connection between disposition ascriptions and condi-
tional statements.4 What seems too strong is Quine’s claim that the relation
(Johnston 1992) are analogous to cases of finking, except that the object does not lose its
disposition, even temporarily; the disposition is rather extrinsically prevented from mani-
festing. For instance, one can ingest a lethal dose of poison and yet fail to die, provided that
a suitable antidote is timely administered (Bird 1998). The poison’s disposition to kill when
ingested is not lost; it is masked by the action of the antidote. Finally, when an object is
induced to manifest the typical behavior without actually having the associated disposition,
the disposition is said to be mimicked (Smith 1977).
4But see Mellor (1974) for an objection to Carnap’s entailment thesis.
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between the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional is one of neces-
sity. Necessity is stronger than universality because, while universal general-
izations may be contingently true (“No spheres of pure gold are greater than
the sun”), necessary truths could not have been otherwise, without violating
the laws of logic or physics (“No object travels faster than the speed of light”).
However, the fact that salt fails to dissolve when the water is saturated or
the atmospheric pressure is abnormally high suggests that the statement “if
salt were placed in water, it would dissolve” is not just not necessary; it does
not even capture a universal generalization. In short, Quine’s analysis got
things backwards: while he argued that disposition conditionals are stronger
than universal generalizations, the existence of actual (as opposed to potential)
exceptions shows that they are weaker.
In sum, conditional analyses of dispositions are thwarted by counterexam-
ples: under certain conditions, salt is placed in water but it fails to dissolve.
These problematic cases can be easily accommodated by Thesis (3), the claim
that dispositions capture regularities. After all, even though salt does not
always, let alone necessarily, dissolve in water, under most circumstances salt
does dissolve in water. And, insofar as salt usually dissolves, the connec-
tion between dispositions and regularities is saved; it is only the necessary
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connection—and, consequently, the SCA—that has to go. However, consider
some of the paradigmatic dispositions that have dominated philosophical dis-
cussion: glass is fragile, salt is soluble, the poison is lethal, barrels are disposed
to roll, etc. Despite the apparent diversity in the range of examples, all these
dispositional properties have a common characteristic: they tend to be man-
ifested, more often than not, by the entities in question. To wit, under most
circumstances, glass breaks when struck, salt dissolves in water, lethal poisons
kills when ingested, and barrels tend to roll when pushed. What is the sur-
prise? Is this not what we mean when we say that entities are disposed to
break, dissolve, kill, and roll? No. At least not in general, or so I will argue.
6.3 Dispositions Without Regularities
We are all familiar with examples where a disposition is attributed to an
entity (or to a class of entities) in spite of the fact that the entity does not
always manifest the disposition, or not all instances of the kind manifest the
disposition at all times. As noted, salt is soluble, but it fails to dissolve in
saturated water. Less obvious, and more puzzling, are cases in which the
connection between dispositions and regularities breaks down: a disposition is
attributed to an entity, but the manifestation of the disposition is the exception
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rather than the rule. Consider a mundane scenario that traces its origins all the
way back to Aristotle: acorns manifest a disposition to grow into oaks, when
they are planted in soil. The trouble is that, since most acorns simply rot and
only a small fraction develops into trees, the connection between disposition
and regularity is lost.
A natural reply is that the puzzle only arises because the specification
of the conditions under which acorns grow into oaks is too coarse-grained.
Once the stimulus-condition “when planted in soil” is spelled out in greater
detail, the objection runs, the connection between disposition and regularity
will be reinstated. In what follows, I argue that this response is problem-
atic: some dispositions cannot be grounded in regularities, regardless of how
precisely the stimulus and response are cashed out. However, given that the
precise molecular and ecological conditions underlying the growth of trees are
extremely complex and relatively understudied, I will focus on a different ex-
ample: genes’ disposition to be transcribed as RNA. Our deep knowledge of
the cellular machinery enables us to frame much more precisely the condi-
tions under which genes display a disposition to be transcribed, as well as the
repression mechanisms that may fink, mask, or mimic such manifestation.
What warrants the claim that genes have a disposition to be transcribed?
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Here is a simple suggestion: the disposition ascription captures a plain regu-
larity in nature.
(i) Genes’ disposition to be transcribed is grounded in the fact that most
genes are reliably transcribed as RNA.
Unfortunately, this will not do. The problem is that gene transcription is
the exception, not the rule. This is a straightforward consequence of the
fact that every cell in an organism derives from the duplication of a single
cell (the fertilized egg). Since virtually every somatic cell has exactly the
same genome,5 differences between cell types must depend on patterns of gene
activation. The important point, for present purposes, is a corollary of this
fact: genes are expressed only when they are required and, at any given time,
most genes in every cell are silenced. In this respect, genes are just like acorns:
the regularities are idleness and rotting, not RNA and oaks. The upshot is that
such dispositions cannot be grounded in actual regularity patterns. Otherwise
we would have to conclude, contrary to our initial assumptions, that genes
have a disposition to be silenced and that acorns are disposed to rot.
This is where the objection raised above becomes relevant again. The log-
5Exceptions include erythrocytes (red blood cells) and mammalian lymphocytes. How-
ever, here we can set these particular cases aside and safely talk as if every cell contains the
same genes.
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ical form of a disposition ascription is not “x is disposed to D,” but rather
“x is disposed to D when C.” The formulation in (i) is misleading, because it
leaves out a description of the cellular machinery necessary for the transcrip-
tion of genes. Once we specify the appropriate stimulus, the objection runs,
the connection between the manifestation of the disposition and the regularity
will be reinstated. So, let us take a look at the molecular structure of DNA
to see what kind of conditions C are required for transcription. Genes have
both structural and regulatory regions, which are constituted of the same ma-
terial (DNA), but perform different functional roles. The structural portion
of the gene codes for the amino acid sequence of the protein. In contrast, the
regulatory regions—promoters and enhancers—do not encode proteins; their
function is to regulate gene expression: they determine where, when, and how
efficiently the encoded molecules are to be transcribed. More specifically, the
role of the promoter is to bind to RNA polymerase—the enzyme that unwinds
the DNA double helix and synthesizes messenger RNA (mRNA)—and orient
it in the right direction and at the right position (at the “beginning” of the
coding sequence) so that it can start the synthesis of mRNA. The second kind
of structural region, the enhancer, binds to transcription factors, proteins that
interact with the promoter to determine when a gene is active and how much
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mRNA to synthesize.6 Transcription factors control gene expression in two
different ways. First, they stabilize RNA polymerase forcing it to remain on
the promoter and begin the transcription of the gene. The second mode of
gene regulation is slightly more complicated. DNA can be so tightly coiled
around the histones—the solid core around which DNA is wrapped—that the
promoter region becomes inaccessible to enzymes. When this happens, tran-
scription factors modify the nucleosome structure, clearing a space for RNA
polymerase to bind with the promoter and begin the transcription of the gene.
With all of this in mind, let us return to dispositions. Recall, the problem
was to reconcile the claim that genes have a disposition to be transcribed with
the fact that most genes are silenced. A brief look at the structure of DNA
revealed that (and why) the presence of the standard transcription apparatus
is necessary but not sufficient for transcription; specific proteins that control
the binding of enzymes to DNA are also required. Thus, perhaps, (i) was too
simplistic; the disposition to be transcribed is grounded in a more sophisticated
regularity, such as:
(ii) When all the necessary molecules are present in the cell, genes are reliably
transcribed as RNA.
6A single gene may have multiple enhancers, each of which can bind various transcription
factors, enabling the gene to be transcribed in different conditions and in several cell types.
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The formulation in (ii) clearly represents a step forward from (i). However,
even this will not do. The problem, simply put, is that cells have repression
mechanisms that keep genes silenced even when the entire transcription appa-
ratus is in place.7 One of the most important and better studied mechanisms
of gene repression is DNA methylation, which involves the addition of a methyl
group to the 5-position of the cytosine pyrimidine ring or the number 6 ni-
trogen of the adenine purine ring. The biochemical details of the process are
complex,8 but the underlying idea is straightforward. When the regulatory
region (promoter or enhancer) of a gene is methylated, transcription factors
fail to recognize it and thus cannot bind it. Since these proteins are necessary
for gene activation, methylating the regulatory region of a gene is a successful
7We should note that the expression “gene silencing” usually refers to mechanisms other
than gene modification (mutations that render the gene inviable). Our focus here is on
epigenetic processes of gene regulation, processes that do not modify the sequences of nu-
cleotides constituting the gene. Epigenetic gene regulation occurs in two varieties. At the
transcriptional level a gene is inactivated by making it inaccessible to transcriptional ma-
chinery such as RNA polymerase and transcription factors. Genes can also be inactivated at
the post-transcriptional level, by preventing its mRNA transcript to translate into a protein
(by destroying or “blocking” it). Given that post-transcriptional silencing still allows the
transcription of RNA, we restrict our attention to regulation at the transcriptional level.
8In brief, the process of methylation is triggered by enzymes called histone methyltrans-
ferases whose action consists in adding methyl groups to histone “tails,” i.e. outgrowths
that project from their main body and are employed by enzymes to access DNA, even when
nucleotides are tightly coiled. The effect of this chemical process is to recruit proteins that
condense nucleosomes even more tightly together, repressing transcription of the wrapped
gene. Once these methyl groups are removed from the histone tails, the density of the nu-
cleosome (and thus its susceptibility to transcription) returns to its “normal” level, i.e. it
returns to the level it had before the methyl groups were added to the tails. Hence, the
methylation of a gene is fully reversible.
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means for repressing its transcription. DNA methylation is by no means an un-
common phenomenon: recent research suggests that 70-80% of CpG cytosines
are methylated in mammals (Jabbari and Bernardi 2004). The conditions for
successful transcription thus need to be reformulated as follows:
(iii) When all necessary molecules are present in the cell and there are no
repression mechanisms, genes are reliably transcribed as RNA.
The formulation in (iii) successfully captures an actual regularity in na-
ture: when the cellular machinery is in place and there are no repression
mechanisms, genes are transcribed. The trouble is that we are now very far
from the original statement. We started off with a general claim concerning a
property of all genes, namely that they have a disposition to be transcribed.
What we ended up with is a highly hedged generalization that, while being
true of all genes, is realized only under particular conditions, which typically
fail to obtain. In addition, and more importantly, there is a worry that (iii)
teeters on an analytic claim. Given the heterogenous nature of the various
means of blocking gene transcription, the obvious way to give sense to “re-
pression mechanism” is as something which stops transcription. But then the
regularity captured by (iii) becomes “genes are transcribed when there are no
mechanisms to prevent transcription,” which borders on analyticity. Alterna-
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tively, one could try to replace the general expression “repression mechanisms”
with an extensive disjunctive list describing all these mechanisms, and claim
that genes are transcribed when none of these is present. However, there are
obvious problems that render this suggestion hopeless. First, the list would
be long, cumbersome, and incomplete, since it is more than likely that many
forms of gene repression are yet to be discovered. Second, given that different
kinds of cells employ different means of repression and not every mechanism
works in every cell, a distinct list for every cell-type is required. Finally, these
lists would have to encompass not just actual mechanisms, but also all the
possible ways that organisms might adopt to repress gene transcription. In
conclusion, (iii) fails to capture the original insight; we can and ought to do
better. In the following section, I suggest a different approach, a general ac-
count of dispositions, inspired by the molecular explanation of gene expression,
which maintains the connection between dispositions and regularities, as well
as a form of the simple conditional analysis.
6.4 The Simulacrum Approach
Let us take stock. The question driving the discussion is: what grounds dis-
position ascriptions? We began by considering reducing dispositions to sub-
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junctive conditionals of the simple or sophisticated kind, but this attempt was
undermined by familiar arguments. Next, we explored the possibility of re-
ducing dispositions to regularities, which is compatible with the observation
that objects do not always manifest their dispositions, as long as they do so
more often than not. However, this suggestion was thwarted by the example
of genes, which are disposed to be transcribed in spite of the fact that most
genes are actually silenced. A third option is to say that dispositions express
normative claims. On this view, a disposition ascription is not a description of
what an entity does (more often than not), but a normative statement about
what the entity is supposed to do when it works properly. This formulation
has the merit of rendering the idea that dispositions capture some sort of po-
tentiality. Nonetheless, there are obvious problems. Given that cells require
most of their genes to be silenced, it would be absurd to conclude that organ-
isms thrive when most of their genes do not work properly. A more promising
way to cash out the underlying intuition is to say that being transcribed is
the function of genes. Organisms require the (selective) transcription of RNA
to synthesize proteins, and genes are selected because of their disposition to
be transcribed. But even this will not do. Even granting that transcribing
RNA is a function of genes, in general, dispositions cannot be identified with
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functions; it would be preposterous to maintain that the function of a fragile
vase is to shatter when struck. In sum, it appears that dispositions are not
grounded in true subjunctive conditionals, regularities, normative statements,
or function attributions. After all this discussion, we are still left with the
problem of understanding what warrants disposition ascriptions.
At this point, one could be tempted to give up on the initial assump-
tion. What molecular biology has shown us, it might be argued, is that we
were wrong in the first place in thinking that genes have a disposition to be
transcribed. Perhaps, genes have an “ability” or a “capacity” to transcribe
RNA, but they are not “disposed” to do so.9 This move, however, does not
solve the general problem, because we cannot distinguish between capacities,
dispositions, and other non-categorical properties simply on the basis of how
frequently they are manifested. Whether or not an object has a disposition
depends on intrinsic features of the entity or on extrinsic features of the sys-
tem in which it is embedded, not on the number of (un)successful attempts.
Hence, even if we stipulate that genes are not disposed to be transcribed, we
9Levi (1980) draws the distinction by arguing that abilities capture possibilities, while
dispositions capture compulsions. To paraphrase, abilities tells us what might happen under
certain circumstances, while dispositions tells us what would happen, i.e. what is likely
to occur in certain circumstances. Distinguishing between dispositions and capacities in
precise terms is an important philosophical endeavor, albeit one that transcends our present
purposes.
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can generate the same puzzle by taking any disposition, and finking, masking,
or mimicking its manifestation for a sufficient number of times. Even if glass
is dropped often enough without breaking, because it is protected by bubble
wrap, this will not make glass any less fragile.
Let us step back and consider the situation from a slightly different per-
spective. The claim that genes are disposed to be transcribed is neither about
any particular sequence of nucleotides nor about the subset of genes that are
transcribed, in appropriate conditions, in an organism or cell. The disposition
ascription makes a statement about all genes—namely that, under certain cir-
cumstances, they display a tendency to be transcribed. What grounds this
statement is a regularity: genes are regularly transcribed as RNA. Now, as
said, this regularity does not hold in the world since, as a matter of fact,
most genes are actually silenced. Nevertheless, in idealized settings, when the
transcription apparatus is in place, genes are always transcribed as RNA. The
aim of this chapter is to present an account according to which dispositions
capture the behavior of abstract models, but they are not ordinary proper-
ties of real entities.10 In what follows, I argue that dispositions are, in fact,
10Here, I am assuming that an entity possesses a dispositional property if and only if the
entity satisfies a certain truth conditional analysis. For example, according to SCA, salt is
soluble iff it satisfies the subjunctive conditional, i.e. salt would dissolves if placed in water.
On the account defended below, real objects do not satisfy the analysans, and thus are not
the bearers of dispositions. However, the present account can be reconciled with the view
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Figure 6.4.1: A model of gene expression.
grounded in lawlike regularities and can thus be analyzed in terms of subjunc-
tive conditionals. The mistake lies in thinking that such regularities must be
actual.
To begin, I should be more explicit about what I mean by “idealized set-
tings.” Consider a simple diagram of gene expression taken from an elementary
cytology textbook (Fig. 6.4.1). Note that this representation of the cellular
environment is inaccurate in several important respects. First, it depicts DNA
as a free-standing double helix in which all base-pairs are visible and accessible
to proteins. Second, all enzymes and transcription factors are assumed to be
that dispositions are properties of entities, provided that one endorses a weaker notion of
property possession. This point will be developed in Section Six.
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present in just the right quantity. Third, there are no repression mechanisms,
such as DNA methylation, that could potentially interfere with the transcrip-
tion of the gene. Finally, the cellular environment is represented as a uniform,
spacious system in which molecules are free to circulate without impediments.
In short, this simplified model represents a set of conditions that turn gene ex-
pression into an exceptionless, lawlike regularity: under these circumstances,
genes are always transcribed. However, such conditions are seldom or never
instantiated;11 real-life cells are much more complicated. DNA is tightly coiled
around histones in ways that often prevent enzymes from interacting with reg-
ulatory or structural regions of the gene; methyl-groups “hide” nucleotides from
transcription factors; proteins necessary for gene expression are often absent
or inaccessible; and molecular interactions do not occur in a void. This so-
phisticated apparatus is what turns real organisms into finely-tuned systems
capable of selectively activate genes in the right place at the right time.
These considerations invite a natural question. Why do biology textbooks
11Whether these conditions are “seldom” or “never” instantiated depends on how strictly
we interpret the features of the diagram. On one view, non-methylated DNA instantiates
some of the conditions represented in the diagram, while methylated DNA does not. Al-
ternatively, one could say that, while the idealized conditions of the diagram are never
instantiated (DNA is never a self-standing double-helix), non-methylated DNA resembles
the conditions represented in the diagram more closely then methylated DNA. For present
purposes, we need not enter the controversy on model interpretation. The important point
is that, in most cases, the cellular environment is relevantly different from the one described
in the model and thereby does not exhibit sufficient conditions for gene expression.
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provide inaccurate representations that are never instantiated in real organ-
isms? The answer is obvious once we recognize that the goal of the model
is not to accurately describe cells. What the diagram purports to do—and
does so quite well—is provide a general explanation of gene expression by
showing how the underlying processes are instantiated in abstract conditions:
when the actual cellular environment suitably resembles the diagram, genes
are transcribed. In this respect, the model of gene expression is analogous to
the ideal gas law (PV = nRT ) or the claim that water is H2O, which also
represent idealized conditions that are seldom or never instantiated (no real
gas satisfies the law, and pure H2O is extremely rare outside the lab), but are
highly explanatory.
The thesis that describing and explaining are goals that do not generally
go hand in hand has been articulated by Nancy Cartwright (1983). In ex-
plicit contrast to deductive approaches to explanation, she contends that it is
a mistake to assume that most realistic models serve all purposes best; there
is a necessary tradeoff between explanatory power and descriptive accuracy.
Cartwright maintains that the vast majority of scientific explanations (though
she restricts her attention to the physical sciences) are not realistic; too much
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realism would obstruct the models’s explanatory power.12 This leads her to
reject the facticity of laws, the view that laws of nature describe facts about
reality. She famously claims that “the laws of physics lie” in the sense that
they hold only in highly idealized models that successfully explain—but do
not describe—the phenomena accurately. In this chapter, I defend an ac-
count of dispositions that mirrors Cartwright’s approach to explanation, but
is completely independent of her view of the fundamental laws of nature. The
suggestion is to reject the thesis—often assumed but seldom defended—that
dispositions pick out properties of entities. To attribute a disposition to an
entity is neither to ascribe a property to that entity, nor to describe a reg-
ularity in nature. Dispositions are properties that capture the behavior of
abstract models, artificial constructions that describe the effects that obtain
when a system satisfies certain initial conditions.13 Given the analogy with
12More precisely, Cartwright distinguishes two senses in which a model can be “realistic.”
In the first sense, a realistic model represents accurately the situation modeled; it depicts
the phenomena precisely. However, a model can also be realistic if it provides an accurate
interpretation of its equations. A model is realistic, in this second sense, if it specifies
what the mathematical formalism is supposed to represent. Most scientific explanations,
Cartwright argues, are not realistic in either sense.
13Following Giere (1988), I take models to be idealized systems that scientists (as well as
ordinary people) use to represent features of the world. More specifically, models mediate
the relation between theories and reality; they are employed as explanatory tools that assert
a theoretical hypothesis claiming a similarity (in relevant respects and degrees) between a
theory and a real system. However, Giere’s view of models as formal constructions charac-
terized by suitably interpreted equations is overly restrictive. Many scientific models, such
as the representation of gene expression discussed above, are not characterized by math-
ematical formulas. Whether or not suitable equations characterizing these models are, in
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Cartwright’s “simulacrum account of explanation,” I refer to the present view
as the simulacrum account of dispositions (SAD).
To illustrate, let us return to genes. The ascription of the disposition to be
transcribed tells us that, when the conditions in a real cell suitably resemble
the idealized model, genes are transcribed. However, the disposition itself is
not a property of genes; the disposition captures the behavior of models, like
the one depicted in Fig. 6.4.1, in which gene transcription constitutes a lawlike
universal generalization. Since, in these models, genes are always transcribed,
their dispositions can be analyzed in terms of subjunctive conditionals. In sum,
disposition ascriptions should not be taken at face value; dispositional proper-
ties are not satisfied by real entities. Dispositions are properties that pick out
classes of models in which a certain behavior occurs without exceptions.
6.5 Epistemic Worries
In the first part of the chapter, I introduced three claims about dispositions
that are often implicitly assumed or accepted as uncontroversial: (1) disposi-
principle, available is an important question, albeit one that I shall set aside. The important
point, for present purposes, is that current science employs models to describe, predict, and
explain, and many of these models make no reference to formal equations. In short, while
endorsing Giere’s notion of models as idealized, abstract systems representing the world, I
place no restriction on the means of representation, or the need of capturing the “behavior”
of the model in precise mathematical terms.
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tions are properties of entities; (2) dispositions are connected with conditionals;
(3) dispositions capture regularities. By presenting the mechanisms of gene
expression, I argued that (3) is problematic: we sometimes ascribe a disposi-
tion to an entity even though its manifestation is the exception rather than
the rule. Nevertheless, we should not give up (3), for it is hard to see what
else might warrant disposition ascriptions other than regularities, given that
conditionals, functions, or teleological claims will not do. I suggested that
we can retain (3) as long as we reject (1), the pre-theoretical intuition that
dispositions are properties of real entities. Dispositions can be analyzed as
subjunctive conditionals, they are grounded in regularities, but they only hold
in abstract models.
Before discussing the payoff of this approach, there are some potential wor-
ries that should be explicitly addressed. In particular, one might argue that
the SAD leaves it a mystery why precise facts about theoretical models have
applications to bits of the real world. In other words, the objection runs, in
ascribing dispositions we intend to advance claims about entities. If, as argued
here, dispositions really only hold in models, it is unclear why dispositions are
so useful and successful in describing the behavior of real entities and why
talk about models leads us to form fairly accurate expectations concerning
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objects in the world. The problem may not appear to be particularly pressing
in the case of dispositions involving genes and other posits of contemporary
science. After all, few of us are directly acquainted with DNA or involved in
experiments that manipulate it. Given that most of our knowledge of genes
comes from textbooks that present us with abstract diagrams, it is hardly
surprising that their dispositional properties hold in these idealized settings
as well. In contrast, when it comes to macroscopic objects, the idea that
dispositions only hold in models becomes counterintuitive. In claiming that
salt is water-soluble or that a glass is fragile, we intend to ascribe a property
to salt and glasses, not to a diagram. Furthermore, dispositions lead us to
form expectations concerning the behavior of objects. In the case of scien-
tific posits, the link to prediction and expectation is less direct. Surely, in
saying that genes are transcribable or that particles are disposed to attract
oppositely-charged particles, we expect genes and electrons to behave in a cer-
tain way. However, these beliefs are strongly tied to the theoretical framework
in which these entities belong. Suppose, for example, that the ascription of
“transcribability” was originally based on the belief that genes are regularly
transcribed. Still, when geneticists discovered that most genes are actually
silenced, they revised the grounds for the ascription and, consequently, the
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observable expectations. Similarly, were we to learn that some electrons at-
tract each other, we would presumably change our experimental expectations
(or, perhaps, we would revise our definition of electron to set counterinstances
aside). In contrast, macroscopic dispositions are much harder to revise or give
up. Our expectations concerning the behavior of salt and glass are entirely
based on direct observation and are largely independent of theories. Hence,
when we ascribe solubility to salt and fragility to glass, no corresponding belief
is formed concerning what happens to salt and glass in models.
The inference from the truism that dispositions are employed to describe
entities (as opposed to models) to the claim that dispositions are properties
of entities rests on a misunderstanding of the role of dispositions in ordinary
thinking. In many cases a disposition is posited for lack of a better expla-
nation. Why do we say that salt is soluble? The answer is: to capture the
behavior of salt, its tendency to dissolve when placed in water. Note that the
disposition ascription does not provide an explanation of this behavior. Dispo-
sitions capture general patterns in need of explanation: they deliver explana-
tory promises, not explanations.14 Imagine a medieval alchemist observing
14This epistemic approach bears important analogies with the “placeholder” view of dispo-
sitions, originally developed by Levi and Morgenbesser (1964). See also Cartwright (1983),
who notes that ceteris paribus laws express our explanatory commitments.
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a grain of salt dissolving in water. His lack of knowledge concerning atomic
chemistry prevents him from offering an adequate explanation; nonetheless,
he might realize that there is a further story to be told.15 Saying that salt
is soluble is a placeholder for the properties which ultimately account for the
behavior of salt. Furthermore, imagine that at one time he attempts to dis-
solve salt in what (unbeknownst to him) is saturated water. Given this new
evidence, he might conclude that his initial generalization was incorrect: salt
is not soluble, after all. Yet, a sophisticated alchemist could conjecture that
what prevents salt from manifesting the expected behavior are some extrinsic
features of the setting. Since the behavior is manifested under some circum-
stances but not others, the model that explains such behavior must abstract
from certain features of the context that might mask, fink, or mimic the dis-
position.
Hence, it would be rational for the alchemist to employ the disposition as a
placeholder, for lack of a better explanation. But why should we refer to salt as
soluble, given that we do have access to a proper explanation? The reason has
to do with pragmatic convenience and division of labor (Putnam 1975). First,
15To be sure, this rational reconstruction is not intended to correspond to an accurate
psychological description. It is quite possible for an alchemist to believe that an appeal
to solubility constitutes a perfectly adequate explanation of the behavior of salt. Thus, in
saying that we should acknowledge the possibility of a deeper explanation, I am appealing
to current standards of explanation.
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despite being aware that the behavior of salt is due to its atomic structure,
most of us ignore the identity and nature of these molecular properties. For
example, while knowing that a relatively complete account of solubility is found
in many textbooks, I could not readily cite it. Second, it is often convenient to
leave the chemical structure unspecified and talk about “solubility” for the sake
of brevity or simplicity. For most purposes, the identity of these properties is
irrelevant; what is important is that we know that they exist and how they
manifest.16
The moral that we ought to draw is that dispositions can be used to cap-
ture the behavior of real objects such as salt, genes, and glasses, but this
does not imply that they are properties of these entities. Dispositions are
placeholders for properties that explain the behavior of entities, but the dis-
positions themselves do not provide any explanation. What are dispositions,
then? Are they promises or assertions? In order to address this question, it is
important to distinguish between the semantics and the pragmatics of disposi-
16As Levi (1977) notes, the placeholder view does not entail that, for the purposes of
satisfactory explanation, dispositions should always be replaced by descriptions of their
microstructural bases. While such redescription may be imposed by some research programs
(e.g. contemporary analytic chemistry), ascribing dispositions is perfectly adequate for other
explanatory purposes. For instance, if we want to explain why Mary added sugar to sweeten
her coffee (as opposed to a different sweetener which would not dissolve in the beverage),
it is perfectly adequate to appeal to Mary’s belief that sugar is soluble. Any further facts
about the molecular structure of sugar would be not only unnecessary, but also irrelevant.
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tional statements. From a semantic point of view, dispositions concern solely
the properties and behavior of a contextually determined model. Disposition
ascriptions can thus be analyzed as follows:
(SAD) x is disposed to D when C iff, in a class of models M, x would D if C
where the identity of M is determined by the context (unless it is made explicit
in the attribution). Note that the ascription makes a claim about a class of
models; it says nothing about the world. However, from a pragmatic perspec-
tive, in attributing a disposition to an entity, we convey more than just the
existence of a particular class of models; we are also asserting that these mod-
els are similar, in relevant respects, to the actual world. In short, dispositions
are assertions that describe the behavior of models. The implications about
the world—which allow us to employ dispositions to describe the behavior of
actual entities—arise from the pragmatic presupposition that a contextually
determined model resembles the world in appropriate ways. We are not inter-
ested in producing any model; we are looking for models that are useful for
the purpose of predicting, explaining, and intervening with real entities in real
systems.
Before moving on, two final issues should be explicitly addressed. First,
how does the context select the class of models in which the disposition holds?
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On the present view, the statement “salt is soluble” is true because salt always
dissolves in water in a class of modelsM. However, there is also a class of models
M* in which salt never dissolves in water because the pressure is invariably
high, or the water is constantly saturated. Why should the conditional be
evaluated in M -models, thus concluding that salt is soluble, as opposed to
evaluating it in M* -models, thus concluding that salt is insoluble? The worry
is that, unless we have a non-trivial way of specifying the models in which
the conditional holds, the analysis becomes vacuous. This objection misses
the target, and it is crucial to see why. True, “salt is soluble” is equivalent
to “salt dissolves in water in models M,” while “salt is insoluble” is equivalent
to “salt does not dissolve in water in models M*.” However, from the fact
that both types of models can be readily produced, it does not follow that
the statements “salt is soluble” and “salt is insoluble” are equally warranted
or useful for the purposes of predicting, explaining, or intervening with the
behavior of salt. As Giere (1988) quite aptly points out, while we can talk
of equations and propositions being “true” about models, these truths have
little or no epistemological significance because the models are constructed to
satisfy precisely these conditions. For instance, in the model of gene expression
presented above, it is true that genes are transcribed; but this hardly surprising
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or illuminating, given that the diagram is intended to capture the conditions
for gene expression. The epistemological significance of the model lies not in
the propositions or equations that it renders true or false. What makes the
model interesting and explanatory is the hypothesis that the theoretical model
is similar, in relevant respects, to a real system.17 Hence, while the simulacrum
account does not specify the conditions under which disposition attributions
are pragmatically assertible, it subsumes many of the difficulties surrounding
dispositions to the general problem of the model-world similarity relation.
Finally, the present account is intended to remain neutral with respect to
the nature of the most fundamental denizens of reality. Some philosophers
of science have argued that our best scientific theories postulate some basic
properties that appear irreducibly dispositional in character. For example, cur-
rent physics does not reduce the capacity of particles to attract each other to
categorical properties. Similarly, the explanation of many chemical reactions
appeals to primitive dispositions of molecules to interact with one another. It
is important to note that I am not suggesting that these “fundamental disposi-
tions” can be reduced to a categorical basis, nor have I offered any argument to
17The nature of the model-world similarity relation constitutes a substantial philosophical
issue, which is subject to much debate in contemporary philosophy of science (e.g. Goodman
1976; French 2003; van Fraassen 2008), but is broader than the topic of dispositions and
cannot be adequately addressed here.
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motivate the thesis that such reduction is possible—an important issue, albeit
independent of the position defended here. It might as well turn out that the
basic constituents of reality are irreducibly dispositional. However, such prim-
itive dispositions would be different from dispositions of ordinary macroscopic
objects (salt, glasses), and of those scientific posits (genes) to which the sim-
ulacrum approach can be applied. Thus, while endorsing the claim that most
dispositions can be analyzed in terms of conditionals and explained in terms
of their categorical basis, we can remain agnostic as to whether the most fun-
damental concepts are particular, local, purely qualitative categorical matters
of fact (Lewis 1986a), laws of nature (Maudlin 2007), subjunctive conditionals
(Lange 2009), capacities (Cartwright 1989), or something else.
6.6 Implications
With all of this in mind, I now move on to consider some of the payoffs of
the account. First, the simulacrum approach preserves the traditional SCA,
which provides the simplest, clearest, and, in my opinion, most intuitive anal-
ysis of dispositions. Recall, what undermined the SCA was the possibility of
dispositions whose manifestation is finked, masked, or mimicked, severing the
connection with the underlying conditional. Here, the disposition holds in a
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class of models in which there are no interfering mechanisms of any sort. In
these idealized settings, the conditional holds without exceptions: salt always
dissolves in water, fragile objects always shatter when struck, and genes are
always transcribed. We can thus provide a straightforward SCA of disposi-
tions, with the explicit proviso that the conditional hold in a class of models,
not in the world:
(SAD) x is disposed to D when C iff, in a class of models M, x would D if
C.
Before discussing other benefits of the account, let us address a potential
worry. Some philosophers have already attempted a defense of conditional
analyses of dispositions by appealing to the notion of “ideal conditions.” My
task is to show that the present approach does not fall victim to the same
shortcomings that beset theirs. Consider, for example, the following analysis,
suggested by Mumford (1998):
(IC) x is disposed to D when C iff, if x were in ideal conditions, x would D
if C.
Let us compare the two approaches. In (IC), dispositions are analyzed in
terms of subjunctive conditionals that describe what happens to real objects
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in ideal conditions. Dispositions are properties of entities that are (always)
manifested in optimal circumstances where nothing goes wrong. In contrast,
(SAD) captures what happens in a class of abstract models that represent the
behavior of real entities. The simulacrum analysis does not appeal to ideal
conditions, but rather to idealized models.18 This subtle—yet significant—
difference between ideals and idealizations allows the simulacrum approach to
avoid two substantial difficulties undermining (IC): the problem of intrinsic
finks, and a trivialization worry.
While Mumford’s appeal to ideal conditions successfully screens off “stan-
dard” cases of finkish, masked, or mimicked dispositions, (IC) cannot rule out
the possibility of intrinsic finks : dispositions whose manifestation is hindered
as a result of something intrinsic to the entity possessing it.19 To illustrate,
Manley and Wasserman (2008) present a class of examples that show how a
disposition can be finked, masked, or mimicked even in paradigmatic mani-
festation conditions. They envision a sturdy block of concrete that has an
18These models are a good example of what Weisberg (2007) calls minimalist idealization,
the practice of constructing theoretical models that include only the core causal factors
that make a difference to the occurrence and essential character of the phenomenon in
question. Disposition ascriptions guide the construction of these models by selecting the
factors required to make the conditional analysis true.
19The existence of intrinsically finkish dispositions is controversial. Without entering into
the details of the dispute, some authors defend the possibility of intrinsic finks (Clarke
2008; Everett 2009), while others have questioned their plausibility (Choi 2005; Cohen and
Handfield 2007; Handfield 2008).
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“Achilles’ heel,” i.e. a weak spot: if it is dropped onto a particular corner at
just the right angle with exactly the right force, an amazing chain reaction will
cause it to break. Although it would be absurd to conclude that the block is
fragile, the heel mimics fragility under very specific circumstances. These ex-
amples thwart any attempt to provide a conditional analysis of dispositions by
refining the stimulus and response conditions, or by restricting them to ideal
circumstances, since intrinsic finking mechanisms are independent of extrin-
sic manifestation conditions. In contrast, the SAD has the resources to avoid
the difficulty. This is because, even granting that intrinsic finks are indeed
possible, such finking mechanisms are not represented in the idealized model.
In the diagram of gene expression discussed above, all repression mechanisms
that could fink, mask or mimic the transcription of a gene are abstracted
away, regardless of whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic. Similarly, the ab-
stract model(s) which capture the robustness of the sturdy concrete block will
set aside and ignore any weak spot that interferes with fragility under very
special circumstances.20
20Manley and Wasserman (2008) also present three additional problems for conditional
analyses: (i) the problem of comparative dispositional ascriptions; (ii) the problem of specify-
ing a mechanism for context dependence; and (iii) the problem of absent stimulus conditions.
The SAD provides the resources to respond to all three problems; however, addressing these
issues in detail would take us too far.
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Setting intrinsic finks aside, the second problem with (IC) is that the ap-
peal to unspecified “ideal conditions” threatens to trivialize the whole analysis
(Fara 2005). To be sure, Mumford acknowledges the difficulty of spelling out
ideal conditions in sufficient detail. In response, he says that even if one can-
not specify these conditions precisely, in most cases we have a solid intuitive
grasp of what they are. Ideal conditions for salt to dissolve in water include
the air pressure approximating that at sea level, the composition of water ap-
proximating H2O, etc. Yet, as Fara notes, unless we have a way of capturing
these conditions in general and precise terms, the entire account becomes vac-
uous. This is because, if ideal conditions are just those conditions in which the
disposition is manifested, then the analysans in (IC) reduces to “x would D in
conditions in which x would D.” This trivialization worry is a substantial one,
which ought to be addressed with utmost care. Recall, the goal is to provide
an analysis of the sentence “x is disposed to D when C,” and this requires
a specification of its truth conditions. One way to paraphrase Fara’s objec-
tion is to say that including an explicit reference to ideal conditions whose
truth conditions are left unspecified renders the entire analysis vacuous. Note,
however, that the SAD analyzes dispositions without appealing to ideal or ide-
alized conditions. The logical form of a disposition ascription is the simple
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subjunctive conditional “x would D if C.” The reference to the class of mod-
els is not part of the truth conditions; it just specifies where the conditional
holds true, outside of the actual world. The task of specifying these models,
whose identity is contextually determined, is not part of the analysis of dis-
position, but belongs to their explanation. Hence, (SAD) is superior to (IC)
in two respects: it successfully deals with the problem of intrinsic finks and it
sets the trivialization worry aside. To be sure, the simulacrum approach does
not solve the trivialization worry, it merely reduces it to a broader and inde-
pendent problem: the world-model similarity relation. A definitive solution
would require a general account of the similarity relation, an important issue
that, as noted above, cannot be adequately addressed in the present chapter.
Nonetheless, successfully reducing a local problem regarding the analysis of
dispositions to a general problem that affects much contemporary philosophy
of science, constitutes a significant advancement.
A second benefit of the SAD is that it preserves the connection between
dispositions and regularities. Dispositions often capture (but do not explain)
a pattern in the behavior of entities under certain circumstances. Ascribing
fragility to glasses captures the fact that glasses usually shatter when struck
and ascribing solubility to salt captures its tendency to dissolve in water. How-
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ever, dispositions can also be ascribed when their manifestation constitutes the
exception rather than the rule. Acorns have a disposition to grow into oaks
and genes are disposed to be transcribed, despite the fact that most acorns
rot and most genes are idle. The present approach covers both kinds of attri-
butions. All dispositions can be analyzed in terms of subjunctive conditionals
that capture a certain pattern in the behavior of an entity. This regularity is
always displayed in abstract models, but does not necessarily correspond to a
regularity in the world. When this happens, the aim of the ascription is not
to capture an actual regularity, but a behavior manifested under particular
conditions which do not, typically, obtain.
Finally, the SAD brings together the analysis and the explanation of dis-
positions under a unified framework. Clearly, the whole burden is shifted from
analysis to explanation. On the present reading, the analysis of dispositions
becomes straightforward: the logical form of a disposition ascription corre-
sponds to a subjunctive conditional, with the proviso that such conditionals
hold in a class of selected models. The hard task is to associate the behavior
of the entity with the right model. But this asymmetry is hardly surprising.
Here it is helpful to compare the situation with a related debate in the phi-
losophy of science. Over the past few decades, philosophers have extensively
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debated the semantic contribution of prefixing a generalization with a ceteris
paribus clause. The discussion hinges on the difference between “All Fs are
G” and “All Fs are G, ceteris paribus.” The important point, for present pur-
poses, is that all competing accounts provide general analyses of cp-hedges by
describing their logical form or truth conditions, but none of them specifies
the precise conditions under which a particular cp-generalization (“all ravens
are black, ceteris paribus”) is true.21 And rightly so: such conditions do not
follow from the semantic analysis; they need to be investigated individually.
Similarly, a semantic analysis of dispositions cannot and need not provide a
general criterion for picking out the models in which the conditional holds.
Just as there are different pragmatic reasons for hedging a universal general-
ization with a ceteris paribus clause, there are various pragmatic reasons for
ascribing dispositions to entities.
In conclusion, the simulacrum account has three payoffs. First, it saves
SCA. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and
21Strevens (minga) divides accounts of ceteris paribus hedges into three broad categories.
(i) On the softening approach, the cp-hedge strengthens the generalization by weakening
the connection between F and G. For example, the cp-clause turns the claim “All Fs are
G” into “Most Fs are G” by identifying a capacity or disposition (Cartwright 1989). (ii)
On the narrowing approach, the cp-clause strengthens the generalization by weakening its
conditions of application. Thus “Ceteris paribus, all F s are G” means “In conditions Z,
F s are G,” for an appropriate choice of Z ” (Hausman 1992; Lange 2002). (iii) Finally, on
the annotating approach a cp-hedge has the function of commenting on causal breakdowns
(Earman and Roberts 1999).
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regularities, despite the fact that some regularities are not actual. Third, it
provides a unified framework for analyzing and explaining dispositions. The
SAD, as presented here, is a deflationary view of dispositions, since it rejects
the thesis that dispositions are properties of objects. Yet, this account can also
be reconciled with the thesis that real entities are the bearers of dispositions,
provided that one is willing to endorse a weaker notion of property possession.
For example, instead of saying that object x has disposition D iff x satisfies the
analysis of D, one could argue that x satisfies D iff the conditional analysis of
D holds in the appropriate class of models M. On this reading, dispositions are
properties of objects, albeit particular properties whose possession depends on
the analysis holding true in a class of associated models. A general discussion
of the relation between entities and properties is an metaphysical endeavor
that lies beyond the scope of this chapter. The moral that we ought to draw
from the present discussion is that abstract models, not real entities, satisfy




Biologists employ a suggestive metaphor to describe the complexities of molec-
ular interactions within cells and embryos: cytological components are said to
be part of “ecosystems” that integrate them in a complex network of relations
with many other entities. The aim of this chapter is to scrutinize the metaphor
of the molecular ecosystem that, despite its longstanding history, has seldom
been articulated. I begin by arguing that the cellular environment is analogous
to the biosphere in important and surprising respects. Next, I discuss some
applications of molecular ecosystem concept to actual biological practice.
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7.1 Introduction
Biologists often adopt a suggestive metaphor to describe the complexities of
molecular interactions within cells and embryos: cytological components are
said to be part of ecosystems that integrate genes and molecules in a complex
network of relations with many other gears of the cellular machinery and with
features of their environment.
The practice of employing ecological concepts to describe cytological inter-
actions has a long history that traces all the way back to the work of early
embryologists. In his celebrated textbook, Principles of Development (1939),
Paul Weiss introduced the expression “cellular ecosystem” to describe Gur-
witsch (1910) and Spemann’s (1921) morphogenetic fields, that is, groups of
cells whose position and fate are specified with respect to the same set of
boundaries. With the rise of the genetic approach, pioneered by the Morgan
School, morphogenetic fields and other embryological concepts were set aside
(Gilbert et al. 1996). Yet, following the “rediscovery” of developmental biol-
ogy in the last few decades of the 20th century, Weiss’ ecological metaphor has
been revived in contemporary molecular research and systems biology. Sev-
enty years after Weiss’ work, it is now once again customary for researchers
to describe living organisms and their components as constituting cellular or
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molecular ecosystems :
“Living systems are autonomous self-reproducing ‘molecular ecosystems’
defined as a collective of self-organized communities of dynamic, inter-
dependent, interacting, and computing molecular species.” (Lee et al.
1997, 491).
“Once a protein is made, it becomes part of a larger level of organization.
For instance, it may become part of the structural framework of the cell,
or it may become involved in one of the myriad enzymatic pathways for
the synthesis or breakdown of cellular metabolites. In any case, the
protein is now part of a complex ‘ecosystem’ that integrates it into a
relationship with numerous other proteins. Thus, several changes can
still take place that determine whether or not the protein will be active.”
(Gilbert 2006a, 137).
“The activation, growth and death of animal cells are accompanied by
changes in the chemical composition of the surrounding environment.
Cells and their microscopic environment constitute therefore a cellular
ecosystem whose time-evolution determines processes of interest for ei-
ther biology (e.g. animal development) and [sic] medicine (e.g. tumor
spreading, immune response).” (Chignola et al. 2006, 1661)
“Evidence is accumulating that microorganisms do not live as isolated
individuals, but as populations of cells that are continuously producing,
sensing and responding to chemical signals, which allows them to com-
municate and cooperate. (...) [T]hese advances lay the foundations to
investigate the dynamic nature of molecular ecosystem networks in time
and space.” (Raes and Bork 2008, 697-98)
The general intuition underlying the metaphor is clear. Molecular mecha-
nisms and processes, such as gene expression, have often been depicted as rigid,
self-regulated, deterministic gears, where every little piece has its specific and
independent role that is unaffected by the cellular and environmental context
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in which it is embedded. This picture, however, is highly misleading. To para-
phrase a humorous analogy from molecular biologist Susan Lindquist, while
protein interactions are typically depicted as dancers individually performing
in a spacious ballroom, a more accurate representation would be something
like the famous “stateroom scene” from the Marx Brothers movie A Night
at the Opera, where every action and reaction is heavily constrained by the
crowded surrounding environment. The ecosystem concept captures well the
complexity of cytological systems, the interdependence of its various compo-
nents, and the fact that cells and organisms are not insulated; changes at the
molecular level both influence and are influenced by changes in the surrounding
environment.
While the ecosystem metaphor is routinely applied to the cytological envi-
ronment, the extent and respects in which the molecular microcosm resembles
the ecological macrocosm is a question that is seldom addressed explicitly.
Analogies between ecological and molecular systems are often assumed but
rarely articulated or discussed in detail.1 A possible explanation for this omis-
1Consider, for example, the first passage quoted above, which is the opening statement
of a chemical biology article (Lee et al. 1997). The term “ecosystem” figures three more
times in the article (once more in the introduction, once in the conclusion, and once in
the title). Yet, what exactly turns “self-organized communities of dynamic, interdependent,
interacting, and computing molecular species” into an ecosystem is never explicitly discussed.
Some of the other quoted works spell out the concept in greater detail, yet they all fall short
of explaining the analogy between ecological and molecular environments.
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sion is that the application of the ecological concept to the molecular realm
is straightforward. On this view, the analogy requires no further development
because it is self-explanatory. This response, however, is deeply puzzling.
Prima facie, developing organisms and their components are very different
from portions of the biosphere. For one thing, organisms are relatively cohe-
sive, compartmentalized, in equilibrium and, as a result, they are much easier
to individuate than environments.2 Moreover, while determining the survival
or organisms is relatively intuitive, making sense of the “survival” and “evo-
lution” of ecological environments is less straightforward. Finally, the clear
and intuitive distinction between biotic and abiotic ecological components—
between living organisms, such as plants, fungi, and bacteria, and inorganic
entities like rock, soil, and air—is meaningless at the molecular level.3 In short,
cells and developing embryos look nothing like ecological units. We are thus
left with the following question: is the ecosystem metaphor well-grounded?
And, if so, what exactly does it purport to capture?
2Whether and to what extent ecological environments are “cohesive, compartmentalized
and in equilibrium” is a substantial question that, however, I shall set aside. The impor-
tant point, for present purposes, is that organisms approximate closed systems much more
accurately than environments.
3To be sure, whether proteins, ribosomes, membranes, or nucleotides are better classified
as “living” or “nonliving” is far from clear. However, all these entities are on a par: either
they are all biotic, or they are all abiotic; there seems to be no intuitive or principled way
of drawing the line.
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The aim of this chapter is to explore structural parallels between ecological
environments and cellular modules metaphorically called “ecosystems.” In the
first part of the chapter, I argue that the cellular environment is analogous
to the biosphere is important and surprising respects. I begin by drawing
methodological parallels between the individuation of molecular and ecological
units. Next, I argue that the cytological machinery instantiates characteristic
ecological relations, such as predation, competition, mutualism, and density-
dependent effects. Finally, I spell out some analogies between ecological and
molecular environments. These considerations will suggest a more general and
precise characterization of molecular ecosystems. In addition, I maintain that
this metaphor is not only accurate; it is fruitful as well. In support of this
claim, the final section explores some applications of the molecular ecosystem
concept to actual biological research.
7.2 Fleshing Out the Metaphor
Following Tansley’s (1935) original suggestion, ecologists typically define ecosys-
tems as communities of organisms together with their physical environment.
In other words, ecosystems are constituted by the totality of biotic elements
enclosed within a spatial region together with the abiotic physical components
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of the area in which the organisms interact, such as air, soil, water, and sun-
light. Despite the intuitive appeal of this general definition—which is routinely
encountered in both popular and technical literature—from a philosophical
perspective, the ecosystem is one of the most elusive biological concepts and
one of the hardest to analyze.4 Consequently, I shall not attempt to define
the molecular analog of an ecological concept whose precise characterization
is still left wanting. Instead, I will focus on some of the criteria that ecologists
employ to individuate and characterize ecological units and emphasize some re-
markable and, perhaps, surprising analogies with the cytological environment.
More specifically, I will consider three aspects of ecosystems: the delimitation
of the system’s boundaries, the community structure, and the concept of the
environment.
Before moving on, it will be useful to specify explicitly the molecular cor-
relates of basic ecosystem components, such as organisms, populations, and
species. Throughout this chapter, I shall treat proteins and other individual
cellular components as the cytological analogs of biological organisms. Ac-
cordingly, molecular kinds correspond to biological species and the totality of
4This widely recognized fact, however, does not make the concept any less fruitful from
a theoretical perspective, or any less testable from an empirical point of view (Odenbaugh
and de Laplante ming).
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type-identical molecules in the system correspond to populations, i.e. commu-
nities of conspecific organisms. To avoid confusion, in what follows, I employ
uppercase letters to refer to molecule types, while indexed lowercase letters re-
fer to individual token molecules. Thus {p1, p2, p3} are all molecules of type P.
With this in mind, we can now proceed to examine the characteristic features
of molecular environments.
Ecosystem Boundaries
Ecologists do not typically look for ecosystems in the same way paleontologists
dig up fossils. The first step is rather to circumscribe a certain territory—
generally delimited by physical discontinuities—like a forest, a grassland, or a
pond, and pose a series of diagnostic questions such as: Which species inhabit
it? What kind of intraspecific and interspecific relations do populations engage
in? How do organisms interact with the abiotic environment? Addressing these
issues helps determining the characteristic ecosystem structure displayed by
the portion of the environment under scrutiny. In short, on the very first pass,
ecosystems are circumscribed, not discovered.
As an illustration, consider a classic contribution to the history of ecosys-
tem ecology: Lindeman’s trophic-dynamic approach to the study of the lake as
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an ecosystem. Raymond Lindeman and his wife Eleanor spent five years exam-
ining the small Cedar Bog Lake in Minnesota. After painstakingly sampling
the lake’s biota, water, and bottom sediments, in addition to monitoring the
distribution of littoral vegetation and vertebrate animals and comparing data
across different seasons, the Lindemans provided a thorough analysis of the
ecosystem structure of this small lake.5 The historical and theoretical signifi-
cance of Lindeman’s (1942) seminal study of the trophic-dymanic perspective
on ecological systems is well documented (see, for example, Golley 1993) and
need not be discussed here. The important point, for present purposes, is his
methodological approach, which instantiates the general procedure described
above. The investigation begins with the circumscription of a relatively well-
defined system (a small lake), followed by a through analysis of characteris-
tic interactions between biotic and abiotic components, and concludes with a
general assessment of the structure of ecosystems—a theoretical concept in-
troduced by Tansley (1935) less than a decade earlier. I refer to this mode of
individuation of the system’s boundaries based on physical discontinuities as
physiognomic individuation.
5Aspects of lacustrian trophic dynamics discussed by Lindeman (1942) include qualitative
food-cycle relationships, productivity (the general rate of production of the concerned food
groups), biological efficiency with respects to lower levels, and the ratio between the biomass
of predators and prey.
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The physiognomic mode of individuation is particularly effective when the
system to be circumscribed is relatively small and uniform, as in the case of
a small lake or wood. In contrast, it is much less functional when applied to
larger and dis-homogeneous systems, such as oceans, forests, or grasslands.
In these cases, a different strategy is more appropriate to identify ecological
units in a finer-grained fashion. Consider the following examples. In a large
ecosystem, such as a large lake or a mountain range, most species are unlikely
to populate in the whole region; each community will only inhabit a portion
of the territory. To wit, shallow-water fish only dwell the coastal regions of
the lake, while certain algae only grow at depth. Likewise, mountain ranges
cover a huge and diverse territory, but coniferous trees only survive below a
certain altitude. While it is clear that both fish and algae belong to the great
lake ecosystem, and coniferous trees are part of the Alpine ecosystem, for cer-
tain purposes, it will be useful to isolate and focus on a smaller portion of
a larger unit, such as the coastal region of the lake or the lower portion of
the mountain range where particular species are found. How can we individu-
ate these smaller and more homogeneous—but no less important—ecosystems
embedded inside the larger ecosystem? Note that the physiognomic mode
of identification presented above might not be applicable. If the altitude of
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the mountain or the depth of the lake increase gradually, there will be no
cut-off point to mark the transmission; as a result, it will not be clear where
the boundary should be drawn. A possible solution to this puzzle lies in the
adoption of an altogether different mode of system individuation. Instead of
circumscribing a section of the biosphere by focusing on physical discontinu-
ities, one can track the activity of organisms and then plot their distribution
inside the territory. Succinctly put, the idea is to first select the relevant pop-
ulation(s). Next, one “draws the boundary” of the system by circumscribing
the territory that they inhabit, in case a single population is selected, or by
overlapping or conjoining these territories, if multiple populations are selected.
The result is a nested hierarchy of partially overlapping ecosystems, ranging
from small regions containing a single population to the totality of the bio-
sphere. The point, however, is that the boundaries of each sub-system can be
traced even in the absence of clear physical discontinuities. For instance, we
can restrict our attention to the mountainous regions colonized by the Nor-
way Spruce, the Silver Fir, or both, even if nothing else distinguishes these
areas from the rest of the mountain, where other species are present. In short,
whereas the physiognomic approach begins with a general delimitation of the
boundaries, and then works “inwards” to explore the ecological structure of the
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territory, the component-specific approach starts by selecting population(s) of
reference, and then works “outwards” looking at their distribution and the
totality of their interactions.6
With all of this in mind, let us set ecology aside and focus on a different area
of biology. Recent advances in genetics and molecular biology established that
development is a product of a series of discrete and interacting modules, which
6This distinction between two different modes of ecosystem individuation is closely con-
nected to the interpretation of another important ecological concept, whose precise charac-
terization is still controversial: the ecological niche. According to Elton’s (1927) classical
definition, a niche is a particular way of making a living in an ecological community. This
definition fits in quite well with the traditional view of the environment as posing selective
pressures on organisms, which respond by adapting. Eltonian niches exist independently of
the organisms that occupy them; niches are defined functionally, and the same niche can be
occupied by different organisms in different communities, as long as these organisms play
the same causal role. For instance, the “large carnivore role” can be fulfilled by lions in
the African Savannah and by tigers in the Indian subcontinent. More recent decent devel-
opments in biology, however, have started to undermined this picture. Hutchinson (1965)
provided an alternative definition of niches as volumes in an abstract space. The dimen-
sions of this space correspond to environmental quantities relative to a certain population.
For example, the dimensions of marine fish niches are likely to include variables such as
water temperature, water salinity, rates of predation, availability of resources, and so forth.
Hutchinson also distinguishes between a species’ fundamental niche—the region of the ab-
stract volume in which a species could, in principle, maintain itself indefinitely—and the
species’ realized niche, the portion of the fundamental niche that the species actually occu-
pies. Building on Hutchinson’s insights, Lewontin (1978) suggested that the very nature and
identity of niches depends on the organisms that occupy them. The niche’s characteristic
dimensions, such as necessary resources, ideal temperature, or foraging range, vary quite
drastically once we change the species of reference. Consequently, attempting to define a
niche independently of its occupants is problematic. Niches, Lewontin says, are found, not
made. The upshot is that there are two opposing concepts of ecological niche, and this
distinctions fits in naturally with the two forms of boundary identification isolated here. On
one view, niches are defined by their causal role and are thus independent of their occupants.
In this case, the spatial region occupied by the niche is individuated physiognomically, on
the basis of physical discontinuities. Alternatively, niches can be viewed as volumes in
multidimensional spaces that capture the mutual relation between populations and their
environment. Here the identification of the occupied region depends on the populations of
reference.
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allow the tinkering of of finely tuned and complex processes without wreaking
havoc to the entire organism (Bolker 2000; Schlosser and Wagner 2004). I
will now argue that the two modes of ecological individuation—physiognomic
and component-specific—isolated above straightforwardly correspond to two
distinct strategies for individuating developmental modules.
“Units of ontogeny” often correspond to entire anatomical traits. The de-
velopmental module can be either a certain tissue, limb, or organ (e.g. muscles,
legs, hearts) or the corresponding morphogenetic fields (the cardiac field or the
limb field), that is, the collection of all the cells committed to the formation
of the trait in question. In such cases, where the module straightforwardly
corresponds to the anatomical trait, the individuation of the module runs par-
allel to the physiognomic mode presented above: researchers pick a particular
phenotypic trait and proceed with an investigation of the molecular processes
underlying its growth, from early embryonic stages to the development of the
adult phenotype. To be sure, contemporary biology is still very far from a
comprehensive, let alone complete, explanation of ontogeny. Still, remarkable
progress has been achieved over the last few decades: many genes, molecules,
and processes responsible for organogenesis have now been identified with pre-
cision.
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Developmental units, however, do not always correspond to entire anatom-
ical traits. Here, two different cases ought to be kept distinct. The former
class of examples is constituted by modules that are much smaller than traits.
Indeed, one of the most important insights of evolutionary developmental bi-
ology (evo devo) has been the discovery of modular units at the molecular
level, which develop independently of larger components. Enhancer regions of
genes constitute a good example (Davidson 2005; Gilbert 2006b). Enhancer
elements are DNA sites that bind with specific transcription factors (regula-
tory proteins) to control the selective expression of genes, that is, whether
and in what quantity the coding sequence is transcribed into protein. Conse-
quently, altering the structure of the enhancer may block the transcription of
the gene or, alternatively, determine its expression at a different time or in a
different area, with obvious consequences for development and evolution. The
fascinating details of enhancer modularity need not concern us here.7 The
relevant implication, for our purposes, is that the units of ontogeny can be
much smaller than—and functionally independent of—the tissues that they
generate. A second class of units that do not correspond to entire anatomi-
7A splendid example of the evolutionary significance of enhancer modularity is provided
by Kingsley’s analysis of the evolution of three-spined stickleback fish. For an accessible
presentation and discussion of these results, see Gilbert and Epel (2009, 337-41).
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cal traits is constituted by developmental modules that cross-cut anatomical
traits. A good illustration is provided by the preliminary segmentation of the
fruit fly Drosophila into parasegments. Succinctly put, the fruit fly larva is
divided into repetitive developmental units called segments, which govern the
identity of the cellular nuclei that they contain. Each segment (or group of
segments) corresponds, at least approximately, to specific anatomical traits.
For example, segments located in the posterior areas of the embryo develop
into the abdomen, segments located in the central regions generate the thorax,
while anterior segments generate the head. Segmentation, however, does not
occur right away; segments derive from an earlier division of the larva into
functional units called parasegments, which are defined by the expression of
pair-rule genes after gastrulation. Parasegments fulfill a central (and complex)
role in the development of the fruit fly that we can set aside.8 The important
point is that segments and parasegments do not correspond: each segment is
constituted by the posterior half of one parasegment and the anterior half of
the following one. As a result, parasegments are fundamental units of insect
design that, however, do directly map onto distinct anatomical components.
These two classes of examples raise an important problem: how do we in-
8For an insightful—yet accessible—discussion, see Gehring (1998).
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dividuate ontogenetic units when they do not straightforwardly correspond to
anatomical traits? As noted, when the developmental module coincides with
a discrete trait, the boundaries of the module simply are the boundaries of
the trait itself. For example, the cardiac field is constituted by all and only
the cells that will eventually form the heart. But what about gene enhancer
elements, which contribute to the formation of many different parts of the or-
ganism,9 or parasegments, which cross-cut developmental modules? The key
to individuating these modules is to select their triggering mechanism (typ-
ically, but by no means always, a cluster of genes or gene products) and to
identify their “habitat” or “niche,” i.e. the various components with which the
mechanism interacts to differentiate particular areas of the organism. Such
habitats generally include a network of genes, various kinds of proteins, such
as transcription factors, paracrine factors, adhesion molecules, as well as signal
transduction cascades, and many other cytological gears. In other words, when
the developmental module cannot be individuated by focusing on anatomical
discontinuities, the system’s boundaries can still be delimited by selecting char-
acteristic elements and tracking their distribution and activity inside a larger
9So-called “toolkit genes,” for example, do not underlie specific traits, but contribute
to the formation of various different parts of the organism. The problem becomes even
more acute when these genes or gene elements are virtually identical across phylogenetically
distant species, as in the case of homeotic genes.
CHAPTER 7. MOLECULAR ECOSYSTEMS 250
system, such as an organism or an embryo. This investigative strategy corre-
sponds to the component-specific mode of ecosystem individuation discussed
above. There we began by selecting species or populations of reference and
then worked outwards to determine their distribution and activities in the
territory; here the preliminary step is to mark a certain macromolecular com-
ponent and determine its diffusion and activity in the developing organism.10
In sum, I distinguished between two modes of individuation. The first
one, physiognomic individuation, circumscribes a system in terms of physi-
cal discontinuities. The second, component-specific, approach focuses on the
distribution and activity of selected populations embedded within a larger sys-
tem, allowing a more fine-grained individuation of units, even in the absence
of real or alleged “natural boundaries.” These two approaches can be employed
both in ecology and in molecular-developmental biology. To be sure, the phys-
iognomic mode is more widely employed in ecology, where units are often
10How can this knowledge be acquired? When the molecular system is simple enough, that
is, when a relatively small number of genes with a clear functional role are involved, we can
study these processes in vivo, by tracking the expression of a gene or the activity of a protein
in different cells and in different parts of the organism. This is typically done with the use of
fluorescent markers in the living organism (hence the expression “in vivo”). However, in vivo
techniques become impractical, if not flatly impossible, in more complicated systems where
genes and proteins are involved in several different interactions across a variety of cell types.
When this is the case, these molecular networks must be studied in vitro, by cultivating
and isolating cellular colonies in test tubes or on petri dishes. This allows researchers to
investigate the behavior of molecules and the development of cells independently of the
myriad interactions and processes occurring in the developing organism.
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characterized by physical discontinuities. In contrast, the component-specific
approach is typically encountered in the molecular sciences, where experimen-
tal manipulation is more readily available. Yet, anatomical discontinuities are
important guidelines also in developmental investigations, and the possibility
of a finer-grained individuation of systems in the absence of physical discon-
tinuities is fruitful in ecological research as well. I thus conclude that these
common modes of preliminary boundary delimitation constitute a first impor-
tant analogy between the theoretical structure and experimental practice of
both disciplines.
The Community Structure
Next, consider the characteristic structure of ecological communities, which
typically exhibit a wide range of interactions, at various levels and of various
kinds. Some of these interactions are defined in terms of the causal role of the
interactors, independently of the precise identity of the relata. Predator-prey
relations, for example, are instantiated by a number of different populations—
rabbits and foxes, birds and moths, etc.—all of which fulfill a particular func-
tional role: intuitively, predators need to feed on prey. In contrast, other forms
of interaction structurally depend on the particular organisms that instantiate
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them and their living conditions. These are the interactions that determine
the specificity of particular environments. To illustrate, the living conditions
of organisms vary substantially across the biosphere: mountain lakes are quite
different from tropical rainforest. Accordingly, particular modes of interac-
tions, such as whether inhabitants graze in a grassland, fly in the air, or swim
under rocks depend, at least in part, on the particular physical conditions and
the kind of available resources. This cornucopia of ecological relations can
hardly be replicated within a single organism, let alone a single cell. Yet, sim-
ple molecular systems instantiate many of the interactions that characterize
the community structure of ecological units. In order to develop the analogy
between the structure of ecological and molecular communities, I shall focus
solely on functional interactions that abstract away from the precise identity
of the interactors and the specificity of their living conditions. The following
examples illustrate how ecological relations, such as competition, predation,
mutualism, and metabolic cooperation have cytological analogs in regulatory
mechanisms and protein modification processes.
Let us begin by focusing on ecological competition, which can be character-
ized, in general, as an interaction between two organisms or species that results
in a fitness gain for one and a fitness loss for the other. Now, surely, whether
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and how it is possible to talk about the “fitness” of genes and other molecular
types is a controversial matter that I shall not address here. Setting the is-
sue of fitness aside, however, cells, proteins and other macromolecules engage
in forms of non-intentional competition, where different cellular or molecular
species attempt to occupy the same “niche.” Chignola et al. (2006), for exam-
ple, observe that cells bordering a growing tumor mass exploit their acquired
capability to resist to more acidic environments and to uptake more nutrients
than non-cancerogenous cells and invade the surrounding tissue. Analogous
forms of competition are also known to commonly occur at a smaller scale,
between cytological components. In the same paper, Chignola and colleagues
note how the survival and clonal expansion of B lymphocytes depends upon
specific interactions between antigens and immunoglobulin receptors. As a
result, specific B cells clones compete and are selected by the foreign antigen.
A similar effect is due to the fact that molecular systems typically contain a
greater variety and quantity of reactants than is strictly needed for a certain
reaction to occur, ensuring that the effect remains stable under a variety of
circumstances. Thus, when there is much transcription factor in a system,
but only a limited number of binding sites, the result is a form of molecular
competition (see Chapter Two).
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Next, consider predation, a biological interaction in which a hunting organism—
a predator—attacks and feeds on another organism, its prey.11 Making sense
of cells or molecules “hunting” and “feeding” on each other is problematic. Yet
catalytic reactions that modify the structure of proteins, effectively inhibit-
ing their capacity to perform their normal function, fulfill a causal role that
is analogous to common ecological forms of population control, such as pre-
dation. Consider, for example, the (reversible) process of phosphorylation,
which consists in the addition of a phosphate group to protein and other or-
ganic molecules, with several important effects, including the (de)activation of
enzymes and receptors. Thus, just as increasing the number of predators in a
territory (e.g. foxes inhabiting a field) will increase selective pressure on prey
(say, rabbits), the number of active proteins in a system is proportional to
the number of enzymes that will modify the protein structure, if they happen
to bind. To emphasize, enzymes do not “feed” on proteins in the same way
foxes feed on rabbits—molecules do not gain necessary nutriment or energy
from these interactions. However, the deactivation of enzymes and receptors
mirrors the causal role of ecological predation, namely, to control the size of
particular populations. Consequently, the periodic fluctuations in community
11Whether or not the prey is killed before the predator feeds on it, the act of predation
typically results in the death of the prey and the predator absorbing the prey’s tissue.
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size and the variations in concentration rates display similar dynamics govern-
ing density-dependent forms of population control.
A third example of an ecological relation that is frequently displayed at the
molecular level is mutualism, which occurs when organisms belonging to differ-
ent species interact in a way that each derives a fitness benefit (i.e. increased
or improved reproductive output). Interactions between adjacent tissues dur-
ing organogenesis, such as reciprocal embryonic induction, constitute a good
example of obligate mutualism—a form of mutualism where the interaction
does not merely raise the fitness of each interactor, but where one species can-
not survive without the other. Reciprocal embryonic induction occurs when
the formation of two organs requires a complex interaction between different
tissues; without this interaction, the two tissues do not develop correctly.12
Like competition and predation, mutualistic relations can also be observed on
a smaller scale, for instance, in the process of cooperative binding—in which a
molecule attached to a DNA site facilitates the binding of molecules of the same
type—or in the case of molecular chaperones, proteins that assist the folding
12Here is a concrete example, borrowed from Gilbert and Epel (2009). When the pre-
sumptive retina of the mammalian eye meets the presumptive lens, the lens “instructs” a
bulge of cells from the forebrain to develop the retina. In turn, the presumptive retinal cells
instruct the placodal epithelium of the developing head ectoderm to generate the lens.
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and assembly of macromolecular structures.13 Finally, I should note that the
analogy between mutualism at the molecular and ecological level becomes more
evident once we look at genetic structures rather than proteins, since proteins
do not autonomously reproduce (they are synthesized from DNA templates).
Genes are more similar to organisms, in virtue of the fact that they may affect
their own replication, by synthesizing the right kind of proteins. Consider,
for example, the feedback and feedforward loops in gene regulation, where the
binding of a transcription factor at an operator ensures that a certain gene
is expressed, while the expressed gene synthesizes more transcription of the
same kind, effectively enhancing its own replication. This case of cytological
mutualism is closer to its ecological analog because the gene itself improves its
chances of being transcribed from its own expression, while the transcription
factors increases its replications rate by interacting with DNA. Now, this is
not to say that genetic mutualism is identical to ecological mutualism since,
as noted, the concept of fitness does not straightforwardly apply at the molec-
ular level and there are other obvious and important differences between the
two disciplines. The point is simply that genetic mutualism is closer to its
13Chaperones typically prevent newly synthesized polypeptide chains from folding into
non-functional units, but they remain inert when these units fold correctly and perform
their normal biological function. Since the tendency of molecules to aggregate in non-
functional units increases when proteins are denatured by stress, the majority (but not the
totality) of chaperones are also heat shock proteins.
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ecological counterpart than similar relations between proteins or tissues.
Finally, various forms of metabolic cooperation can be found at the molec-
ular level, in the form of complementary pathways (e.g. groups of blood pro-
teins, usually activated by antigen-antibody complexes, which mediate specific
antibody responses), the active or passive transport of metabolites in and out
of the cell, and the processes of biofilm and mat formation, whereby microor-
ganisms or cells aggregate to each other, forming a homogeneous “slime” that
allows them to adhere to a biotic or abiotic surface. Like ecological systems,
molecular environments are highly sensitive to density-dependent interactions,
such as variations in population size. This affects not only the dynamics of
the system—as noted in the above discussion of as competition, predation,
and mutualism—but also the structure of the system itself. A good example
is provided by quorum sensing, a stimulus-response system employed by many
bacterial species to coordinate gene expression according to local population
density, which feed back on the structure of the population. In short, the
heterogeneity of the local habitat determines the range and nature of possible
interactions in molecular environments, like it does in the biosphere. Just as
a diverse environmental structure allows a great variety of interspecific inter-
actions (compare rainforest with deserts), a complex developmental system
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enables a broader range of molecular interactions and a more nuanced array
of responses to stress-induced reactions and other environmental conditions.
The Environment
The third aspect that I shall consider is the concept of the environment. Eco-
logical ecosystems encompass both communities of living organisms and the
physical environment in which these organisms thrive, reproduce, compete
and, more generally, interact. As mentioned above, the distinction between
biota and abiota is hard to spell out at the molecular level, since there seems to
be no principled way of drawing the line between living and non-living compo-
nents. Then, how are we to conceive of the molecular environment? I contend
that it is possible to individuate various types of molecular environment even
without a clear separation between organic and inorganic components.
In the context of a lucid analysis of adaptation, Robert Brandon distin-
guished between three different concepts of environment: external, ecological,
and selective (Brandon 1990; Brandon and Antonovics 1996). Simply put, the
external environment encompasses the sum of all the physical factors (biotic
and abiotic) surrounding the organism. While clear and intuitive, this notion
is extremely broad. Obviously, not every element of the external environment
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has an impact on the life of every organism in the system, For example, the av-
erage PH of the soil is unlikely to directly affect the growth of a population of
foxes. For the purposes of investigating the development and evolution of par-
ticular organisms a more specific notion of environment is required. Brandon
defines the subset of the external environment that directly affects the global
reproductive output of an organism, population or species as their ecological
environment. In a nutshell, the ecological environment of a species is consti-
tuted by all and only the features that affect the survival and reproduction
of that species. While this concept of ecological environment is much more
restricted than the all-encompassing external environment, relative to some re-
search projects, even this ecological notion of environment is excessively broad.
The ecological environment measures the scale of environmental heterogeneity,
that is, the performance of an individual across a variety of different (external)
environments. But suppose that we are interested in isolating only the differ-
ential reproductive output of a population in a particular environment; what
we need are the factors that make an actual difference in fitness—how the en-
vironment affects the organisms’ contribution to the next generation. In this
case, only a subset of physical factors constituting the ecological environment
of that population will be salient; this subset will constitute the population’s
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selective environment.
In sum, Brandon identifies three concepts of the environment, ranging from
the all-encompassing external environment to the restricted selective one. I
argue that a similar distinction can also be applied to molecular environments.
Recall that the cytological correlate of organisms and species are molecules (or
other individual macromolecular gears). The external molecular environment
(ExME) of a molecule, such as a protein, corresponds to the totality of the
system’s components, including all other molecules, proteins, enzymes, DNAs,
RNAs, and other kinds of molecular gears, such as cellular membranes, mi-
crotubules, mitochondria, and organelles. Just like its ecological counterpart,
the ExME of a protein is extremely broad and all-encompassing, including
elements that do not interact with the protein at hand. For example, the syn-
thesis of P -protein might be unaffected by the presence or absence of enzymes
that catalyze Q-reactions. By restricting the ExME to all and only those com-
ponents of the system that interact and affect the function or replication of
molecular type P , we obtain P ’s ecological molecular environment (EcME). In
other words, the EcME of molecules P is constituted by the collection p1...pn
of all P -molecules, together with all molecules Q,R, S... that react with P ,
enzymes that catalyze P -reactions, DNA operators to which P can bind, the
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transcription factors that “compete” with P to bind to these sites, etc. In
short, the EcME of P -molecules is the subset of P ’s ExME that (actually or
potentially) interact with P . Finally, by restricting the EcME of P -molecules
to all and only those cytological gears that affect P ’s production or replication,
we obtain P ’s selective molecular environment (SME). It should be obvious
that the EcME and the SME of a molecule can overlap, but do not necessarily
coincide. To wit, repressors and other inhibiting factors that bind to DNA,
preventing the transcription of P , are part of both P ’s EcME and SME. In
contrast, stretches of nucleotides to which P binds to regulate the expression
of genes that do not encode P itself are part of P ’s EcME, but not of its SME.
In conclusion, Brandon’s tripartition of the ecological environment concept
into external, ecological, and selective, can be transferred to cellular systems
despite the fact that no intuitive distinction between biotic and abiotic compo-
nent straightforwardly applies. As we shall see in the following section, these
distinctions play an important role in the explanation and understanding of
biological systems.
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Mapping Ecology onto Cytology:
The Molecular Ecosystem
Let us take stock. Genes, molecules, and other gears of the cytological
machinery do not act in isolation, but form a complex network of interactions,
which displays remarkable similarities with the processes and relations em-
ployed by ecologists to characterize environmental ecosystems. First, there is
an analogy between two modes of system individuation, one that focuses on
physical or anatomical discontinuities, and one which tracks the range of action
of a selected class of populations. Second, the community structure of cellular
systems instantiates some characteristic relations of ecological environments,
such as competition, predation, mutualism, and metabolic cooperation. Third,
Brandon’s distinction between ecological, external, and selective environment
can be preserved at the cytological level and employed to conceptualize the
notion of molecular environment.
With all of this in mind, we are now in a position to characterize molecular
ecosystems more precisely. Recall, ecologists define ecosystems as communi-
ties of organisms together with their physical environment. Mirroring this
general definition, we can treat a molecular ecosystem as a collection of in-
teracting molecular gears (cells, genes, proteins, enzymes, etc.), exhibiting a
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characteristic community structure (competition, predation, mutualism, etc.),
together with their external molecular environment (membranes, microtubules,
organelles, etc.) These systems, located in embryos or organisms, can be iden-
tified either physiognomically, on the basis of physical (anatomical) discon-
tinuities, or focusing on the distribution and activity of a selected subset of
components.
If we compare this with previous analyses, there are noteworthy similarities.
Raes and Bork (2008, 693), for example, define microbial ecosystems as “a
system that consists of all the microorganisms that live in a certain area or
niche and that function together in the context of the other biotic (plants
and animals) and abiotic (temperature, chemical composition and structure
of the surroundings) factors of that niche.” At the same time, the present
definition purports to identify more perspicuously the characteristic features
of the system, such as the preliminary modes of identification, the ways in
which molecular communities “function together” in the context of other biotic
and abiotic composition, and the various components of the environment.
This general characterization of molecular ecosystems is not intended to
provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine, exactly, which com-
munities constitute ecosystems. Spelling out a precise operational definition of
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the ecosystem concept—at either level, ecological or molecular—is a daunting
task, which cannot be adequately addressed here. The upshot of the above
discussion is simply that the widespread practice of employing ecological con-
cepts to describe the molecular milieu is more than just a suggestive metaphor.
Conceptualizing the complexities of molecular interactions as embedded within
ecosystems captures some important features of the cytological environment.
In the rest of this chapter, I focus on some applications of the concept of the
molecular ecosystem to actual biological practice.
7.3 Applications
Recent years have witnessed a methodological shift in molecular biology, from
reductionist approaches—which attempt to analyze the structure and func-
tion of individual or small groups of molecules in relative isolation—to holistic
approaches that purport to explain the behavior of entire systems, without
breaking them down to their component parts. Initially, these “wholes” con-
sisted of a handful of genes embedded in a network, which captured how these
genes responded to external stimuli, influences, and signals. Steady advances
in robotics and computation, however, enabled the creation of complex models
that reproduce the wiring of complete cells and microbial organisms (Kitano
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2002; Joyce and Palsson 2006). In the meanwhile, the next step in this rapidly
progressing field has already been targeted: the goal is to extend models that
capture the behavior of individual cells and simple organisms to models ca-
pable of analyzing the complexity of entire ecosystems (Raes and Bork 2008).
An assessment of this ambitious project transcends our present purposes. The
much more modest aim of this section is to show how the molecular ecosystem
concept defined above can be fruitfully employed in present and future studies
of biological systems.
To begin, we should note that the expression “molecular ecosystem,” as
currently employed in the biological literature, is ambiguous: it can refer,
indifferently, to ecological and cytological environments. As an illustration,
imagine that over the next few decades the systemic approach will fulfill its
most optimistic promises and advance to the point of unravelling the molecular
complexities of entire ecological environments. On the envisioned scenario, sci-
entists will be able to provide complete—or reasonably complete—molecular
descriptions of the physical interactions underlying large portions of the biome,
such as lakes or mountain ranges. Following Raes and Bork (2008), the re-
sult of this extremely ambitious project—which, to emphasize, is still very far
from being accomplished—can be called “eco-systems biology.” Now, consider
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the role of the ecosystem concept in this enterprise. The appeal to “ecosys-
tems” serves to draw the boundaries of the system under consideration, not to
characterize its molecular structure. After all, we cannot predict in advance
what kind of physical interactions will be discovered. All that we know, before
embarking in the project, is that the result of the investigation will be the com-
plete mapping of an entire ecosystem, where “ecosystem” refers to the concept
currently employed in ecology: the totality of biotic elements enclosed within
a spatial region, together with the abiotic components of the system. On the
other hand, the expression “molecular ecosystem” is also employed in the lit-
erature to serve a different and independent purpose, namely to accurately
represent and describe the interactions in cellular systems. To wit, when Lee
and colleagues claim that living systems are autonomously self-reproducing
“molecular ecosystems” or when Gilbert maintains that transcribed proteins
become part of “complex ecosystems,” the point is not that organisms coincide
with ecological units or portions of the biosphere. The thesis is rather that the
ecological ecosystem concept is a fruitful metaphor to characterize the cellular
environment and its characteristic interactions. In short, the molecular ecosys-
tem concept can fulfill two different roles in biological investigations. On the
one hand, it may figure as the explanandum of current (or, more likely, future)
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explanations, which aim at the individuation and modeling of entire portions
of the environment. Alternatively, the ecosystem functions as the explanans of
the systemic approach, whereby the ecological metaphor serves the purposes
of characterizing the nature of cytological interactions.
The definition of the molecular ecosystem suggested above, which ex-
plicitly distinguishes between two modes of individuation—physiognomic and
component-specific—provides the resources to resolve this ambiguity. If the
ecosystem serves as the explanandum of the systemic approach, the unit un-
der scrutiny is individuated on the basis of physical discontinuities. When this
is the case, the system may coincide with entire ecological units. Once the
modeling is complete, it will become possible to determine whether the molec-
ular modules exhibit structural analogies with ecological (or other kinds of)
systems. In contrast, when the ecosystem is the explanans of the molecular in-
vestigation, the boundaries of the system cannot be circumscribed in advance.
In such cases, it is the selection and tracking of populations of reference that de-
termines the ecosystem structure. In sum, the proposed “molecular ecosystem”
definition provides the resources for capturing and explaining the distinction
between two current uses of the ecosystem concept in molecular biology. To
avoid confusion, I suggest that we refer to the molecular study of ecological
CHAPTER 7. MOLECULAR ECOSYSTEMS 268
units as molecular eco-systems biology, while restricting the expression molecu-
lar ecosystem biology (unhyphenated) to the application of ecological concepts
to characterize molecular systems.
Next, let us focus on the community structure described above. To what
extent do the analogies between cytological and ecological communities affect
biological practice? The importance of studying molecular interactions from
an ecosystem perspective is explicitly acknowledged in the scientific litera-
ture.14 A full-fledged ecosystem approach consists in a detailed specification
of the wiring and connections of the system’s components. While determining
all the regulatory interactions in small cellular systems can be already quite
complicated, focusing on larger and more complex system introduces further
layers of complexity.15 A detailed examination of the structure of large molec-
ular systems requires a careful mapping of ecological relations onto cytological
ones. The analysis of molecular communities sketched in the previous section
purports to do precisely this: it provides an explicit account of structural rela-
14To wit, Raes and Bork (2008, 693) suggest some molecular issues that could be ap-
proached at the ecosystem level, including “estimating the relative importance of ecosystem
members in ecosystem functioning and productivity, the effect of nutrient availability on
species composition or the resilience of the ecosystem to disturbances.”.
15“In ecosystems, [connectivity] encompasses an even wider range of interactions at various
levels. These include ecological interactions between the carriers of function (organisms),
such as competition, predation, and structural interactions (such as mat formation).” (Raes
and Bork 2008, 695).
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tions at various levels. Of course, the general analysis attempted here does not
specify all of the details of the correspondence, which depend on the particu-
lar circumstances of concrete examples. The above definition only provides a
general framework that can then be applied, once the details are filled in, to
analyze the ecological structure of molecular systems.
Before moving on, an important clarification is in order. The observa-
tion that molecular networks exhibit an ecosystem-like structure is by no
means novel. For example, Chignola et al. (2006) mention instances molecular
competition between tumorous and “normal” cells. Similarly, Raes and Bork
(2008) note that processes such as mat formation and metabolic cooperations
are sometimes instantiated in cytological processes, and mathematical models
originally developed with respect to population ecology have been successfully
applied to animal cells (Bajzer et al. 1997). Yet, the present definition of the
molecular ecosystem concept provides a more systematic attempt to specify
the ecological structure of molecular systems. Once the relevant details are
plugged in, such concept can be fruitfully applied to systems biology and eco-
systems biology to bridge the conceptual and methodological gap that still
divides ecological and molecular studies.
Finally, let us focus on some potential scientific applications of our concept
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of the molecular environment. Over the past few decades, our understanding
of the relation between organisms and their environment has undergone a ma-
jor theoretical shift. While biologists traditionally conceived environmental
changes as independent of the development of organisms and the evolution
of species, in a series of seminal essays, Richard Lewontin (1978, 1983a,b)
famously argued that biological and environmental changes as really a func-
tion of each other. The impact of Lewontin’s insight has inspired a number
of new approaches in ecology, such as niche construction and ecosystem en-
gineering.16 While these theories were developed with respect to ecology and
evolution, recent research has revealed that, just as organisms construct their
own niches (beavers build dams, earthworms alter the composition of their
soil, etc.) cells and molecules also engineer their own ecosystems. Now, surely,
this molecular process of niche construction is much less documented than its
ecological analogue; however, we now have clear and convincing examples of
16In brief, niche construction is the idea that “organisms, through their metabolism, their
activities, and their choices, define, partly create, and partly destroy their own niches.”
(Odling-Smee et al. 1996, 641). In turn, “Ecosystem engineers are organisms that directly
or indirectly modulate the availability of resources (other than themselves) to other species,
by causing physical state changes in biotic or abiotic materials. In doing so, they modify,
maintain and/or create habitats.” (Jones et al. 1994, 374). The relationship between these
two—partly overlapping—theories constitutes an important question that, however, I shall
set aside. For the sake of simplicity, following Pearce (2011), I treat ecosystem engineering
as any modification to the environment caused by organisms, including the physical con-
sequences of their trophic activities. In turn, niche construction is here understood as a
particular kind of ecosystem engineering where the modification of the environment feeds
back to the engineering organisms.
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niche construction at the molecular level, such as symbiotic microbes inducing
gene expression in the host’s gut epithelia (mutually benefiting both the host
and themselves) or in the development of mammals:
“Mammalian development is a case par excellence of an organism creat-
ing a niche and having the niche modify and permit the development of
the organism. Mammalian embryos construct their niche by instructing
the uterus to alter its cell cycles and its adhesion proteins and by in-
ducing angiogenesis and a barrier to the immune system. The placenta
induces the decidua reaction in the uterus, causing the uterus to become
a habitat for the developing embryo. In so doing, the placenta instructs
the uterus to bring food vessels into the fetus. Hormones from the em-
bryo itself help construct an embryonic from the developmentally plastic
anatomy of its mother reproductive tract. The uterus reciprocally helps
induce the formation of the placentive tract.” (Gilbert and Epel 2009,
395).
This example illustrates how the kinds of molecular environment isolated
in the previous section correspond to actual developmental distinctions. The
cells and molecules constituting the mammalian placenta are embedded in a
broad external molecular environment, which is constituted by the entire sur-
rounding uterus, as well as other environmental signals. Yet, not all features of
the uterus are directly relevant for the development of the organism. The cy-
tological mechanisms employed by the embryo to construct its habitat—such
as those responsible for altering cell cycles and adhesion proteins, for inducing
angiogenesis, and triggering decidua reactions—constitute the embryo’s eco-
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logical molecular environment. If we restrict this EcME to those mechanisms
governing the growth of the embryo and the replication of its cells, we obtain its
selective molecular environment. To be sure, this tripartition of environmental
concepts is not required in order to explain mammalian development—after all,
we already have clear and precise explanations of the relevant processes (fur-
ther details can be found in Gluckman and Hanson 2005). Yet, the suggested
trichotomy provides a useful framework to distinguish the contribution of the
various components, to compare these developmental mechanisms across or-
ganisms, and to specify, more precisely, the molecular analogs of the ecological
processes of ecosystem engineering and niche construction.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter was to analyze the striking resemblance between the
cellular environment and the biosphere. In the first part, I focused on three
analogies between the ecological macrocosm and the molecular microcosm.
First, I considered the individuation of ecological and molecular systems and
distinguished two approaches, depending on whether one focuses on physical
discontinuities or on the activity of selected populations. Second, I showed that
molecular environments display several processes and interactions characteris-
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tic of ecological communities, such as competition, predation, mutualism, and
metabolic cooperation. Third, I applied Brandon’s distinction between exter-
nal, ecological, and selective environment to molecular systems. On the basis
of these considerations, I suggested a general definition of molecular ecosys-
tems. In the second part of the chapter, I discussed some applications of the
concept to actual biological practice. More specifically, our general definition
disambiguates between two uses of “ecosystem” in systems biology, it provides
a more systematic account of the community structure of molecular networks,
and sheds light on the constituents of molecular niches. Needless to say, the
relation between molecular developmental biology and ecology deserves to be
scrutinized in much greater depth and detail than I have done here. My goal
was, much more modestly, to unravel a metaphor that is central to much histor-
ical and present biological practice, but whose foundations have seldom been
investigated. The moral that we ought to draw is that the analogy between the
macrocosm and the microcosm is not only suggestive, but also accurate and,
more generally, that molecular and ecological studies can fruitfully illuminate
each other.
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